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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
In colonial and post colonial India, the question of communalism is/ 
has been a vexing question. It was/ is the communists who addressed this 
question more comprehensively than any other political formation. Precisely 
because of this, a study of the "Communist Movement and Comruinal 
Question in India, 1920-48" holds great importance. 
The present study, consisting of 6 chapters, has made an enquiry into the 
question dividing its developt^ent in various phas^a It has elaborated ipon 
how the Communist Party of India perceived Hindu-Muslim problems vis-a-
vis its role in the National movement during these years. 
The first chapter is an introduction to the study which has analysed 
and scrutinized the existing major works e.g. M.R. Masani, John H. 
Kautsky, Gautam Chattopadhyay, Bipan Chandra, B.R. Nanda, Bhagwan 
Josh and Suranjan Das. These works have not focused adequately on the 
communal question/Hindu-Muslim relations. Some of these works ue 
confined to specific regions, that too addressing only marginally on ihe 
communal question. 
The 'Introduction' of the present study therefore attempts to look into 
the relationship of the League, Congress and Communists on the one hand 
and the Communist Party's attitude towards the question of 'Pakistan', on 
the other. The famous 'Adhikari thesis' on 'National Self-determination has 
been analyzed and an attempt is made to see the changing views o ' tlie 
Communist Party on this issue. 
The second chapter, 'Establishment and Growth of Communist 
Ideology and Party' deals with the whole historical context of the foundation 
of the Communist party of India, since the world war I, from Tashker t to 
Kanpur, 1918-1925. It elaborates upon how the revolutionaries went abroad, 
their 'Hijrat movement', and how the splinter groups of revolutionaries came 
together after concretizing their ideological/tactical differences. The Kanpur 
conspiracy Case (1924) was a sort of major landmark in the ideologi(;al-
organizational emergence of the Communist party. This chapter therefore, 
devotes a whole separate section on it. It has derived much from hitherto 
untapped vernacular sources available with the NMML. Then the chapter 
concludes with the first Communist Conference of Kanpur (December 
1925). 
The third chapter, 'Communist Party in India, 1925-39' deals mairly 
with the various workers and peasant parties, which explains how tie 
communists underlined the economic basis of the class identity rather than 
any other social basis of the identities. The WPPs also addressed the 
communal question, which ahs been taken up here also. This phase is 
marked by the Meerut Conspiracy Case (1929-33), therefore, there is a 
whole sub-section on this aspect, and then it takes up the Draft Piatfor n of 
Action of CPI, 1930. From here onwards. Left sectarianism can be distinctly 
traced. Having elaborated upon the ideological, organizational progress of 
the CPI, locating the communal question, in the communist politics becomes 
convenient and explanatory as well. This chapter, therefore, produces an 
exclusive sub-section on CPI's concern with the communal question dunng 
1920s-30s. It is a well known fact to the students of Indian History that the 
decade of 1920s was most fatal in terms of the rise of communalism in India. 
G.R. Thursby and almost all text-books/reference books on the social-
political history of late colonial India deals with this aspect. But the roles/ 
attitude of the communist parties have not been dealt adequately. This :^ ap 
has been sought to be filled up in this chapter. This may be mentioned here 
that the CPI was first political formation of colonial India to have passed a 
resolution against dual membership, which prohibited its members agaiast 
joining any communal organization. For example, Hasrat Mohani and S D. 
Hasan were asked to quit the Muslim League in 1927, characterizing the 
dual association as 'splintered consciousnesses.' Same restriction was 
imposed on K.N. Joglekar for having association with Brahmin Sabha. 
During 1934-37, the CPI suffered from state repression. This aspect has oeen 
explored with the help of many archival documents not used before. Having 
found many significant archival documents pertaining to it, this sub-settion 
of the chapter looks deeply into the communist activities in different regions. 
The fourth chapter, 'Imperialist War to People's War 1939-1945' deals v^1th 
this period (1939 to 1945) witnessed the ascendancy of imperialists; it ilso 
saw a paradigm shift in CPI's assessment which characterized the World 
War-ll as 'imperialist war'. It has tried to look nto 
continuation/discontinuation of their succumbing to the anti-imperialist plan 
of the communist movement during this time to clear the wrong impression 
of their support to the British war efforts. This was also a phase when the 
Muslim League made a rapid rise after the formation of ministries (19^"'-
39). Addressing this problem became vital both for the Congress and he 
Communists, hence a detailed treatment of the subject in the chapter. 
The period between 1940 and 1948 saw the partition of the couniry 
along communal lines. This fatal decade witnessed dreaded faces of 
communalism. The fifth chapter, 'Communist Party, Muslim League and the 
Question of Pakistan', therefore, deals exclusively with the CPI's 
engagement with the League's Separatism, Pakistan Question and 
historically much debated position of the CPI on the issue. 
During this phase the CPI came out with the question of right to self-
determination for nationalities, which posed serious problems before the 
theoretical position of the CPI. Having insisted on class identity, the CPI 
was questioned for having taken this kind of position, which, prima fc<cic\ 
contradicted the economic basis of class identity. This chapter has trie i to 
explain all these aspects in detail. 
The last chapter concludes the whole work. The Communist Party's 
acknowledgement of the existence of nationalities and acceptance of ri|;ht to 
self-determination for nationalities, unleashed a process to understand the 
economic and political problems of the minorities, the problem of 
communalism and some hitherto ignored aspects of partition. The questions of 
communalism and of nationalities came to be seen as linked inextricably v\ith 
each other. 
It, therefore clarifies that on the question of Pakistan, the CPI's attitude did 
not provide any concession to any political group on the basis of aspirations 
premised exclusively on religious considerations. At the same time it was not 
averse to the provisions of safeguarding their concrete political and economic 
interests in the face of their backwardness and under- representation in power 
structure. The CPI always put primacy on the economic issues like poverty, 
which remained central to its agenda, which was in contrast with other 
contesting parties. Subsequently, in the post colonial period, the quest on of 
self-determination continued to be discussed by the party. 
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Introduction 
A study of the "Communist Movement and Communal Question n India, 
1920-48", constitute an important subject of enquiry which holds the key for 
understanding several political developments obtaining during the course of 
national movement in India. The present study is an attempt to investigate the 
communal question from 1920 to 1948 and its relevance for understanding the 
contemporary political questions like communal riots, demands of the Muslim 
League and their counterpart commimal parties and the question of 'Pakistan'. 
This is the period during which communist movement began in India and 
progressed through several crucial tests. To be specific, our aim is to assess the 
evolution of the Communist movement's approach to the communal question 
between 1920 and 1948. An attempt in this regard is made to see liow the 
Communist Party of India perceived Hindu-Muslim problems vis-a-vis its role in 
the National movement during these years. 
It is very satisfying to note the kind of attention the communist movement 
has drawn over its long history in India. M.R. Masani has tried to assess the role of 
communists in his book The Communist Party of India: A Short History^ and is 
possibly the first attempt to make a historical assessment of the Communist Party 
of India. Masani's evaluation of the rise of communist movement in India serves 
at best as one of the earliest texts on the concerned subject. This work tries to 
M.R. Masani, The Communist Party of India: A Short History, London, 1954 
argue that the Communist Party of India worked directly under the supervision of 
Communist International. He is particularly acerbic in taking stock of the 
communists' 'blunders and betrayals.' Masani's work has largely ignored the 
complex issue of communal question and Communist Party attitude towaid it. He 
writes that the communist support to the idea of Pakistan as a separate Muslim 
state meant the total dismemberment of the country and its 'Balkanization' into a 
dozen or more independent states.^  
Similarly we find that a host of writers on Indian Communist movement 
provided an extreme form of interpretation accusing the Party of having acted 
directly at the behest of either Communist International or the Communist Party of 
Great Britain, and, therefore, as the "agenf' of British imperialism during the 'Do 
or Die" struggle of the Indian people.^  So we will looks into this question in the 
light of the vast available sources. 
Next important study on the subject is by John H. Kautsky.'* Kautsky's 
purpose is to assess the role of the Soviets in formulating the strategy of the 
Communist Party of India. He tried to prove that the Indian Communists were in 
fact been doing just what they had always claimed they were doing: 'struggling to 
' Ibid, p. 84 
Madhu Limaye, 'Indian Communism: The New Phase', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 27. No 3. 
September, 1954, pp. 195-215; John H. Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A 
Study in the Postwar Evolution of International Communist Strategy, New York, 19^6; Gene D. 
Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller (ed.). Communism in India, Berkeley and Los Angeles 
University of California Press, 1959 
•* John H, Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India, New York, 1956 
bring about world socialism under the leadership of the Soviet Union.' However, 
his work starts from 1945 and looked even in the post colonial period, whic h is out 
of purview of oiu" study. This work is simply a history of Soviet Union and the 
part played by it in the formulation of policies by the Communist Party cf India. 
This work has ignored the major problem of CPl's contribution and its policy 
towards 'Pakistan resolution' that is to be investigated. 
Another important work on the theme is Communism and Bengal 1 reedom 
Movement.^ The author has conducted a series of interviews with som»5 of the 
Marxists in Bengal, including, Gopen Chakravarty, Radharaman Mitra. Satis 
Pakrasi, Pramatha Bhowmik, Atul Rose and Abdur Rezzak Khan. It provides a 
chronology of a wide variety of ideas in response to worldwide historical stimuli, 
and thus documenting underlying socio-economic and political forces within 
India, particularly the communal question. 
Despite his rigorous attempts to provide documentation, Chattopadhyay s 
work has some limitations. Perhaps the most controversial of his assertions 
concerns the founding of the Communist Party in India, which, according to him, 
was brought largely through the work of Abani Mukherjee and Nalin Gupta. 
According to Chattopadhyay, "once ...historical facts are established firmly, the 
myth of Muzaffar Ahmad being the founder of the Indian communist movement 
Gautam Chattopadhyay, Communism and Bengal Freedom Movement. Vol. I. (19n-1929). 
New Delhi, 1970 
gets blown up sky-high."^ This work has largely ignored the use of vemacular 
sources and their perceptions of the rising communist movement and communal 
question. 
Bipan Chandra and other contributors to The Indian Left: Critical 
Appraisals^ have also dealt with the Communist ideology's growth in India and its 
various facets. This is one of the most comprehensive volume on the subject. The 
Indian Communist Party has been left behind. It could never gain hole on the 
nationalist movement: it was always hovering on the edges, always goading, but 
never taking lead. This book has tried to create the impression thai essays 
communists' adherence to a paradigm based on external analysis and on the 
ideology of a foreign power leads to nowhere. The Communist Party failed to take 
advantage of the upsurge of peasant discontent at the end of the 1920s because the 
leadership in Moscow insisted upon a centralization of form and structure luisuited 
to the Indian condition and temperament. The collected essays also come down 
heavily on Communists side of the Pakistan issue. Shri Prakash's contribution m 
this volume is of considerable significance for our theme. 
The CPI was thus never able to answer the question as to why the Muslim 
League could gam any 'mass influence' at all. Once the theory of the l>eague's 
democratic character had been given up, it was replaced by the conspiratonal 
Gautam Chattopadhyay, Communism and Bengal Freedom Movement, Vol. I, (H 17-1924). 
New Delhi, 1970, p. 27 
^ Bipan Chandra (ed.), The Indian Left: Critical Appraisals, New Delhi, 1983 
intrigues of imperialism. The imperialists had granted Pakistan to keep "a British 
dominion to allow British dominion to allow British capital to have almost 
undisputed sway over the Muslim majority areas". The Punjab almost unchsputed 
sway over the Muslim majority areas". The Punjab unit of CPl in one of its 
resolutions in October 1947 argued that the communal disaster had been i shame 
on "the Punjab the land of Lala Lajpat Rai, the Punjab that gave India Iqbal", 
According to it these riots were not a "spontaneous outbursf'. Indeed, "the leader, 
inspirer and organiser of this offensive is British imperialism. It seeks tc disrupt 
our economy, so that India may continue to be dependent on Britain". Nothing 
could bring out more sharply the communists view of India in 1947. for them the 
75 year-old social process which led to the rise of a large communal intelligentsia, 
the Hindu revivalism of the rising mercantile classes in specific regions and the 
objective dependencies of the Congress liberalism on it in heu of a socially radical 
mass programme, the ideological and political channels created and political 
channels created for the spread of communalism by the British designed separate 
electorates, their support of the League as a counterweight to ( ongress 
nationalism-all his and much more remained uncomprehended. Really became 
defined by the formal logic of selected Marxist principles. Even here the Leninist 
stand-pomt of the primacy of the working class interest, the necessity for 
continually expanding one's own sphere of influence within an united front, etc., 
were missing from the CPI strategy. 
The question is not whether the communists would have prevented the 
partition of Pakistan or done away with the communal problem. The point is that 
the communists did not even build the presuppositions to correctly fight against 
them. Theu-s was not a materialist analysis of communalism based on the actual 
history of the national movement. Rather, for them the history of the national 
movement was the reflection of an idealized history frnnly rooted in their minds 
backed up by the psychological fixedness of an intense emotional loyalty The 
dialectic of their method was provided by a constant interaction between the fixed 
permanence of this idealized history and the perpetually shifting conjunctures of 
the real one. The attempt to grasp the latter was strictly conditioned by tht range 
of choices available in the first. The question was one of reducing the concrete 
form of a phenomenon to its presumed truth, and not of presuming the truth, in the 
first instance from the concrete form of the phenomenon itself. But then as Mark 
pointed out in his critique of Hegel's method the attempt to rediscover the "iogical 
idea" (here the idea of self-determination in the communal problem) in every 
object meant that "the real subjects are reduced to mere names of the idea so 
that we are left we are left with no more than the appearance of real knowledge. 
They are and remain uncomprehended because their specific nature has not been 
grasped. 
Thus according to Shri Prakash, the CPI failed to realise and propose an 
"ahemative strategy to the Gandhian" strategy of negotiations from above "to 
unite various communal organisations against the common target i.e. eviction of 
the British. They failed to expand their areas of influence among tht lower 
peasantry in minority dominated areas and thus restricted their capacity to 
penetrate into this layer of society. This failure was responsible for preoludmg 
expansion of the communist ideology at horizontal level. Shri Prakash is of the 
opinion that such a misperception on the question of Pakistan accounted largel> 
for CPI failure to address itself to this political problem.^ 
B.R. Nanda provides a brief survey of a complex interplay of personalities 
and politics that affected the growth of leftist ideas and parties. He, he wever. 
indicates that the Bolshevik Revolution failed to make a great impact on ndians 
because of the presence of the Gandhi at the helm of a nationalist movement that 
was already on the crest of a rising wave. Whereas Zafar Imam's essay (in the 
same Volume), on the other hand, points out that the Russian Revolution gave a 
significant impetus to India's freedom struggle by its call for national self-
determination. The emergence of leftist parties, trade unions and terrorist gioups 
on the wake of the Bolshevik revolt, likewise, helped the rapid transformadon of 
the Indian National Congress into a dynamic organization- a process that Diarked 
the beginning of the end of British rule and the growth of socialism. The essays in 
Socialism in India , however, do not contribute everything original or unfamiliar 
to the world of scholars. 
^ Cf. Bipan Chandra (ed.), The Indian Left: Critical Appraisals, pp. 256-57 
'^ B.R. Nanda (ed.), Socialism in India, New York, 1972, Second Impression, New Delhi. 1 9^ ] 
Another critical account on the national movement and covering left 
movement is Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920-47 in three volumes. 1 he first 
two volumes argue that the Indian Left failed to come to terms with the reality of 
India's colonial situation. To them, in colonial India the "primary contraaiction" 
was between imperialism and the Indian people and Gandhi recognised this and 
shaped the Congress into a vehicle to express this multi-class, anti-imperialist 
consciousness. He also recognized that the colonial state, as a semi-hegemofiic and 
not purely repressive state, could only be displayed through a 'counter hegt^monic 
strategy.' By contrast, the communists clung to illusions of an insurrectionary 
upsurge and, partly because of this, wrongly characterised the Congress as a 
bourgeois organisation that was halfhearted in its nationalism and that wousd seek 
to curb the militant struggles of the lower classes. 
This work is sharply critical of the political and intellectual Left. The three 
volumes are animated by the belief that victory was a matter of having the right 
"line" or paradigm. They display a complete intolerance towards all other 
viewpoints. 
Suranjan Das in his authoritative work Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-
1947 has examined the nature and factors behind communal riots in Bengal to 
understand the evolution and growth of communalism in pre-independent India. 
He has tried to understand the phenomenon as a developing proctss of 
' Bhagwan Josh, Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920-47, 3 Vols.,, New Delhi. 1992 
Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal 1905-1947, Delhi, 1991 
legitimization. He has dealt with the "launch of the Pakistan movement". He has 
dealt with this problem in the context of Muslim League and its leadership efforts 
to popularize the concept among Muslim masses of Bengal. Suranjan Das has 
briefly touched the role of the Communists by underlming the involvement of the 
Communist Party of India and labour unions, especially Calcutta Tramwa> 
Worker's Union in organising peace squads or expressing their anger over the 
19 
League's promotion of such fissiparous tendencies. 
The Communist movement in India is a product of the given historical 
conditions at home and abroad. It arose, when, in the beginning of 192()s the 
Indian proletariat drawing its inspiration from the Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
the October Socialist Revolution, entered the Indian political scene. Duiing the 
course of nearly half a century from its beginning, it has gone through a long 
process of twists and turns, ups and downs, additions and modifications. 
The Communist movement in India, since its inception, has tra^ elled a 
militant and heroic course frill of uncountable hardships and sufferings ind has 
struggled under the ban imposed by the British Government. Throughout its 
career, it has faced a series of institutional suppressions (e.g. the Pushawar 
Conspiracy Case 1921, the Kanpur Conspiracy Case 1924, the Meerut Conspiracy 
Case m 1929 and so on). All along the line, it has shown the bravest spirit of not 
fearing any brute force and daring to struggle against the most ferocious enemy. In 
'^  Ibid, pp. 181,86, 190 
its legendry fights, numerous communists have heroically laid down their lives for 
the national cause. 
Hence, a history of the Communist movement in India is important to 
ascertain the role of the Communist Party of hidia in the national liberation 
movement. It was under the influence of October Revolution, the revolutionaries 
like V. Chattopadhyaya, M. Barkatullah, M.N. Roy, Abani Mukherjee, and 
Shaukat Usmani etc. were goaded to establish communist groups throughout the 
country. Even since its coming into existence in India, they continued to assess 
and reassess the situation as a dynamic political organisation. 
One of the most overarching question was the communal question from 
1920 onward. After the withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation movement there was a 
significant rise in the communal riots during these periods. In the context, the 
Communist Party of India's role and the subsequent writings on the communal 
question merit our attention. Our attempt in the present thesis is to evaluate the 
particular position taken up by the communists on the question of communal 
problem on the basis of availability of new literature especially the appearance of 
Communist Party's documents. 
The Communists leaders were arrested in Meerut Conspiracy Case (1929-
1933) it is generally believed that the influence of the communists waned in the 
aftermath of the Meerut Conspiracy Case. But for example our study of the 
Government Intelligence Department and Home Department documents suggest 
10 
the contrary. We find that the Communist Party functioned during these years 
even after the imposition of ban on the Party. 
An important phase during the course of freedom struggle was the period of 
Second World War (1939-45), which marked a switch over in the Communist 
Party of India's assessment from an 'imperialist war' to 'people's war'. The period 
from 1939 to 1945 which witnessed the ascendancy of imperialists, also saw a 
paradigm shift in CPl's assessment and its characterization of World War as 
'imperialist war'. They advocated People's war. Other changes in the party line 
during the course of war (when they considered it a people's war) need also to be 
investigated. We will try to look for continuation/discontinuation ol their 
succumbing to the anti-imperialist plan of the communist movement during this 
time to clear the wrong impression of their support to the British war efforts. 
It is generally assumed that in the post Congress Ministry period, League's 
influence among the Muslims had increased on the basis of allegation that 
Muslims were ill-treated under the Congress Ministry as clearly documented by 
Suranjan Das, Joya Chatterji, Salil Mishra, Mushirul Hasan.. So, in this context we 
have tried to look into the relationship of the League, Congress and Communists 
on the one hand and the Communist Party's attitude towards the question of 
'Pakistan'. The famous 'Adhikari thesis' on 'National Self-determination' has 
been analyzed and an attempt is made to see the changing views of the Communist 
Party on this issue. Despite all odds, the country was divided into India and 
Pakistan as two separate identities. 
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Chapter II 
Establishment and Growth of Communist Ideology & Party 
ILL First World War and the Russian Revolution 
The First World War' started as a result of imperialist rivalries for the re-
division of world markets and territories. Its effects were seen in every sphere of 
life, specially political and economic, throughout the world. In India too ii led to 
the rise in the prices which deteriorated the condition of the workers as well as 
peasantry. The workers demand for higher wages, deamess allowances and shorter 
hours of work began to figure prominently from 1917 onwards and it brought 
spontaneous protests and strikes. The end of the year 1918 was marked by a gieat 
strike in the Bombay cotton mills, and by January 1919, 125,000 workers commg 
from practically all mills of Bombay were out of work. The strikes occurred in the 
country throughout 1919 and 1920, and nearly paralyzed the whole industrial 
organisation. At the same time, the heavy taxation deteriorated the conditions of 
the peasantry as well. 
'After the First World War, the internal situation in colonial and dependent countries also began 
to undergo rapid changes. The patriarchal and feudal way of life continued increasnigh to 
disintegrate under the onslaught of capitalism in the conditions of brutal colonial exploitation 
with the use of imperialist methods. The ftirther decay of feudal relations and the devolopment 
of capitalist ones resulted in the aggravation of contradictions of the colonial resume and 
promoted the mounting of liberator}' aspirations of oppressed peoples.' (E. Komarov. / enin and 
the National Liberation Movement in India: Historic Essays, New Delhi, 1986. p. I l l ) 
" Zafer Imam, The Rise of Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 1917-1929" in BR Naiida (cd ). 
Socialism in India, New York, 1972, Second Impression, New Delhi, 1991, p. 47 
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The Russian Revolution pitted proletarian ideology against imperialism and 
its success was celebrated as victory of the proletariat all over the world. It 
provided an alternative before every colonial country to get rid off imperialism 
The Indian Communist movement was also a post Russian Revolution 
phenomenon.^ The Communist ideologies started entering into India ihrough 
various sources."* In the words of S.A.Dange, "The First World War and the 
Russian Revolution brought the first wave of class consciousness and stiike 
struggles to the Indian factory workers in big cities and town...it began to figure 
from 1917 onwards."^ The news of the February Revolution in Russia was 
enthusiastically received in India. All sections of Indian opinion both the 
nationalist and the pro-Government, joined hands in welcoming the beginning of 
democracy in Russia.^ Even the nationalist leaders were influenced by the 
Bolshevik Revolution and they welcomed it.^  
Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.), History of the Communist Movement in India. The 
Formative Years 1920-1933, Vol. 1, New Delhi, 2005, p. 25 
•* M.R.Masani, Communist Party of India A Short History, p. 27: He writes that a stead> and 
expensive stream of literature had been flowing into India ever since Communist activit\ m the 
country started. 
S.A.Dange, On Trade Union Movement, p. 20, Cf Pankaj Kumar, Communist Mcvemeni in 
India, p. 16 
^ Zafar Imam, 'The Rise of Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 1917-1929'. p. 42 
Lala Lajpat Rai regarded Bolshevism, "the real and genuine idea which can not be d.^stro\ed ' . 
Lala Lajpat Rai, Unhappy India, Calcutta, 1928, pp. 485-86; Similarly Tilak believed that -the 
principle and practice of Bolshevism stemmed from Geeta and Shastras". (Cf Pankaj Kumar p 
7); Further Tilak in his Kesari of January29, 1918 described Lenin as an "advocate of peace "". 
13 
The formation of the Third Communist International (Comintern)*^ in March 
1919 was instrumental in organizing the Communist parties in the colonies. In 
1919, the Third International decided to support nationalist movements in the East 
'as they tend to upset the existing authority while not opposing revolutionary 
aspirations''^. The Congress which concluded on 6 March 1919 adopted a 
resolution "On the International Situation and the Policy of Entents' and a 
"Manifesto of the Communist international to the proletariat of the whole \vorld." 
And the "Thesis on Colonial and National Question" of Lenin was adopted 
at its Second Congress of the Communist International held in 1920.' Th s was m 
(Shashi Bairathi, Communism and Nationalism in India: A Study in Inter-relation ihip 1919-
79-/7, Delhi, 1987, p. 17) 
*  Communist International (1919-1943), was bom out of a vision, originating in tht dream of a 
world revolution. The visionary was Lenin, the architect of the Russian Revolution For a recent 
study on the history of Communist International see, Sobhanlal Dutta Gupta, Comii ilcrn and the 
Destiny of Communism in India 1919-1943: Dialectics of Real and Possible Hisl)rv. Kolkata. 
2006 
^ M.R.Masani, Communist Party of India A Short History. London, 1954. p. 20; Adaikan (cd). 
Documents, Vol. I, p. 105. On March 1919, held an international conference of Communist 
International, it was attended by 52 delegates from 35 organisations of 21 countries Lenin 
presented Thesis on bourgeois democracy and dictatorship of the proletariat as well as the 
guidelines of the Communist International outlining the tasks of the communist parties These 
were adopted as the basic programmatic documents of the international communist movement 
and on 4 March the Conference converted itself into the First foundation of the Co igress of the 
Communist International. 
'" Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. I, p. 195; the Second Congress of the Comintern, held m 1920 
stated that 'the nationalist movement in the Colonial and semi-colonial countries was 
objectively fundamentally a revolutionarv struggle and as such it formed a part o the struggle 
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the context of determining the most complex problem i.e. the national liVeration 
all over the world and the role of the Communists. One of the central questions 
discussed here relates to the attitude that the Communists should adopt \is-a-vis 
the anti-imperialist movements "led by the bourgeois." 
Lenin's original Draft Theses as well as Roy's Draft supplementary Thesis, 
following a substantial modification of the latter by Lenin, was examined by a 
Commission on National and Colonial Question. Both the Theses " ware later 
adopted by the Congress, following discussions and modification. 
Roy, in his Draft Theses, arrived at a position substantially diffei ent from 
Lenin's. His position, being derived from an assessment of the nature of the 
colonial bourgeoisie and the degree of preparedness of the proletariat, was at 
complete variance with that of Lenin's. Sanjay Seth argues that for Lenin the 
project in East was one of, namely, national liberation; for Roy the objects were 
multiple in the sense that, notwithstanding his acceptance of Lenin's position, for 
him, a distinction had to be made between bourgeois democratic move nents and 
for world revolution. Sir Cecil Kaye, Communism in India (ed), Mahadev I'rasad Saha. 
Calcutta, 1972, p. 1 
" Bipan Chandra (ed.). The Indian Left: Critical Appraisals, New Delhi, 1983. p. 1 
'- This has been already dealt in detail. For original draft of both the Theses see. Aihikan (ed ). 
Documents, Vol. I, pp. 151-205; also see Adhikari. 'Lenin on Roy's Supplemen an Colonial 
Theses', Marxist Miscellany, I, Delhi, Januar>-, 1970, pp. 1-30 
Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India 1919-1943: 
Dialectics of Real and Possible History, p. 66 
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mass revolutionary movements led by the Communist Party. It is now well 
known fact that Lenin agreed to substitute the expression "bourgeois democratic" 
by "national-revolutionary" in the adopted text of the Colonial Theses. ' 
Even before the people of the East, especially of India, could respond to the 
First Congress of the People of the East at Baku (September, 1920), the colonial 
authorities were busy creating an organizational network to prevent the iileas of 
the Third International from trickling down to the militant nationalists of these 
countries.'^ This is further corroborated by the scanning of the British Government 
Home Political and other secret reports that the Government maintained sti ict and 
careful watch over all correspondences of Indian leaders. This was not all and at 
the same time the Government started mischievous propaganda against the 
Bolsheviks.'^ 
At the same time the Government of India used to publish an annual report 
to Parliament on India. India in the Year 1919 of this series records that a special 
Sanjay Seth, Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics: The Case of Colonial India. New Delhi. 
1995, pp.63-64 
''' Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India: 19'9-1943: 
Dialectics of Real and Possible History, pp.66-67. Lenin introduced a distinction bet\veen two 
types of bourgeois democratic movements within the framework of nationalism: one being 
reformist, oriented towards cooperation with imperialism, the other being radical, pla>ing a 
militant role vis-a-vis imperialism. Roy's strategy of revolution in colonial countries like India 
was based on the premise that it had to bea proletarian revolution led by the Communist Part\. 
'•^  Bhagwan Josh. Communist Movement in Punjab (1926-1947), Delhi. 1979. p. 44 
'^  Muzaffar Ahmad. Communist Party of India and Years of Formation (1921-1933). Calcutta. 
1959, p. 4 (Henceforth CPI and Years of Formation) 
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staff to deal with the "dangers of Bolshevik agents and propaganda" was 
established that year. In the Indian police circles, this was known as tht (anti) 
Bolshevik Department of the CID which functioned both at the Cential and 
provincial levels. It appears that the Bolshevik Department continued to function 
as a part of the Indian police even in the last two decades or mori after 
1 S 
independence. 
Alarmed by the victory of Russian Revolution and the successes of the 
Bolshevik regime in Russia and the growing revolutionary spirit sweeping: India. 
the Anglo-Indian Press pubHshed a series of articles and editorials about the 
Bolshevik menace and the dangers inherent in the spread of Bolshevik ideis. It is 
mentioned by the Intelligence Bureau that in December 1918 the wireless stations 
of the Bolshevik Government broadcast a report of a memorandum handed to the 
Central Executive Committee of the Soviet by an "Indian delegation", in the name 
of the "Peoples of India". It called upon the Soviet for assistance and ended with 
an expression of confidence that the days of England were numbered and taat free 
Russia would stretch out a fraternal hand to oppressed Indians. Wireless message 
intercepted a year later spoke of the facts the Russian Communist Party had 
'^  Adhikari (ed). Documents, Vol. I, pp. 60-61; for details see, India in 1919: A report prepared 
for Parliament, Calcutta, 1920 by L.F. Rushbrook Williams, Officer on Special Diit\ in the 
Home Department, Government of India 
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decided "to take concrete measures to spread revolution in the East" and that the 
Third International would establish sections in oriental countries. 
In November, 1919 the Home Department of the Government of India 
issued a circular to all local governments drawing their attention to a number of 
defensive measures against Bolshevism enunciated by the Central Government. 
The measures included prohibition of Bolshevik literature, appointment cf special 
officer to collect information about Bolshevik activities outside and inside the 
country and to take suitable action to prevent Bolshevik emissaries from coming to 
India-^ *^  
The large quantities of Bolshevik notes which made their way to India were 
an ominous sign, and the administration took vigorous and successful measures to 
prohibit their circulation. The menace to India has been rendered more real by the 
opening of traffic on the Orenburg-Tashkent railway, which resultec in the 
reinforcement of Bolshevik forces in Turkistan.^' It was only in April 1920 that 
the names of some 'pro-Bolshevik' Indians were referred to in a confidential 
report. The leading Indian press also welcomed the October Revolution. 
'^  H. Williamson, India and Communism, Calcutta, 1933, p. 87. It further noted that on the 9'^ 
February 1924, Moscow turned her eyes more directly on India, and speaking through 
Chicherin, proclaimed that 'Future India must stand at the head of the free Eastern Republics" 
Sobhanlal Datta Gupta (ed.), A Documented Histon' of the Communist Movement m India. 
1917-1922: Select materials form Archives on Contemporary History. Vol. I. New Delhi. 2007. 
p. 74 
-' India in the Year 1919, L. F. Rushbrook Williams, Calcutta, 1920, pp. 6-7 
" Subodh Roy (ed.). Communism in India 1919-1924, Calcutta, 1971. p. 2 
II.2. The Revolutionaries Abroad 
The revolutionary activities undergoing outside India during the course of 
the First World War also facilitated the causes of Indian liberation movepient The 
revolutionary groups of Indians abroad were now particularly encouragt;d by the 
conflict between Germany and England on the one hand and latter's war with 
Turkey on the other. Consequently, the initiatives in the direction of o ganizing 
revolutionary terrorism from abroad became associated with such names as 
Shyamaji Krishnavarma, V.D. Savarkar, Lala Hardayal, Madam Cama and Ajit 
Singh in Europe and shortly Germany became a major centre cf Indian 
revolutionaries abroad. This ultimately crystallized in the formation of tae Berlin 
Committee in which Raja Mahendra Pratap, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya. 
Bhupendra Nath Datta, among others, played a crucial role.^'' 
These developments led to the formation of 'Provisional Government of 
India' with the help oiMuhajirs by Raja Mahendra Pratap as its president in Kabul 
on December 1, 1915.^ ^ ObaiduUah Sindhi who was a Sikh convert was engaged 
Dainik Basiimati, a daily newspaper (published from Calcutta) wrote "on 17 November 1917" 
that "the downfall of Tsardom has ushered in the age of destruction of alien burcaucrac> in 
India too"; Amht Bazar Patrika, in its editorial 'Bolshevism and Bolsheviks" characterized 
October Revolution as the 'Russian Volcano', Cf Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(edf.). History 
of the Communist Movement in India, The Formative Years J 9 20-J 933, p. 29 
Sobhanlal Datta Gupta (ed.), A Documented History of the Communist Move me it in India 
1917-1922,\oU,p. 4 
•' Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and the Communist Party of India, (henceforth Myself and CPl) 
Calcutta, 1970, p 154: In March 1915 under the influence of ObaiduUah Smdhi 15 students 
as a Professor at the Deoband College in the Saharanpur District cf United 
Provinces. There he started the Deoband Old Boys' Association, which became a 
centre of "Pan-Islamic intrigue" as mentioned by Home Department Political 
Files.^^ He was entrusted with the port-folio of the Home Ministry, Barkatullah (c. 
7 July 1854 - 20 September 1927)^ ^ was appointed as Prime Minister, Mohammad 
Shafiq (who later became secretary of the Communist Party of India formed in 
Tashkent in October 1920) as secretary of Interior Ministry. Mohammad Ali, 
Mohammad Wali Khan, Mohammad Basher and M.Pillai were allotted different 
posts under the Provisional Govemment.^^ They tried to build good relations 
between them and Soviet Union in 1916 but since Great Britain and Soviet Union 
from Lahore left for Kabul to fight Jihad against the British rule and liberate India frcmi British 
subjugation. 
*^ Home Poll. February 1918, No. 32, Cited in Sobhanlal Datta Gupta (ed.), A Documented 
History of the Communist Movement in India 1917-1922, Vol.1, p. 19 
•^  In March 1919, Barkatullah went to Soviet Russia as the Afghan representative to negotiate the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. He stayed on in Soviet Russia for several months. closeK 
involved in Pratap's activities to popularize Marxism and Socialism among Muslims n Central 
Asia. For this purpose he has written a number of articles and pamphlets, the best known 
among which was on Bolshevism and Islam. 
-^ Raja Mahendra Pratap, My Life Story, Vol. I, 1886-1941, edited by Vir Singh, Delhi, p 5 1 ( 1 ' 
Pub 1947) This Provisional Government sent several missions, issued many proclamations and 
tried to come to some kind of understanding with the Czarist, Kerensky's and Bolshevik 
Russia(p. 54); In fact Raja Mahendra Pratap was one of the earliest advocates of building up a 
strategy of establishing an Indo-Russian alliance by taking advantage of the Angle -Russian 
rivalry-, even before the revolution, (Sobhanlal Datta Gupta (ed), A Documented Histcry of the 
Communist Movement in India 1917-1922, Vol.1, p. 7); (Harkishan Singh Surject ct al.(eds ). 
History of the Communist Movement in India, The Formative Years 1920-1933. p 35) 
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were allies in the war, she could not break the alliance. But Maharaja Piatap was 
not disheartened by Russia's persistent lack of interest in his proposal. It had taken 
three years of continuous efforts of Pratap in the face of repeated refusals and 
changes in Russian political scene and polity to start a dialogue with Russian 
authorities on the means to be employed to attain Indian independence. 
In the aftermath of the October Revolution of 1917 Russia became the 
refuge of revolutionaries from all over the world who considered the new Russia 
as their hope for a brave new world of the future. The establishment of the 
Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 on Lenin's initiative with its 
avowed objective of realizing the goal of a world revolution provided fresh 
impetus to their aspirations. The Indian revolutionaries abroad, scattered m 
different countries like the United States, Germany, France as well as he north 
Western provinces of India were also no exception to it and they began flocking to 
post revolutionary Russia as representative of various streams, especially after the 
formation of Comintern was announced. Sharp political and ideological 
differences notwithstanding, they, remained united by one common aim. namely, 
the overthrow of British imperialism by adopting appropriate revolutionary 
methods of struggle which would be distinctly at variance with the reformist 
methods of freedom struggle, as popularized by the Indian National Congress 
since its inception.^^ The Provisional Government of India in Kabul became the 
Sobhanlal Dutta Gupta, "The Comintern and the Indian Revolutionaries in Russia in the 
1920s", Communist History Network Newsletter No. 13, Autumn 2002. p. 12 
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first grouping of Indian nationalists to have established contacts with the 
Bolshevik Government and the link of this important event was iorged in 
Tashkent. 
Significantly, just two months before the Second Congress of the 
Communist International, Mohammad Shafiq published a bilingual vernacular 
weekly (in Urdu and Persian) the Zamindar from Tashkent in May 1920 with an 
objective to train Indian workers in revolutionary zeal and educate them in the 
methods of the Russian Revolution. 
Meanwhile, Abdur Rab and M.P.B.T.Acharya in Kabul formed the Indian 
Revolutionary Association (IRA) towards the end of December 1919 or iit January 
1920. Later in February 1921 Rab met Lenin for the second time and at his 
request, prepared a list of books on the Indian Liberation Movement. The 
delegates of the IRA led by Rab and Acharya went to Tashkent on July 2, 1920 
from Kabul and contacted the Council for International Propaganda. And the 
branches of IRA were formed in Tashkent. Abdur Rab, Acharya and Mahendra 
Pratap attended the Second Congress of the Communist International in Leningrad 
M.A.Persists, "Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National 
Liberation Movement (1918-July 1920), in Ulyanovsky, ed.. The Comintern and the Fxist. 
Moscow, 1979, p. 77, Cf, Surendra Gopal, 'Indian Freedom-Fighters m Tashkent: 917-1922 
(Contesting ideologies: Nationalism, Pan-lslamism and Marxism), Mimeographed; See. Raja 
Mahendra Pratap, My Life Story, where he has narrated his efforts in getting Russian support 
for the cause of country's freedom. 
Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.). History of the Communist Movement in lulia. The 
Formative Years 1920-1933. p. 37 
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on July 19, 1920. During their stay in Tashkent, Rab published the Political 
Programme of Indian Revolutionary Association on August 13, 1920. It >ent nine 
delegates to attend Baku Congress in the first week of September 1920. 
II.3. Hijrat Movement 
The Hijrat^ ^ movement was an anti-imperialist mass upsurge which brought 
the common Muslim masses into the mainstream of national politics. It oiiginated 
from the Khilafat Movement. During the first World War the Prime Miaister of 
Great Britain earnestly sought help from the Indian Muslims. He therefore, made 
pledge to them in these words: "Nor we are fighting to deprive Turkey of the rich 
and renowned land of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in 
race." '^* But Lyod George did not fulfill his pledge. In April 1920 as soon as the 
news reached India, a powerful Hijrat movement broke out."*^  It was as a esult of 
the treaty of Sevres which disposed off the Turkish Khalifa (Caliph), considered as 
the spiritual head of the Islamic World.^^ Shaukat Usmani wrote that 'the wave of 
Hijrat which swept over India in 1920 took with it to lands far off not only some 
dissatisfied landless peasants and shopkeepers of the Punjab but also some 
'- Ibid, pp. 37-39 
The word Hijrat, i.e. migration, means to go away leaving one's country and friends behmd in 
order to save one self from oppression. This was the meaning written b> Muzaffar Ahmad in 
his book, CPI and Years of Formation , p. 12 
"•* The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. I, p. 139, Cf, Muzaffar Ahmad. M 'self and 
CPLp. 160 
'^  Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, p. 160 
* Haithco.x, Communism and Nationalism in India, p. 20 
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members of the intelligentsia determined to liberate India from foreign > oke/ 
He further opined that it was the religious aspect of the Khilafat Movement that 
moved the Muhajirs as a v^hole. The idea was to leave the country whcse mlers 
(British) were attacking an Islamic state and acting against the Muslim's laith, and 
to settle down in a country which was under Islamic regime. Later Usmani 
joined Communist Party of India in Tashkent in early 1921 and was subsequently 
convicted in the Cawnpore and Meerut Conspiracy Cases. 
The Indian Muslims were irked and 'Khilafat' movement developed among 
them with the aim of forcing the English to restore the power and prestige of the 
Caliph.'*° 
Afghanistan became a preferred destination for Indian Muhajirs because of 
its proximity, accessibility and the anti-British stance of its ruler AtnanuUah. 
During this period from June 1919 until the summer of 1920, the Muhajirs in 
Kabul had considerable freedom of movement."*' On its part, the Afghan 
Shaukat Usmani, Historic Trips of a Revolutionary: Sojourn in (he Soviet Union, Delhi. 1977. 
p. 3 (henceforth The Historic Trips of a Revohitionary): Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself end (PI p 
161 mentioned that the Muslim of Sind, NWFP and Punjab and other provmces too sold their 
properties and migrated. 
Harkishan Singh Suijeet et al.(eds.), History of the Communist Movement in India. The 
Formative Years 1920-1933, p. 28 
'' Ibid. 
' Cf. Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement. Religious Symbolism and Political Mob'lizaiion in 
/nJ/a, New Delhi, 1982 
•*' Khizr Humayun Ansari, The Socialist Thought Among the North Indian Muslim (I h 7-/9-/"). 
Lahore, 1990, p 24 
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government opened a reception centre for the Muhajirs at Jabal-us-Scraj. The 
estimated number of muhajuin (migrants) arriving in Kabul was t stimated 
between 18,000 to 50,000.''^ 
Some of the Muhajirs intended to go to Turkey, to obtain arms and 
ammunition, and to gain military training with the intention of returning to India to 
fight British imperialism.'*^ However, the Afghan Government realized that it was 
unable to meet the expenses of the muhajirs due to financial crunch; then the 
Afghan official started oppressing the muhajirin in a variety of ways. They were 
compelled to leave Afghanistan and nearly 3000 muhajirin returned vie Khyber 
Pass.'*'' A section of Muhajirs in Afghanistan decided otherwise; instead of coming 
back to India, they proceeded towards the Soviet Central Asia. Shaukat L smani, 
an eminent the muhajir has thrown light on the reasons prompting them lo decide 
on this course. Some of the Muhajirs including Akbar Kan Qureshi, Mian Akbar 
Shah Khattak, Gauhar Rehman, Abdul Majid, Sultan Khan, Rafiq Ahmad, Fazl 
•*" Shaukat Usmani, Historic Trips of a Revolutionary, p. 4: According to his estimate tlie number 
of Muhajirs who left India was more than 36,000 people; G. Adhikari (ed), DOCIWUH/S of the 
History of the Commiinist Party of India, Vol. II, New Delhi, 1974. p.42: the lumber of 
Muhajirs was around 18,000 
^^ Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI and Its Formation Abroad, Calcutta, 1962, p. 16, Shauka Usmani. 
Historic Trips of a Revolutionary, p. 17 
** Surendra Gopal, 'Indian Freedom-Fighters in Tashkent: 1917-1922 (Contesting ideologies; 
Nationalism, Pan-Islamism and Marxism), Mimeographed- p. 5 
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Elahi Qurban, and Ferozuddin Mansur decided to proceed to the Soviet I Jnion to 
procure arms; for the moment they kept their opinions to themselves. ' 
They submitted a joint petition to Amanullah Khan seeking permission to 
go to AnatoHa. They divided themselves into two groups in Jabal-us Siraj and 
Muhammad Akbar Khan and Muhammad Jan were elected as the leader of their 
respective group.'*^ In the words of Muzaffar Ahmad, "Afghanistan was a more 
backward country than India. It was not liked by a number of Muhajir youag men. 
They started insisting that they would go to Turkey and join the war on tht side of 
Turkey. Finally, the Afghan government gave them permission to proceed to 
Turkey."^^ 
Two hundred Muhajirs succeeded in reaching Tirmiz'^ ^by crossing Amu 
Darya to enter Soviet Russia. A large group of these people fell into the bands of 
Turkomen rebels. But here their lives were saved by the Red Army. Hence they 
fought with arms along with Red Army to defend the Kirkee fort agamst the 
counter-revolutionaries. Subsequently, some of these young men joined military 
school at Tashkent. Later on they joined the newly founded Eastern Universit\ 
which had been set up for teaching Marxism."*^ 
^ Shaukat Usmani, Historic Trips of a Revolutionary, p. 6 
"*^  Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, p. 162 
"*' Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI and Years of Formation, p. 12 
Ibid, pp. 12-13; Shaukat Usmani, Historic Trips of a Revolutionary, p. 6; Adhikari (ed). 
Documents. Vol. I, p. 27 
"""^  Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI and Years of Formation, pp. 12-13 
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When M.N.Roy^° heard of the arrival of the Muhajirs, he thought lie might 
be able to recruit some of them for the proposed liberation army and invited them 
to Tashkent to meet the group that had been rescued near Kirkee by the Red 
Army.^' 
Another batch of muhajirs which included Shaukat Usmani, Rafiq Ahmad, 
Abdul Majid, Ghaus Rehman, Fazal llahi Qurban, Ferozuddin Mansoor and Akbar 
Khan reached Tashkent in November 1920.^ ^ All of them joined CPI founded by 
Roy and attended courses of study, first at the Indian Military School established 
in Tashkent and later at the Eastern People's University, Moscow After 
completion of courses they made an attempt to come back to India. ^  Or the way 
back home many of them were arrested and tried in four consecutive Communist 
conspiracy cases which were held between 1921 and 1924 in Peshawar "^ Of the 
' Cecil Kaye noted that 'M.N. Roy played prominent part in the Communist campaign agamst 
India...He left India in April 1915 and returned in June...He went to Shanghai and thence San 
Francisco, where he arrived in June 1916...Left Mexico in 1920 and arrived in Mosc o\\ in June 
1920... he persuaded Soviet Government to provide a large quantity of arms and ammunition to 
be sent to the Indian frontiers through Afghanistan. Sir Cecil Kaye, Communism in .'ndia. (cd.). 
Mahadev Prasad Saha, Calcutta, 1971, p. 1 
John Patrick Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India, p. 20 
' ' Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol.1, p. 22 
" Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement in Punjab (J926-1947), Delhi, 1979, pp. 51-5 2 
For detail about the Peshawar Conspiracy cases see: Adhikari (ed.). Documents. Vol.11, pp. 27-
50; Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India, pp. 34-35; MuzafFar Ahmad. Myself and 
CPI, pp. 161-198; Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.). History of the Communist hhvement w 
India, The Formative Years 1920-1933, p. 51; the list of convicts are given in detail bv Shaukat 
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seven accused who were convicted in Moscow (Peshawar) Conspiracy case, Mir 
Abdul Majid, Ferozuddin Mansoor and Ghaus Rehman later on became activists in 
the Communist Movement.^^ They were booked under section 121A of the Indian 
Penal Code. Muzaffar Ahmad wrote that the Peshawar Conspiracy case was m 
reality the first Communist conspiracy case in India. 
II.4. Formation of Communist Party of India, Tashkent 
With the help and consistent efforts from both Third International as well as 
M.N.Roy along with the participation of Muhajirs that the Communist Party of 
India was founded at Tashkent in 1920. The emigre Communist Party was formed 
after a meeting held at Tashkent. It consisted of seven members: M.N.Ro>, Evelyn 
Trent-Roy, Abani Mukherji, Rosa Fitingow, Mohammad Ali, Mohammad Shafiq 
and Acharya. Shafiq was elected as secretary of the Party, Roy as secretary of 
Turk Bureau and Acharya as chairman signed the minute. The inaugural meeting 
also adopted the principles proclaimed by the Comintern, and decided to work out 
en 
a programme of the CPI suited to the conditions of India. 
Usmani, Historic Trips of a Revolutionary, pp. 32-34; Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI ami Years of 
Formation, pp. 45-54 
'^  Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement in Punjab (J 926-J947), p. 52: After the partition of India 
Ferozuddin became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of West Pakistan and Fazal 
Ilahi Qurban became member of the Communist Party of Pakistan. 
^^ Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI and Years of Formation, p. 14 
Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.), History of the Communist Movement in jndia. 'I he 
Formative Years 1920-1933, p. 47; Shaukat Usmani. Historic Trips of a Revolufionin: p 46: 
Shaukat Usmani mentions the date of formation of CPI at Tashkent as November '. 1920 It 
appears that he had used Russian calendar; M.R.Masani, Communist Party of India, pp. 21 -22: 
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Little is recorded about the activities of the party, but the minute s of the 
CPI of December 15, 1920, reveal that three persons were inducted into ihe party 
as candidate members. They were Abdul Qadir Sehrai, Masood Ali Shah and 
Akbar Shah.^ ^ A candidate member was to complete a probation period of three 
months for full membership of the party. The same meeting also elected a three-
member Executive Committee with Roy, Shafiq and Acharya. They also decided 
to register the party in Turkistan. Many of the Muhajirs joined CPI and later they 
joined the newly founded the University of the Toilers of the East in 1921 
The formation of the CPI was followed by the foundation of the Indian 
Military School in Tashkent with equipment and trainers brought by Roy. The 
formal opening and the functioning of the school began probably at the beginning 
of October 1920 after batch of 50 Muhajirs had arrived at Tashkent (which 
He writes that 'the earhest recmits, apart from a few political exiles and wandering 
intellectuals, were made by the Communists among the Muhajirin, fanatical Muslims who left 
India as an unholy land in protest against the Afghan war of 1919; John Callaghan. 'The heart 
of darkness. Rajani Palme Dutt and the British Empire - a profile'. Contemporary British 
History, 5.2, 1991, p. 262, soon after the formation of CPI at Tashkent, it appears tiat friction 
existed between the Moscow-based Roy, on the one side, and the CPGB together with the 
Berlin Committee of Indian revolutionaries under the leadership of Virendranath 
Chattopadhyaya on the other. The latter objected to Roy's foundation of a Commun si Part> of 
India (CPI) at Tashkent in 1921 with a handfiil of members and also to Roy's altra-leftist 
reading of the situation in India which imagined that the CPI itself could lead the fight for 
national independence; Sir Cecil Kaye, Communism in India, p. 3; Adhikari (ed). Documents. 
Vol. I, p. 57, mentions on the basis of Devendra Kaushik and Muzaffar Ahmad's comments 
that the initiative to form CPI at Tashkent came from Acharva of Indian Re olutionar\ 
Association which was functioning in Tashkent and other parts of Turkistan. 
'^  Adhikari (ed.). Documents. Vol.1, pp. 331-32 
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continued from October 1920 to the end of May 1921). The Indian Military School 
(Indusky Kurs) in Tashkent was originally planned to train a liberation arm\' based 
on the muhajirs who were expected to enter the Soviet Union in large numbers. In 
fact in the formal and ceremonial opening of the school, speeches were made m 
that strain: "Trained in the Tashkent Military School, Indian revolutionaries would 
carry the message of the Russian revolution to their countries, which surelv inspire 
the Indian masses to undertake heroic actions for overthrowing the British mle."' 
Then in Moscow, the Communist University of Toilers was founded on /vpril 21, 
1921. Shaukat Usmani and Rafiq Ahmad who had joined the Tashkent Military 
School later shifted to the University of the Toilers of the East.^ ^ 
Cecil Kaye noted that "Communist groups to be formed in Moscow whose 
work will be to (1) prepare a propaganda literature in all Indian language: (2) 
^' Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol.1, p. 52, reports that 26 out of 50 Muhajirs joinod Indian 
Military School. According to various accounts of the Military School in Tashkent, t lere were 
three courses: one for training air force pilots and officers, another for infantry officers and a 
third for ordinary infantry soldiers...General political education was given to all but the more 
educated were given an impressive political education course. But it fiinctioned o ih for 8 
months from October 1920 to May end 1921. There are different opinions regarding tie closing 
of the school. M.N.Roy seems to connect the closing of the school with the signing ol the trade 
agreement between Soviet Russia and Britain. Shaukat Usmani believed that '"it is ibsurd to 
think that this dissolution had anything to do with the trade negotiation between the Sov iet and 
British Governments, some writers have alleged so."'; H. Williamson, India and Commumsm, p 
3. It received a first hand report of the Communist school in Tashkent where mstruction was 
given in methods of capturing a city with the help of 1000 men. At the appointed hxir these 
communist agents will assume control and will paralyze the government of the city 
Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.). History of the Communist Movement in India. The 
Formative Years 1920-1933, p. 49 
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collect and train Indian revolutionaries and send them to India; (3) select from 
Indians now in Moscow, an emissary to India; who shall- (a) form a Conmunist 
Party in India; (b) establish liaison between the Third International , Gandhi and 
the Khilafat Party; (c) arrange for dispatch to Russia of representatives of the 
Indian working classes for instruction in revolutionary matters; (4) send a man to 
America to form a Communist Party among the Indians in California." 
Therefore, after completing the study in the Communist University, 
Muhajir recruits were sent to India through various routes in batches o ' two. ' 
Some came through the North-West frontier, others through the Pamirs. Among 
those who came through the former route, choosing their own companions were 
(a) Shaukat Usmani and Masood Ali Shah, (b) Mia Muhammad Akbar Shah and 
Gowher Rahman Khan.^ ^ But most of them were arrested soon after their entr\' 
into India. They were sent to Peshawar in June where the first conspiracy case was 
launched. Their trial was under Section I21-A of the Indian Penal Code which was 
'^ Sir Cecil Kaye, Communism in India, p. 6 
"' Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI. p.167; 21 out of 26 muhajirs who joined Militar School 
and later went to Moscow to join the Eastern People's University have been mentioned in the 
statements of the witnesses in the Peshawar Conspiracy Cases: (1) Fida Ali (Peshanar); (2) 
Abdul Qadar Sehrai (Haripur); (3) Sultan Mohammad (Lahore); (4) Mir Abdul Majid; (5) 
Habib Ahmad (Shahjahanpur, UP.); (6) Ferozuddin Mansoor (Sheikupura); (7) Rafic Ahmad 
(Bhopal); (8) Mian Akbar Shah (Nowshera Derveshi, Haripur); (9) Gour (Ghaus'.') Rahman. 
(10) Aziz Ahmad; (1) Fazl Ilahi Qurban; (12) Abdulla; (13) Mohammad Shafiq; (14) Shaukat 
Usmani; (15) Masood Ali Shah; (16) Master Abdur Hamid; (17) Abdul Rahim Mccrut 
Hazara); (18) Ghulam Mohammad; (19) Mohammad Akbar; (20) Nisar Raz; (21) Hafiz Abdul 
Majid. Adhikari (ed), Documents, Vol. I, p. 55 
L. P. Sinha, Left-Wing in India, Muzaflfarpur, 1965, p. 105 
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an offence of conspiracy to 'deprive the King-Emperor of his sovereigr ty over 
India." On May 31, 1922 the Judgment in this case was delivered. Muhammad 
Akbar Khan and Bahadur were found guilty and were sentenced to ligorous 
imprisonment for three years and one year respectively. 
U.S. Emergence of separate communist groups in India 
The journey of the early Indian Communists, in ideological terms, wis from 
nationaUsm to Marxism. M.N. Roy himself, of course, was an example of this. His 
conversion to Marxism occurred abroad, under the influence of leading figures in 
the international Communist movement; and it occurred during a period when he 
was not directly engaged in nationalist politics m India. 
The attempts to build Communist Party began at four places ir India, 
independently of each other. The first four prominent places were Calcutta, 
^ For detail see, Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, pp 173-194; Adhikari (ed), Dociimt nts. Vol 
II, New Delhi, 1974, pp 26-41; Home Political, F.N, 103, 1923, Part. I; It was reported in the 
Home Political file that "Fazl Elahi alias Kurban was a native of Lahore was sent to ndia Ho 
was arrested in Bombay on 5* April, 1927 and prosecuted in Peshawar conspirac\ cisc under 
Section 121 A of the IPC and sentenced to 5 year rigorous imprisonment" David Pctric. 
Communism in India (ed.), Mahadev Prasad Saha, Calcutta, 1972 (This book providi s one of 
the earliest and best factual pictures of the growth of Communism in India, even thougli written 
from an imperialist angle and a practical hostile intent. Its values lie in the fact th.it it was 
prepared during the very period when Communism was having its impact and taking roots in 
India.); Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI and Its Formation Abroad, pp 45-55, Rafiq Ahmad i^ ives the 
detail information about the Peshawar conspiracy cases as well as the list of those v ho were 
convicted. 
*'^  By contrast, the first Communists in India men such as Dange, Singaravelu. Ghulam Hussain. 
and Muzaffar Ahmad all began as Congressmen. Sanjay Seth, Marxist Theory and Nctionalisi 
Politics: The Case of Colonial India, p. 108 
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Bombay, Lahore and Madras. The Communist International was the source of 
inspiration for them. However, the Communist International established 
independent connections with each of these four places. 
At the Ahmedabad session of the Indian National Congress (1921), Crandhiji 
had defined 'Puma Swaraj' to mean 'Dominion Status'.^^ The embiyonic 
Communist group had widely distributed a leaflet in the name of the Communist 
Party of India, signed by M.N. Roy and Abani Mukherji. But no Communist was a 
delegate to the Ahmedabad Congress. Hence, a strident Khilafat leader, Maulana 
Hasrat Mohani, who later joined Communist Party of India, moved an amendment, 
declaring that "complete Independence, free from all foreign control" should be 
the aim of the Indian National Congress, in place of Dominion Status. Crandhiji 
vehemently opposed by calling it "irresponsible" and it was voted oui by an 
overwhelming majority.^^ 
Shripat Amrit Dange^°, an important recruit to communism from Bombay, 
public activities started with the first big mass anti-imperialist movement agamst 
the British rulers, participated actively in the Non-Cooperation movemeni led by 
•* Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, p. 78 
'^^ Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, 1922 
^^ Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. 1, Bombay, 1935. p. 228 
'' Ibid. 
"' Dange (10 October 1899 - 22 May 1991) was a prominent Judiart politician and trade unu..n!st 
who along with Muzaffar .4hmad, founded the Communist Party of India and ser\ai as ils 
chairman until 1978. For furtlier details about Dange see Mohit Sen (ed). Indian Con mumsm: 
Life and Work ofS.A. Dange, New Delhi, 1992; Dick Kooiman. 'Bombav Communist ^ and the 
1924 Textile Strike", Economic and Po/itical Weekly, July 19.. 1980. pp 1223-1236 
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by Gandhiji in 19207' But soon he became critique of Gandhi's ideology and 
method of struggle. He was profoundly influenced by the Russian revolution and 
Lenin's thought^^ He began his search for new paths of struggle and became 
interested in Marxism and wrote a book Gandhi vs. Lenin in 1921. It was a 
comparative study of approaches of both the leaders; but, Lenin coming out as 
better of the two. Dange criticized Gandhi for his excessive emphasis on religious 
and moral considerations and reliance on the goodwill of individuals to effect 
change. He came to believe that only a revolution involving the solidarit/ of the 
workers, peasants, and army could bring down foreign rule and with it, 
capitalism. '^* Muzaffar Ahmad rightly observed that in those days it lequired 
^^  After leaving College, Dange was attracted by socialist thought; his mind carried the great 
impression of the Russian Revolution and Lenin. His open preaching of socialism <. ombmed 
with active interest in working-class struggles was too much for British imperialisn. Dange 
was arrested in connection with what is known as Kanpur Bolshevik Conspiracy Case. (New 
Age (Political Monthly of Communist Party), Vol. 8, No. 10, October 1959. pp. 14-15) 
'" Adhikari (ed). Documents, Vol. I, p. 277; after his rustication from the Wilson College. Dange 
joined the Non-Cooperation Movement. When this movement failed, Dange cind his associate 
formed a 'Radical Group' within the Bombay Provincial Committee... (Muzaffar Ahmad. 
Myself and CPI,^. 107) 
" Ibid; Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, p. 107, 114; It is Dange's book that brought 
Ranchoddas Bhavan Lotvala in contact with Dange. Later Lotvala fixed a monthK allowance 
for Dange and allowed him to use his library for fiirther study on Marxism; Mohit Sen (ed). 
Indian Communism: Life and Work ofS.A. Dange, p. 2 
The book reflects Dange's imperfect understanding of the Marxist stand on violence, vhich he 
considers as the only method of struggle in Communism. For detail description about Dange s 
book see Sanjay Seth, Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics: The Case of Colonial india. pp. 
109-114; Adhikari (ed). Documents, Vol. I, pp. 281-310; Muzaffar Ahmad, My self, md CPI. 
pp. 107-112 
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considerable courage to write such a book. It clearly shows that Dange had 
turned towards Marxism-Leninism. His Gandhi vs. Lenin attracted the attention of 
the Communist International also. 
With Lotvala's help, Dange bought the English weekly. Socialist, ^ ^ the first 
Indian Communist journal, in August 1922. Keshava Nilkantha Jogkkar and 
Chaitaliya joined Dange to work with him. Subsequently, R.S. Nimbkar, S.V. 
Ghate, and S.S. Mirajkar also joined him. 
The Bombay Chronicle, in June 1922, reviewed Gandhi vs. Lewi, which 
prompted Cecil Kaye to write down Dange's name in his note book In 
'^ Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI: Year of Formation. J 92]-J 933, p. 10. 
*^ Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, pp. 107-8 
" It was English weekly which continued to appear till the end of December 1922 af er which it 
became monthly. It continued to appear as a monthly upto his arrest in the "Kanpu Bolshevik 
Conspiracy Case" in February 1924. Thereafter a few issues of the paper appearec in 1924 in 
the weekly form edited by K.N. Joglekar then it stopped. (Adhikari (ed.), Documents. Vol. 1. p 
505. For detail also see pp. 505-517) 
Ibid, pp. 116-17; No journal under this name {Socialist) had ever been brought out i i India ever 
before. (Muzaffar Ahmad, CPL Year of Formation, 1921-1933, p. 10): its pages attested that 
Dange's had embraced Marxism, and was influenced by Roy's analysis of the relation between 
class and national independence. In its September issue, it was first proposed that a Marxist 
party be established in India- the Indian Socialist Labour Party of the INC. The object of the 
party was to be 'the establishment of the people's state in which land and capital arc owned 
communally and the process of production, distribution and exchange is a so*, lal function 
democratically controlled', an aim to be achieved by 'the organisation of the workers political K 
to capture the power of the state and industrially to take over the control and management of 
the industrial machine". (Sanjay Seth, Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics: The Cose of 
Colonial India, p. 115); Adhikari (ed), Documents, Vol, I, p. 505 
' ' Ibid,, p. XI 
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September 1922, Dange and M.N.Roy came into contact with each othei. Roy 
congratulated Dange on the appearance of Socialist and sent his articles ibr the 
paper. Dange also requested Roy to send propaganda material. In October 1922, a 
communist emissary Ashleigh visited Bombay and handed over to Dan^ e secret 
papers from Roy. Muzaffar Ahmad vmtes that Ashleigh gave him passage money 
to participate in a conference in Europe. Roy wrote a letter to C'ange in 
December 1922, informing the address that he was going to hold a conference in 
Berlin, where the programme and organisation of a revolutionary parly of the 
working classes, and the control of the Trade Union Congress, vould be 
discussed. About this time Roy, in an article entitled 'Labour Party' wrote that the 
workers and peasants of India must be organised into a revolutionary party.^' But 
Dange declined to accept his invitation. His outlook is evident from his 
correspondence with Singaravellu, his writings published in the Social/si as also 
his statement in the Kanpur Case. 
Malaypuram Singaravelu Chettiar (18 February 1860-11 February 1946) a 
lawyer based in Madras proclaimed himself a Communist in 1922.^ ^ Hi.^  is one of 
the important figures in building of the Party in Madras. He gave up h s practice 
"' Ibid., p. 359 
*•' A.R.Desai and Sunil Dighe, Labour Movement in India 1923-1927: Documents. Vcl. IV. Delhi. 
2004,p. 145 
" Cf. K. Murugesan and C.S. Subramanyam, Singaraveln-First Communist in SoutI India. \c\\ 
Delhi. 1975 
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83 during the Non-Cooperation Movement. He joined labour movement in 19 !2. He 
attended the Gaya Session of the Indian National Congress in 1922 and moved the 
resolution on National Independence. '^* He expressed his faith in nor-violent 
methods and advocated Marxism from the Congress platform. He said, (omrade 
in this hall, fellow workers, peasants of Hindustan, I have come to speak on your 
behalf as a representative of the interests represented by the great order of the 
Communists. I have come to tell you the great message which communism offers 
to the workers' 
Singaravelu had read M N Roy's India in Transition. The book had impressed 
him. And he wrote a letter to Roy admiring the book and expressed his desire to 
translate the book into Tamil language.^*' Roy also wrote letters to Chettmr askmg 
him to select delegates for a Communist conference in Berlin and attend it himself 
if possible.^^ 
'^^  Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPU p. 120; Muzaffar Ahmad, CPl: Year of Formation. V>21-
79i i ,p . l l . 
•^' Muzaffar Ahmad, CPl: Year of Formation, 1921-19 S3, p 11. 
*' Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Session of the Indian National Congress (Ga\a) 
1922, pp. 16-17, Cf Shashi Bairathi, Communism and Nationalism in India, p.47 
^^ Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPl, p. 120: Later he was expelled from Communist Party on a 
proved charge of dishonesty. 
" Sir Cecil Kaye, Communism in India, pp. 40-41, also document cited in Kanpiir Bolshevik 
Conspiracy Case, Home Poll. F. No. 278. p. 24, Cf Shashi Bairathi, C ommunism and 
Nationalism in India, p. 47. In Cawnpore Conspiracy Cases man\ letters were presented before 
court written by MN Roy to Chettiar and vice-versa. 
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In the formation of the Communist Party of India at Tashkent by MN Ro>, 
there were persons from Punjab also. They were arrested and prosecuted in the 
Tashkent conspiracy case in 1921-22 and in the Moscow conspiracy case in 
1922-23. However, even independently of these persons (Communists), a 
separate link with the Punjab was established.^^ The communist movement m 
Punjab was started by Shams-ud-Din and Ghulam Hussain. They started 
publishing an Urdu newspaper called Inquilab (Revolution) to disseminate 
Marxism. Ghulam Hussain accepted Marxism-Leninism and agreed to proceed 
along the path charted out by the Communist International in conformity with 
Indian conditions. ^'^ 
Ghulam Hussain tried to form an All-India Communist organisaiion and 
issued a circular from Inquilab office in May, 1923 to hold a confeience on 
June, 1923 at Lucknow.^ *^ The circular was sent to all important Communist 
leaders in India. But the programme the programme could not materialize as 
they were arrested before the convening of the conference. 
Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, p. 118. Ghulam Hussain taught Economics in Edwards 
Church Mission College in Peshawar. 
' Ibid, In Lahore he joined the North-Westem Railway Workers Union and subsequent y became 
its secretary. He was also in contact with Dewan Chaman Lai. According to Muzaflar Ahmad 
Ghulam Hussain became communist after his visit to Kabul. In Kabul he met Mohammad Ali. 
who came from Tashkent after the formation of CPI there. The> had a lot of disc jssion tor 
several days 
' Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. II, pp. 138-40 
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Muzaffar Ahmad'^ ' was the moving spirit behind the formation of 
Communist nucleus in Bengal.''^ He himself wrote that 'while editing Kavyii^ 
(New Agej I became interested to some extent in the problem of workers'. 
He started reading Marxist literature which he had bought and gradual!/ turned 
towards Communism. It was lack of adequate finance and non-availability of 
Marxist literature which made him to work hard. After disbandment of 49'' 
Bengali Regiment in 1920, Qazi Nazrul Islam entered into politics in addition 
to poetry and literature, '^* Nazrul was involved in formation of the Communist 
Party. He, however, did not join the party, though he became one of the 




He was bom (1889-1973) at Sandwip (Noakhali District, E. Bengal) 
He belonged to the poor peasant family and was influenced by the workers strikes ;ind popular 
movement going on in Bengal at that time; according to British intelligence eport. the 
Calcutta group was started by Muzaffar Ahmad a journalist. Nalini Gupta had introduced 
Muzaffar Ahmad to the Communist International at the beginning of 1922 From tiicn onward 
he began to correspond directly with Roy. (Khizr Humayun Ansari, The Emergence of Socialist 
Thought Among North Indian Muslim (1917-1947), pp. 62-63) 
'^  Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPl, pp. 79, 81. He purchased Marxist literature in us desire to 
study about labour movement in general. In November 1921 he bought (1) a booklet of an 
article by Lenin, Can the Bolshevik Retain State Power? (2) Lenin's Left-Wing Coinmumsm-An 
Infantile Disorder; (3) People's Marx: Abridged Popular edition of Capital, edited b> Julian 
Borchardt, Translated in English by Stephen L. Trask. 
'•* Ibid, p. 77; Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI: Year of Formation. 1921-1933. p.5. Qazi >.azrul was a 
Havildar in the 49* Bengali Regiment. He was influenced by the Russian Revoluti( n 
^^Ibid. 
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In the United Provinces, the Communist activity was started by Shaukat 
Usmani, who was trained by Roy in Tashkent and was sent to India for this 
purpose. After his return to India, Shaukat Usmani got into touch with the 
various Communist groups at the important centres like Bombay, Calcutta, 
Madras and Lahore. He actively engaged himself in organising a Communist 
centre at Banaras. 
Thus we can safely say that most of the Communist groups in India had 
originated independent of each other. But for long they could not become 
strong enough and existed as illegal bodies. There was no central committee or 
organisation of the Communists till December 1925. The Ccmmumst 
International played an important role in forging individual relationship with 
the Communists and provided continuously an idea of forming party 311 an all-
India level. 
II.6 Kanpur Conspiracy Case 
The British Government had got disproportionately alarmed at the foundation of 
the Communist Party of India under the leadership of M.N.Roy. Though its 
membership was not large but the British government was apprehensive about 
C.P.I's role in the fast changing political scenario of the country.'^ '^  The stinings of 
communist ideology were reflected in the dehberation of the Indian National 
Congress. The British Government seemingly scared of the impact of communist's 
Cf. Arindam Sen and Partha Ghosh, eds., Commimist Movement in India Historical 
Perspective and important Documents 1917-1939. Vol.1, Patna. 1991. pp. 61-63 
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ideas on the members of the Indian National Congress. Alarmed by the acvocacy 
of radical ideas from the nationalist fora, the government filed a case of ti eason 
and conspiracy to overthrow the legally constituted authority against the 
Communists in 1924. This case became famous as Cawnpore (now speh <anpur) 
Conspiracy Case.^ ^ Communist trials had taken place in India, in frontier towns 
like Peshawar where Russian trained muhajir Communists were put on trial. But 
no case had attracted public gaze like the Kanpur case. Pages of newspapers daily 
splashed sensational communist plans and people for the first time learnt d such a 
large scale about communism and its doctrines and the aims of the Ccmmunist 
International in India. 
The continuously increasing popularity of communism and lenorism. 
particularly among youth alarmed the British government so much so that it 
launched a round of repression. On 17* March 1924 the Kanpur Conspi acy Case 
was started in the court of Joint Magistrate of Kanpur. Initially eight persons were 
H. Williamson, India and Communism, pp. 88-89. It has been mentioned m this book that 
communism was taking its root in India slowly due its feudal spirit and hereditar\ p inciplcs arc 
ingrained in India. By 1924 its (Bolshevik) menace to India's peace and prosperity had become 
sufficiently serious to necessitate the first important Communist Conspiracx case, and m 
February of that year a formal plaint was lodged at Cawnpore agamst a selection of eight 
(including the absent Roy) of 168 Indian Communists whose names the "brief of the case 
contained, the charges being that of conspiring to deprive the King-Emperor of tht sovcreignt\ 
of British India. For detail see Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPL pp. 327-406: Sobhanlal Datta 
Gupta (ed.), A Documented History of the Communist Movement in India 1923-!'>25: Select 
materials from Archives on Contemporary History, Vol. II, New Delhi. 2007. op. .'^ 44-.>Xl. 
Muzaffar Ahmad, CPl: Year of Formation. J92J-J933, pp. 15-19; Adhikari (ed.) Doamienis. 
Vol. II, pp. 452-84 
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framed as Bolshevik agents and were charged with planning to overthrow the 
British Empire and thus violate the section 121A of Indian Panel Code "^^ The 
accused were named in the court as follows: Maula Baksh'alias Shaukat lismani, 
Muzaffar Ahmad, Nalini Bhusan Das Gupta, S.A.Dange, Ghulam Hussain. 
M.N.Roy, Singaravelu Chettiar and Ram Charan Lai Sharma. Out of them, only 
Usmani was present in the court. The case could be launched only against the four 
of the accused, because R.C.L. Sharma not being under the British JuDsdiction 
(for he had taken shelter in Pondicherry) could not be brought into the court for 
the trial. M.N.Roy was in Europe, so he also could not be produced, Singaravelu 
was on bail against a sum of Rs. Fifty thousands.^^ 
This conspiracy case was filed on the basis of intercepted letters v ntten by 
Berlin-based M.N.Roy to different persons in India. Ross Alston, an advocate 
from Allahabad represented the government in the trial. The accused had not hired 
a defence counsel. They were charged of violating the provisions of Section 121A 
of IPC. The main charges of the case filed before the magistrate read as follows: 
"They wanted to remove the rule of the British Emperor from India by 
opening the branches of Communist International in India." 
It has also been said that "their objective was to use fair or unfair means: 
(they) had also decided to get control over the India National Congress. They were 
'^ ^ Calcutta Samachar, 18 March 1924, Vol, 9, No. 13, p. 3. (Micro-film, availabli in NMML) 
This paper was also known as a Hindu Sansar, later on. 
'^Ahhyudaya, 5 April 1924, Vol. 18, No. 13, p. 1 
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getting support from the revolutionary organization of Russia. In this regard (they) 
have communication with many cities. Kanpur is also one of the importan places. 
To achieve their target they had propagated banned revolutionary literature, 
newspapers and books. Col. Cecil Kaye in his statement said that "Indian 
revolutionaries from different part of Europe gathered at Moscow in 1920 with the 
intention to propagate Bolshevism in India. M.N.Roy was the moving spirif \ 
In the court, one significant document presented was the letter of the 
Executive committee of the Third International, addressed to the workers, and 
Bolshevik activists in India.''**^  Letter started with the endorsement and sympathy 
of the activities of Indian counterparts. "All the revolutionaries of the world 
appreciated the historic task of Indian peasants and political activists. A 
revolutionary programme was prescribed for them. They were urged to. 
1. establish a democratic republic, 
2. have no relations with imperial government any more 
3. abolish Zamindari system, 
4. nationalize railways, aero planes and other means of public prope ty. 
5. have eight hours working day. 
"" Ibid, p. 5; A 'Bolshevik Conspiracy Trial of 8 Indians' a collection of court piocecdings at 
Kanpur trial published regularly in those days by the Bombay office of the "Tinus of India '. 
The file is available in the National Archive of India, New Delhi, India. But we fmd cvcr\da\ 
reporting of the trials in the vernacular press and the reactions of the nationalists. 
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6. Establish workers' association in factories and peasant organisation n 
villages.'°' 
Besides, they were also advised to organize strikes by workers and not to 
pay new taxes and protect their rights.'^^ This according to them would stiengthen 
their organization. At the end they cried "Long live India's National and Social 
independence/ Down with British imperialism/ Long live International Democratic 
Institution."' ^ 
Cecil Kaye (Director of the Intelligence Bureau of the Government of 
India) proves that, about the end of the year 1921, information was laid bt fore him 
of the alleged existence of a conspiracy to overthrow by force the existing 
Government in India, or, in the world of the section "to deprive His Majesty the 
King Emperor of the Sovereignty of British India."'°^ The first arrests of the 
Communists, who were later figure in the Kanpur Conspiracy Case, began as early 
as in May 1923, just at the time when the main Peshawar Conspiracy oase were 
concluding. These arrests were in fact a continuation of the campaig i of anti-
communist repression started by the Peshawar cases. "^ ^ 
"" BandeMataram (Urdu), 21 March 1924,, Vol.67; Pratap, 31 March 1924, Vol. 11. No.21. p.7: 
Abhyndaya. 5 April 1924, Vol. 18, No. 13, p.5 
'"-Abhyudaya, 5 April 1924, Vol. 18, No. 13, p.5 
"" Ibid 
Sobhanlal Datta Gupta (ed.), A Documented History of the Communist Movement in India 
1923-1925, Vol. II, p. 545 
"'• Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol.11, New Delhi, 1974, p. 273; For detail about t ic Peshawar 
Conspiracy Cases see, Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, pp. 152-198 
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()(, Meanwhile, the Government withdrew the case against Ghulam Hussain 
Eventually the case was pushed against the remaining four persons, namely 
Shaukat Usmani, Muzaffar Ahmad, Nalini Gupta and S.A.Dange.'"^ Charges were 
framed against each of them, individually. 
Shaukat Usmani was charged as being a Bolshevik agent and having 
connection with Berhn-based M.N.Roy and his communist party. He was 
convicted under section 121A of IPC. A number of evidences were presented from 
the government side on 29 April, 1924, reported the Tej, (an Urdu daily). They 
were mainly from the intelligence department who had intercepted letters written 
by M.N.Roy to the accused on 3 May 1924. Shaukat Usmani repeated before the 
court, as he had done at the initial stage of the case, that "he was a student' , and 
was not a member of any such conspiracy which aimed at overthrowing the British 
Empire or had any relation with M.N.Roy and his communist party with the 
''"^ Abhyiidaya, 5 April 1924, Vol. 18, No. 13, p.5 
"" Ibid; we see that Muzaffar Ahmad, Shaukat Usmani and Nalini Bhusan Das Gr pta wrote a 
plea letter to the District Magistrate of Kanpur, requesting to transfer their jail rom United 
Provinces to the New Central Jail, as they objected that the climate of this province was not 
suited to their health. Home Poll. F. No. 421/1924 
'"* Regarding M N Roy's letters to Shaukat Usmani, See Sukhbir Choudhar\. Feasants and 
Workers'Movement in India 1905-1929, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 154-57 
"" Tej, 7 May 1924, Vol.2, No. 105. The file of this paper is missmg from March tc April 1924. 
(Nehru Memorial Museum Library, New Delhi) 
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intention of fuelling revolution amongst workers and peasants, "nor 1 have any 
opinion like this". 
H.E.Holmes gave a judgment sentencing Usmani to four years rigorous 
imprisonment. He was sent to Bareilly jail.'" Pratap, a Hindi weekly, repcrts "we 
got confidential news that Usmani had not taken food for the last 26 days in 
protest against the brutalities of jail administration. Milk was given to him 
forcefully through rubber pipes on 27**' day, when Nawab Mahboob Ali visited jail 
and saw Usmani he assured the latter that there will be no injustice agamst him, 
only then Usmani was persuaded to terminate his hmiger strike. "We also got 
news", the Pratap reported "that the treatment meted out to these well educated 
gentlemen is not good. This was mainly because they are Indian not British '."^ 
The Tej reports that during the course of hearing of the case, the 
government advocate observed, "If Usmani is not punished then 1 do xoX know 
who is to be punished? He is not only a conspirator but he is proud cT being a 
member of conspiracy"."^ Defence counsel Mani Lai asserted that the letter found 
at the time of arrest were not proved to be written by Usmani.' '^  
"" Pratap, 31 March 1924, Vol.11, No.21, p.l; Abhyudaya, 5 Apnl 1924, Vol. 18 No. 13. p v 
Tej\ 5 May 1924, Vol.2, No. 103, p.3 
'" Pratap, 29 September 1924, Vol.11, No.46, p.6 
"'Ibid.,p.4 
' " TeJ, 1 IMay 1924, Vol.2, No. 108, p.7 
"^Ibid, 12 May, No. 109, p.3 
46 
Muzaffar Ahmad was arrested on May 1923 few days after Usmani', an est, 
in Calcutta. On March 17, 1924 a charge sheet was filed against him in tlie court 
of Joint Magistrate of Kanpur on similar charges^'^ An envelope containing two 
letters purported to have been written by M.N.Roy, one to T N Roy and ttie other 
to Muzaffar Ahmad, were produced in the court by intelligence department.'"' 
Charges levelled were the same. Muzaffar reply to this charge sheet was, 'I will 
give my statement in session court".'"' A numbers of witnesses were produced 
before the court mostly from the intelligence department."^ 
Muzaffar Ahmad neither denied his involvement in the conspirac;/ nor did 
he admit any relations with M.N.Roy and his communist party and asserte d that he 
had no intention of bringing revolution through workers and peasants.' He also 
said that he was a journalist by profession.'^^ Like Shaukat Usmani, he was also 
awarded four years rigorous imprisonment and was sent to Gonda Jail ' The 
same paper reports that Muzaffar Ahmad was imprisoned in Rai Bareilly Jail '^' 
Third accused, Nalini Bhusan Das Gupta, was arrested on 20 Decembei 
1923 in Calcutta. He made a detailed statement on 21 December 19^3 and on 
'^-Pratap,3l March 1924, Vol.11, No.21, p.7; also see,//owe Po//. / : No.2I 1 1924 
' " Tej, 3May 1924, Vol.2, No. 103, p.3 
^^'^Pratap, 31 March 1924, Vol.11, No,21, p.7 
' " Tej, 3May 1924, Vol.2, No. 103, p,3. 
' " Ibid, 7 May 1924, Vol.2, No. 105, p.6 
'-" Ibid; Ztdqarnain, 1 May 1924, Vol. 22, No. 18, p. 3 
'-' Pratap, 14 July, 1924, Vol.11, No.36. 
' " Ibid, 29 September 1924, Vol.11, No.47, p. 4. 
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subsequent eight days that speeded up the judgment.'^^ By now the govtmment 
had collected a vast mass material from many sources." '^* He was also accused of 
planning to overthrow the British rule.'^^ The Calcutta Samachar, a Hind reports 
"on 29 April Nalini and Dange were produced in the session under section 121A 
of IPC regarding Kanpur Bolshevik Conspiracy Case. The case will start today" \ 
Nalini Gupta contested the charges levelled against him. He said. '1 have 
neither conspired to deny the sovereignty of British Emperor in India nor nave any 
idea to do so".'^'' He also said that he was an engineer and his age ranged between 
22 and 23 years.'^^ 
The Pratap published an interview (entitled "Char") with fall the four 
accused. Some excerpts from Nalini's interview are as follows". Nalini himself 
asked to the reporter. "Do you know who Nalini is? He is a well reputed engineer, 
lived eleven years in Europe Lloyd George has awarded him a good certificate for 
rendering services during wartime".^^^ Reporter asked, "How long vill it last, 
that's fact?" RepUed Nalini, "we will die, if it comes to, that ". Reporter said, "I 
won't let you pray live, if not for your sake, for the sake of us the do nothing 
'-^  Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. II, p. 275 
'-•* Ibid, pp. 275-76; also see Home Poll. F. No.2h 1/1924 
'-' Bande Mataram, 25 April 1924, Vol.95, p.5; for detail also see. Home Poll. F.ho 21 I !924: 
Home Department, Political, 1925, File. No. 272 
'-" Calcutta Samachar, 8 April 1924, Vol. 9, No. 46, p. 2 
'-^Pratap, 31 March, 1924, Vol.11, No.21, p. 1. 
" ' Tej\ 1 May 1924, Vol.2, No. 105, p.6. 
129 Pratap. 14 July 1924, Vol. II, No. 36, p. 2. 
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ones".'- '^^  Like others Nalini was also awarded four year rigorous imprisonment 
1 -11 
and sent to Gorakhpur Jail. 
The editor of the Socialist, S.A.Dange from Bombay, was also an accused 
in the Kanpur Conspiracy Case. In the district magistrate's court of Kanpur. he 
was accused of being a Bolshevik agent who conspired to overthrow the 
sovereignty of British Emperor in India.*''^  He was convicted under section 121A 
of IPC.'" 
In the court he pleaded, "I am having correspondence with M.N. loy. But 
when 1 knew that his ambition was to overthrow the British rule from India, then 1 
switched of relations. I have published all those letters in Maratha Pape s in July 
1923. I am a supporter of communism. English and indigenous traders and 
businessman intend to keep the poor of the country depressed by virtue of their 
wealth. To eradicate this evil I think it necessary to propagate communism. '^ ^ 
Dange said in his defence that he was journalist.'''^ He denied any role in 
any conspiracy to overthrow British regime.'^^ He was also given four year 
rigorous imprisonment like others and sent to Sitapur Jail from Kanpur Jiil.' '^  
"" Ibid 
132 
Ibid, 29 September 1924, Vol. II, No. 47, p. 4 






Pratap, 31 March 1924, Vol.11, No,21, p.l 
Tej^ 7 May 1924, Vol.2, No. 105, p.6 
'* Ibid.; Zulqarnain. 14 May 1924, Vol. 22, No. 11, p. 3 
Pratap. 29 September, 1924, Vol. II, No. 47, p. 3. 
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1 ^X 
The Matwala, a Hindi daily from Calcutta reported that "fifth convict M 
Singarvellu Chettiar's case will start from first July. Does it still remain to end'^'' 
W.Chriti, the joint magistrate of Kanpur filed a petition against eight persons who 
were accused of being Bolshevik agents. Singaravelu was one of the accused. But 
he was released on bail of Rs. Fifty thousand,'^^ and for consideration of poor 
health.'"^^ But his letter was produced by Col. Kaye before the court. It expressed 
hope that since Congress was nearly dead after the postponement ol Bardoli 
Satyagraha Gandhi, "now only peasants and workers will succeed. But it requires 
financial support. We should wait till this government accepts the Russian 
government. After that we will ponder whom to send".^ '*' 
A letter addressed to C.R.Das by M.N.Roy was also intercepted by the 
intelligence department. Yogendra Kumar Sen, Assistant Sub-Inspector identified 
the photocopy of the letter. ^ '^ ^ C.R.Das out rightly refiited the charge. Ht said that 
he never received any letter from M.N.Roy.'"^ 
It is interesting to note that at the level of the joint magisttate's court, all 
four accused remained undefended. Whereas in the session court Pandit Kapil Dev 
'^ ^ Matwala, 28 July 1924, Year 1, No. 44, p.851; this weekly had hostile attitude towards the 
persons accused in Kanpur Conspiracy Case. Therefore, it reported the case in brief 
^•'^ Pratap, 29 September, 1924, Vol. II, No. 47, p. 7\Abhyudaya. 5 April 1924. Vo IH. No.i.v 
p.l; Calcutta Samachar, 8 April 1924, Vol, 9, No. 46, p. 2 




June 1998, p. 10 
rej\ 7 May 1924, Vol.2, No.l05, p.6; Zidqarmin, 14 May 1924, Vol. 22. No. 11, p. 3 
Calcutta Samachar, 30 March 1924, Vol. 9, No. 40, p. 2 
Pratap. 31 March 1924, Vol.11, No.21, p.l 
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Malviya defended S. A.Dange and Nalini Gupta and Muzaffar Ahmad and Shaukat 
Usmani were defended by Dr. Mani Lai. 
The Tej reported on 29* April that dozens of witness were produced before 
the court from the side of government, who had intercepted letters written to the 
accused. The proceedings of this case are also interesting. Malviya asked the 
witness Rai Karan Bihari Mukherji, inspector, intelligence department, 'was this 
only method of correspondence?" '^*^ Inspector replied, "I do not know but one 
thing I knew this is a method of communist correspondence". Dr. Malviy i argued. 
"There is no evidence to prove that there is an International Organisation in 
Europe. It was based on a letter written by Lord Curzon to Soviet government. But 
that letter is not presented in the court. No proof has been put about Roys 
leadership. Nor it has been proved that leaders, Roy and Dange or Roy a id Nalmi, 
had achieved a consensus on a conspiracy".''*^ 
Karan Bihari, an accountant in the New India Life Insurance Company. 
Bombay, was produced before the court as a witness against Nalini Gupia He was 
an old friend of the accused. Dr. Malviya wanted to know from him, 'Did you 
ever suspect that he was trying to revolt against the crown?" He replied in 
'^ Pratap. 28 Apnl 1924, Vol.1 U No.21, p.7, 
" ' Tej, 3 May 1924, Vol.2, No. 103, p.3 
'"**' Ibid., 11 May 1924, Vol.2, No, 108, p.7 
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negative. He told, "I was never suspicious about him and his connection with Roy 
or Bolshevik government of Europe". 
Dr. Mani Lai in the course of his defence deah with the contents of the 
Bolshevik literature alleged to have been received by the accused. He argued 
vehemently that there was no harm in holding communist views....According to 
him a communism was nothing but an attempt to bridge the wide gulf that exists 
between the capitalists and the labourers in matters of wealth and power, i t is not 
his majesty who is opening shops in India, running factories in Kanpur or Bombay 
or coming of administer the civil services".''*^ 
The Pratap reported that three assessors were appointed namely Shive 
Prasad, Ayodhya Nath and Krishna Dutt.'^^ Shiva Prasad held Muzaffar Ahmad 
and Usmani guilty.^ ^^ While Ayodhya Nath thought that only Usmani v a^s guilt> 
and Krishna Dutta considered all the four innocent.'^^ 
'^' Ibid., 1 May 1924, Vol.2, No, 102, p.3 
'*^  Adhikari (ed,), Documents, Vol. II, pp. 313-315, has produced the details of Dr Mam Lais 
defence speech. 
'* BandeMatamm, 15 May 1924,, Vol. 5, No. 11; Pratap, 26 May 1924, Vol.11. Nc 27. p.4 
"" Pratap. 12 May 1924, Vol.l 1, No.27 
'^ ' Ibid. 
'"Ibid. 
52 
On 20**" May 1924, session judge H.E.Holmes delivered the judgment. All 
the four were sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment. ^ A strong protest 
against this infringement of civil liberty was expressed in the vernacular prt ss. 
A Hindi weekly Ahhyndaya wrote: It appears "We are in favour of right to 
speech, expression and thought. We can not tolerate the penalty given to them for 
having independent ideas. Therefore, how can we be in agreement with such long 
judgment (read punishment). We hope that his matter will not end here. 
The Pratap's observation was equally contemptuous of the judgment. "In 
India, till now, no case coimected with Bolshevik conspiracy was pursued in the 
manner as at Kanpur. We had read news one year ago that in Madras pro\ ince one 
gentleman was jailed for seven years for being a Bolshevik propagandist But that 
was a case in which conspiracy could not be proved. It was an indivioual case. 
Kanpur conspiracy case was first of its kind. From political point of views, it was 
very important. Because of this a heavy uproar was created at the int^mational 
level. In the parliament, Mr. George Salisbury and other parliamentarians 
considered this case so important that they collected funds to fight agai ist it. The 
previous year Marquis Curzon, foreign minister of Britain had written to his 
Russian propagation of Bolshevism in India. Fro this, Curzon referred to the 
imprisoned advocated of Bolshevism in Afghanistan and Central Asia But until 
153 Matwala, 24 May 1924, No. 39; Zulqarnain, 28 May 1924, Vol. 22. No. 20; P-atap. 7 July 
1924, Vol.ll,No.35, p. 3 
^ Ahhyntdaya, 24 May 1924, Vol, 18, No.20 
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now no incident had taken place in India, on the basis of which it could be 
conclusively declared that Bolshevism had been propagated here. This v^  as for the 
first time that four accused were punished by the government. It also c uestioned 
the basis of judgment. Like the Pratap, the Prabha, a monthly, was very critical of 
the judgment. ^ ^^  It wrote that two years back, International Communist Party had 
given nearly 1000 to 'Daily Herald' a labour party paper. The propagation of class 
war in Britain is going on openly. In ""Labour Monthly \ R Palme Dutt and 
Lansburry propagated Bolshevism. Even the sons of Baldwin and George 
Lansburry openly propagated Bolshevism against the wishes of their father, "But it 
is India, this country of "impotents" where Bolshevism in considered as war 
against British Emperor. Here being enemy of British Imperialism and saying 
Down with British imperialism in a crime under section 121A of IPC. How long 
this kind of justice will last".'^^ 
Satyabhakta gave a report entitled "Government assault on Communist 
Party" which was published in Pratap. He wrote, "Indian Communist Part> tided 
paper was seized. The government says that the paper's content fall under section 
121 A of IPC... There is nothing new about it. Everyday more forceful articles are 
published in India. So the government must say clearly that Communist Part> and 
its ideology are illegal".'^^ 
Pratap, 26 Ma>' 1924, Vol, II, No. 27, p. 4; Prabha, 1 June 1924. Vol.1. No. 6. p. 479 
' Prahha, 1 June 1924, Vol. I, No. 6, p. 479, T. No. 54 
157 Pralap, 20 August 1924, Vol. II, No. 49. 
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To conclude, we may say that the Kanpi^l!"onspiracy Case helped in 
crystallizing the disorganized and scattered ranks and file of Communist > m India. 
The Kanpur conspiracy provided a chance for those having communistic ideas to 
sympathise with the accused who were convicted by the British goveinment on 
wrong charges. The apprehensions made the British more hostile towards the 
Communists. But it proved fruitful for the formation and establishment of a 
communist party in India. We find that large number of people came in support of 
the accused and press vehemently criticised government policy of suppressing 
these people. This wide coverage by the press proved blessing in disguised for the 
ideological propaganda. In November 1924, Roy wrote of the Cawnport Case that 
it had had good effects as well as bad: "People have got used to heaiing things 
which simply terrified them before... We must reap the benefit of this ^ ituation. 
We must prepare to begin the struggle for the legalization of our party". ' 
H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 89; the conviction at the Cawnporc had a sobering 
effects on Indian newspapers. The Vartaman (Cawnpore) wrote, in August 192-^ . that Ro\ s 
programme "appears to be sweeter than honey and more pleasant than paradise to the poor 
Indians and there is every likelihood of their welcoming it heartilv."" The BanJc Mataram 
announced that an Indian Communist Party had been openly formed "with branchc > at C aicutta. 
Madras, Bombay and Cawnpore", and that "an All-India Communist Conference v\ ill be held in 
three months' time." Sir David Petrie, Communism in India 1924-1927. pp. 61-62 (This book 
provides one of the earliest and best factual pictures of the growth of Commun sm in India, 
even though written from an imperialist angle and a practical hostile intent. Its val acs lie in the 
fact that it was prepared during the ver\' period when Communism was having it> impact and 
taking roots in India.) 
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Later in the communistic survey by the Intelligence, it is reported that w ith 
the institution of the first Communist conspiracy case at Kanpur, faith in 
communism was established as no offence, and the fear of the law against 
communism largely removed; the immense power of mass action as i political 
weapon became recognised by nationalist intellectuals of advanc<;d views 
Communism began to earn appreciative comment in quarters which coald not be 
dismissed as irresponsible. The first phase in Indian Communism had reached." '^  
As an immediate consequence, the Kanpur communist conference was held 
in December 1925, which resulted in the birth of Communist Party of India. It 
strengthened the left elements considerably.'^ *^ Secondly, a new awakening took 
place which helped in the formation of a broader based left oriented part> in 
Bengal. Thirdly, a front was created under the aegis of the Communists which 
excluded persons belonging to communal organisation or had communal ideology. 
II.7 The First Communist Conference, Cawnpore (mod. Kanpur), 2()-28 
December 1925 
The Kanpur Communist Conference held in the last week of December 
1925"^' has a very important role in the formation of Communist Party of India.'^ '^  
^'"^ Home Poll. 7/7/1937 
'"" Irfan Habib, op.cit. p. 10 
"'' Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. II, pp. 591-670: Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(cds.). History 
of the Communist Movement in India. The Formative Years 1920-1933. p. 87-11 I: H N.Mitra 
(ed.). The Annual Indian Register, December 1925, pp. 367-371; Devendra Kausiik and L.A 
Mitrokhin, "First Indian Communist Conference at Kanpur (1925)". Mainstream (WcckK). 
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It was the first legal conference of communists in India. And ai)art from 
Satyabhakta and his associates. Communists like Muzaffar Ahmad, S.V Ghate. 
K.N. Joglekar, R.S. Nimbkar, Abdul Majid, Ayodhya Prasad, Janki Prasad 
Bagerhatta etc. attended this conference. The emigre Communist Part) of India 
was formed in Tashkent under the guidance of the Communist International led to 
the emergence of various Communists groups in different parts of India with their 
varying degree of understanding about the principles of scientific socialism. This 
conference was the first prototypical event in British India where almost all 
communist groups and elements joined. However, the Comintern, which was in 
contact with all active Marxist, socialist groups in India, through Floy, was 
completely in dark about the conference, and Satyabhakta, the convenor of the 
conference, did not belong to any such group. The idea of holdinj^ -, such a 
conference was first mooted by the leaders of the recognised communist groups 
Annual Number, 1969, pp.67-71: Sobhanlal Datta Gupta ed., A Document of the Communist 
Movement in India 1923-1925, Vol. II, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 697-736; Muzaffir Ahmad. 
Myself and CPI, pp. 407-13 
"^ ' Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol.11, p. 609, It was the Central Secretariat of the CPI acforc the 
split took the unanimous decision about the date of the foundation of the Party being 1925 The 
Secretariat at that time consisted of Ajay Ghosh, B.T. Ranadive, PC. Joshi, M. Basapunniah. 
Z.A. Ahmad, S.A. Dange, and A.K. Gopalan. It was on 19 August 1959 that the Pprtv centre 
sent a letter to the Indonesian Communist Party in answer to its query that "It was m December 
1925 that in meeting of representatives of the various groups of Communists in the countr\ 
held at Kanpur that the Communist Party of India was formed." 
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functioning in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Lahore and U.P., particularly by S A 
Dange from jail.'^^ 
When the Communist leaders were arrested and prosecuted in the Kanpur 
conspiracy case (1924) many statements appeared in Indian press. It was Dange 
who suggested from jail to utilize this opportunity to hold an open conference of 
the communist party. Letters were published discussing the question thf t an open 
communist conference be held to test the statements made in the course cf the case 
proceedings.'*''* So it was during this period that the idea of holding a communist 
conference at Kanpur cropped up when the INC session was also going to be held 
at Kanpur in 1925. It was openly discussed in the Socialist early in 1*>24 and it 
shows that the pioneers of the communist party were thinking in terms of an all-
India conference of Communists to create a countrywide organisation with an all-
India centre.'*'^  
It was thought by some that the colonial government was not justified in 
prosecuting the Communists. Therefore, they attempted to form a legal' 
communist party. And Satyabhakta was instrumental in organizing conference 
through his Indian Communist Party, which was started by him on September 1. 
Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol.11, p. 591; Adhikari, The Comintern Congress a id the C PI 
Marxist Miscellany, January- 1971, Delhi, p. 18 
Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. 2, p. 594 
" ' Ibid., p. 595 
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1925. Its birth was announced through the Bande Mataram of Calcutta, Praiap of 
Kanpur and Aj of Banaras.'^ *' 
Before going into different aspects of the First Communist Conference it is 
important to have some discussion about Satyabhakta's Indian Communist Party 
(ICP). It was formed on September 1, 1924. It was widely covered in vernacular as 
well as English newspaper. By June 1925 he claimed to have enrolled 250 
members "from different provinces in the country."'^^ Those who had joined his 
party were mainly from the United Provinces (UP), Rajasthan and Madhya 
'*^  Devendra Kaushik and LA. Mitrokhin, 'First Indian Communist Conferenct at Kanpur 
(1925)", Mainstream (Weekly), Annual Number, 1969, pp.67-68. Satyabhakta real name was 
Chakan Lai, came from Bharatpur state. In 1923 he came to Kanpur and began to vork among 
the workers. He took a keen interest in the Kanpur conspiracy case and launched vigorous 
campaign in Hindi press for the release of communist prisoners. He wrote in I'raiap He 
concluded from the Kanpur case that to advocate communism was not in itself illegal and that a 
communist part>' could exist without engaging in activities which the government :ould regard 
as treasonable.; Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol.11, pp. 591-600. Satyabhakta was i member of 
the national revolutionary (terrorist) group in U.P., who was influenced by Octooer Socialist 
Revolution. Cecil Kaye (Intelligence bureau chief), records that Satyabhakta corresponded with 
Sylvia Pankhurst who was then editing Workers' Dreadnought, the organ of the CPGB. to 
obtain communist literature. David Petrie records that "He attracted attention too as a 
correspondence of S.A. Dange..." He published two leaflets one in Hindi and othcr in English. 
both entitled "The Indian Communist Party" (Bhartiya Samyavadi Dal). The UP Government 
banned both these leaflets by a notification in its gazette dated 11 October 19 Z4. Later he 
published another leaflet "An Appeal to the Lovers of Communism"' (Samyavad <c Prcmix on 
Se Appeal, 12 November 1924); Ibid. pp. 597, 598. It was in Hindi daily Aj of 12 JiiK l'-*24 that 
Satyabhakta first announced his intention to set up his Indian Communist Part>; fo' more detail 
about Satyabhakta and programme also see. Sir David Petrie, Communism in Indie 1924-192". 
pp. 157-67 
Devendra Kaushik and LA. Mitrokhin, pp. 67-68 
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Pradesh. Some of the prominent names amongst them were Maulana Hasrat 
Mohani, Ram Shankar Avasthi (editor, Vartaman), Radha Mohan Gckulji, and 
Suresh Chandra Bhattacharya (sub-editor, Vartaman). 
The main aim of the ICP was declared as: "The right of peasants on land, of 
workers in factories and mills to be recognised and that they should be recipients 
of the product and profit obtained from land and factories; all employees be 
ensured decent living conditions."'^^ He called upon all wage earners, including 
peasants, workers, clerks, school-masters, railway and postal employtes, peons, 
etc, to join the party.'^^ 
Thus we see that Satyabhakta's Indian Communist Party talked about of 
complete swaraj, of abolishing landlordism and ending all exploitation He called 
upon the toiling people to achieve these by "capturing all councils, big and small, 
district boards and municipalities and other bodies which are today ruling the 
country."'^' In December 1924 Satyabhakta issued a Hindi leaflet "Samyavad ke 
Premiyon se Appeal" (An Appeal to the Lover of Communism) dated 12 
November 1924. This document fell into the hands of British Intelligence Bureau 
chief David Petrie and it is reported by him. It has mentioned clearly that Indian 
Communist Party wants:-
Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.), History! of the Communist Movement i i India. The 
Formative Years 1920-1933, p. 89 
'® Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol.11, p. 597 
''' Ibid. 
'" Ibid. p. 599 
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1. The kisans should be the absolute owners of the produce of their lelds. no 
ejection, no arbitrary taxes from them and abolition of Zamindari systems. 
2. All the profits of the factories should go to the workers engaged in them. 
The word "workers" is for all from the coolies' upto the managers. No large 
profits to shareholders or directors. 
3. All land, railways, telegraphs, tramways, mines and forests etc., should be 
owned by a democratic government. Possession of all these led to public 
miseries. 
4. Every person should earn his living by working with his hands or bodies. 
No work, no right to get their food even. 
5. Sufficient wages to man or woman to provide them good food, clothes and 
neat houses 
6. The up-bringing and education of children in the hands of democratic 
government, expenses borne by public treasury. 
7. One man one house, other rest with democratic government, givt n to those 
who have no home to in. 
8. Administration in government hands, right to vote to men and \vomen for 
the election of the representatives constituting the government. 
9. No favour on the basis of race, religion, colour, descent or wealth, equal 
treatment in political and social matters. No one should be regarded as 
untouchables or low caste. 
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10. Government to utilize taxes on intoxicants, forests, canals, salt, 
administration of justice etc. as a source of income. Stop use of intoxicants 
altogether. 
11. A limit of wealth should be fixed...The limit should be place ai a lac of 
rupees roughly. 
12. Interest, rent, satta, phatka, horse race betting, lottery etc. should be stopped 
as it lead to illicit gain produce various defects in the general public. 
All debts due from peasants and workers should be cancelled. It is the firm 
determination of the C.P. to free India from the fetters of slavery at the earliest 
opportunity and to establish Swaraj; the administration of country in tht hands of 
the representatives elected by the general public."'''^ 
Despite its peaceful and no-violence policy publicity, the ICP could not 
save itself from troubles at the hands of the British authorities. The government 
was suspicious of the Party and raided its office thrice at Kanpur once in 
December, 1924 and again in February 1925 and July, 1925. The poHce seized a 
number of books on communism from the SociaUst Bookshop run by Satyabhakta, 
His leaflet 'Bhartiya Samyavadi Dal' (Indian Communist Party) was declared as 
Home Poll, F.N. 449/1924. Satyabhakta (Secretary, Indian Communist Party. Cawnporc). 




seditious literature by the government and its publication was forfeited." But 
both the Bombay Communists and the Communists abroad looked at the {tarty and 
dubbed it as having of 'doubtful elements'. A handbill prepared by the C.P.I, in 
1941 maintained that it consisted of fools and spies.^ "^^  The Communists generally 
looked down upon this Communist Party. 
At the same time as the annual conference of the Indian National Congress 
was being held at Kanpur, the Indian Communist Party of Kanpur convened an 
open all-India conference of the Party towards the end of December 1925 which 
was attended by Communists and other radical nationalists from different parts of 
the country. British Communist M.P. Saklatvala had been requested to preside 
over the conference but he could not attend. When M.N. Roy heard this news he 
had also sent a message to different groups of Communists in the county to help 
and make the conference at Kanpur a success.'^^ 
The First Indian Communist Conference met at Kanpur (Cawnpur) on the 
26 of December 1925 presided by M. Singaravelu who explained the aims and 
objects of the Indian Communist Party which he declared, stood for the 
emancipation of workers from their present state of economic bondage. The Party, 
he continued, aimed at securing the rights of the working classes and establishing 
Devendra Kaushik and L.V. Mitrokhin, op.cit., p. 68; the police informed Satyabh.ikta that the 
object of the search was to prevent the spread of communism in India. Report or, Newspaper 
and Periodical in Bengal, 12 September, 1925, pp. 672-73 
' " L.P. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, pp. 156-57 
Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. II, p. 607 
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a Workers' State in India under any system of Self-Govemment. The immediate 
aims of the Party, he stated ftirther 'is to win Swaraj for the masses in india, to 
prevent exploitation of the workers and peasants by suitable land and industrial 
legislation, to secure to the bread winner a minimum wages by which ht and his 
children shall have the necessaries of a decent life and to end all distinctions of 
castes, creed or sect in all political and economical relationship.' 
Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Chairman of the Reception Committee, described 
the aims of the Party to be the establishment of a Soviet Constitution in India after 
the establishment of Swaraj. In his address he said:-
"The movement of Communism is the movement of peasants and 
workers." Further he described the aims and objects of the Party "to estabhsh 
Swaraj or complete Independence by all fair means. After the establishment of 
Swaraj to see that it takes the forms of the Soviet Republic on which all principles 
of Communism will come into force."'^^ Maulana stated that "our organization is 
purely Indian. Our relation with similar Parties of other countries will be only that 
of sympathy and mental affinity to these entire in general and to the Third 
International in particular. Neither we give them any practical help, nor do they 
176 
''' Ibid 
H.N.Mitra (ed.), The Annual Indian Register, December 1925, pp. 367, 371 
'^Mbid 
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extend any financial aid to us."'^'^ Not only this, he tried to link communism with 
1RO 
Islam in order to show that it was not anti-religious. 
It was in this conference that the name of the party was changed to 
'Communist Party of India' instead of 'Indian Commmiist Party'. Sat>abhakta 
scheme of national communism and its relationship of detachment with 
International Communism differed with others like Muzaffar Ahmad, S.V. Ghate 
and K.N. Joglekar. They challenged Satyabhakta's pretensions of national 
communism with their own conception of internationalism and maintains d that in 
line with the practice of Communist International, the name of the Party should be 
Communist Party of India. When Satyabhakta himself in minority he left the place 
with his papers and files.'^' The constitution was also adopted which stated the 
'object' of the party as follows: 'The establishment of a workers' and peasants' 
republic based on the socialization of the means of production and distribution, by 
the liberation of India from British imperialist domination.' The resolution 
adopted for the establishment and formation of the party clearly spelt out that: 
"Whereas, the workers and peasants of India are unable to live a human life on 
account of being exploited both by the foreign and native capitalists and landlords 
in India and whereas the existing political parties in India are dominated by 
bourgeois interests which are diametrically opposed to the well-being of the Indian 
' ' I b i d 
180 
181 
Ibid., pp. 367-68 
Muzaffar Ahmad CPI and Years of Formation, p. 19 
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workers and peasants. This conference of the Indian Communists resolves that a 
party be formed for the purpose of the emancipation of the workers and })easants 
of India! This party shall be known as the Communist Party of India and the 
ultimate aim of the party shall be the establishment of a republican sAvaraj of 
workers and peasants, and the immediate object of the party shall be the securing 
of a living wage to the workers and peasants by means of nationalization and 
municipalization of public services namely land, mines, factories, houses, 
telegraphs and telephones, and railways and such other public utilitit s which 
require public ownership... No one who is a member of any communal 
organization India shall be admitted as a member of the Communist Party '" ' 
The victorious elements at the Kanpur conference brought together the 
Communists of diverse places and constituted a central committee of the 
Communist Party of India at Kanpur itself.'^ "^  
In March 1926 Sepassi wrote to the effect that for the establishment of new 
Communist Party of Bagerhatta, Muzaffar Ahmad, etc., would be given "every 
kind of help available .. .Financial help will be given as much possible", but at the 
same time a rider was put to at that it was important that the Party should refrain 
from publicly declaring its independence of "outside world and Third Iniemational 
in particular" was prepared "to send all kinds of literature".'^ '* 
' " Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. II, pp. 665-66 
Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI and Years of Formation, p. 20 
^ Sir David Petrie, Communism in India, pp. 98-99 
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An informal conference of the CPI was held at Calcutta (16-18 Apr! 1926) 
and it was unanimously decided that the party should completely disown 
Satyabhakta and his organisation. And in May 1926, the headquarters of tlie Party 
was shifted to Bombay from Kanpur.'^^ The object of the removal of the 
headquarters of the Communist Party from Kanpur to Bombay was said to be the 
desire to facilitate communication with foreign countries. 
The provisional general rules for the Party were drawn up and in these rules 
the objects of the Party were given as follows :-
(a) To secure the freedom of India by all practicable means. 
(b) To end all sorts of exploitation of man by man. 
(c) To establish a Workers' and farmers' republic through the 
nationalization of the means and instruments of production and 
distribution, such as land, mills, factories, railways, tramways, ships etc. 
The Party programme was to educate and organise the working classes 
namely, peasants, labourers, and servants engaged in other occupations, for the 
abolition of capitalism.'^^ 
^ Ibid, pp. 99, 167, David Petrie recorded that the split occurred because of its international 
connection. 
Ibid, p. 165, the removal of the headquarter form Kanpur to Bombay was supportec b\ Ghate. 
Joglekar, Muzaflfar Ahmad, while it was opposed by Hasrat Mohani, AzacI Subhani. 
Satyabhakta and Arjunlal Sethi. 
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Chapter III 
Communist Movement in India, 1925-39 
III.l. Workers' and Peasants' Parties 
The Communist Party of India organised the Workers' and Peasants" on 
class lines. The Peshawar and Kanpur conspiracy cases had led to the realization 
by the Communists almost the need of an "open party, say a Workt^rs' and 
Peasants' Party" so as to organise militant trade unions and peasant masses for 
their urgent demands.' The period following the Kanpur Communist Conference 
and formation of CPI witnessed the establishment of workers' and peasants' 
parties in various provinces of India, culminating in the formation of the /vll India 
Workers' and Peasants' Party (WPP) by the end of 1928. Though Communists led 
these parties in various provinces, the WPP was not a Communist Party, o' even a 
veiled Communist Party. As the General Statement of the Meerut prisoners was to 
explain this in 1932, the WPP was conceived of as the organisational form of the 
united front of the working class, the peasants and the petty-bourgeois io cany 
through the national democratic revolution'.^ 
The Workers' and Peasants parties according to Roy were the medium 
through which the Communists could find their way to the masses. He thought that 
' Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. II, p. vi 
Jyoti Basu and others (eds.). Documents of the Communist Movement of India, Vol. II. Calcutta, 
1997, p. 253 
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the object of the WPP was to make new Party "the rallying giound for all the 
nationalist revolutionary elements into a revolutionary mass party". 
The Workers' and Peasants parties in India passed through two distinct 
phases: (I) they existed as labour groups within the Indian National Congress with 
no connection with the mass of workers. The Bengal Workers' and I'easants' 
Party, for example, had originated as a Labour Swaraj Party inside tht; INC in 
1925." So also it did in Madras and Bombay; (II) From the beginning of 1928 they 
' International Press Correspondence, 18 Februarv' 1929, Articles by Roy on W. &P.P.. Cf LP 
Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, p. 178; in fact in letter to Dange (19 December 1*^ )22) Ro\ 
applied Lenin's tactics to India by pressing for the formation of an illegal Comm mist Part>. 
and for the establishment of a 'front" organisation to operate within Congress o fight the 
compromising tendency and develop the revolutionary trend in bourgeois nationalism As thc 
letter put it: "The time has come for the organisation of our party in India... A revolutionary 
mass party has to be organised as a part of the Congress, but this party must hi under the 
control and direction of our own party which cannot but be lUegaF'. (Adbikari (cd). 
Documents. Vol. I, pp. 593 and 595); Legality was seen as crucial for the building up of an 
open mass movement without which the Communists would have been isolated in small 
sects. (Bipan Chandra (ed.). The Indian Left: Critical Appraisals, p. 3) 
'' In Bombay, around November 1926, a group of Congressmen in the Bombay PC( decided to 
form a party called the Congress Labour Party. Many of the leaders of these earh parties and 
even WPPs were radical Congressmen like Dange, Singaravelu, Velayaidhan. Jogickar. 
Nimbkar, Thengdi, Satyabhakta and Bagerhatta. (Adhikari (ed.), Documents. Vol 11, p. 129, 
Vol. IIIA, pp. 31-32, 147, Vol. IIIB, p. 32-33 and 165); The detailed account of Labour 
Swaraj Party which is viewed by Dr. Adhikari, as a fore-runner of the Workers" a id Peasants 
Party provides a picture of early experiment in the formation of a Marxist organisation in 
India. (A.R.Desai and Sunil Dighe, Labour Movement in India I923-I927 Documents. Vol 
IV, Delhi, 2004, p. 141) 
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turned towards the masses, adopting a more independent stand-point. The 
formation of the Gimi Kamgar Union was accomplished during this phase ' 
The idea of forming WPPs was first mooted to evolve a plan of action m 
India in the context of government repression (as in Peshawar and Kanpur 
conspiracy cases) and the absence of any communist influence in the countiy. 
especially over masses. Many organisations and parties in different parts of India 
were involved. These parties may be seen as precursors to the WPPs and many of 
them just changed their names to WPPs. 
As early as in September 1922 in his Socialist S.A. Dange suggested the 
formation of an 'Indian Socialist Labour Party of the Indian National Congress .' 
At the Gaya session of the Indian National Congress (December 1922) 
Singaravelu and others distributed Roy's proposed programme for the Congress. 
and the formation of a left-wing party was discussed, which resulted in the 
production and publication of a 'Manifesto' for a new party in March i 923. This 
was subsequently rewritten and issued in April under the names of Singaravelu 
^ L.P. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, pp. 178-79; we find that the first voice was raise d in 1920 to 
declare the necessity of organising in India a political party of the working class (Adhikari 
(ed.). Documents, Vol. IIIA, pp. 164-76), 'Programme of a Working Class Party" pp. 176-82; 
Sanjay Seth writes that 'despite the existence of a CPL the WPPs became the mam vehicle for 
Communist activity in India. Energies were directed at building the WPPs and succcssi\c 
meetings of the CPI CEC urged members to do so." (Sanjay Seth, p. 121) 
Socialist, Vol. I, No. 8, 16 September 1922 in Adhikari (ed.). Documents. Vol. II. p 64 
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and M.P.S. Velayudham (who signed themselves as Indian Communists), as the 
manifesto of 'the Labour and Kisan Party of Hindustan'/ 
The Labour and Kisan Party was formed by Singaravelu in 1923 ard it held 
the first 'May Day' meeting in Madras city, published the Labour Kisan C azetle in 
October 1923, a fortnightly in English and Thozhilalan a weekly in Tamil/ On 28 
May, the Swadeshmitran carried an item of news saying that the secretarv' of the 
Hindustan Kisan Party has announced that in Punjab a Labour Kisan Paity Unit 
has been formed with M.A. Khan, Ghulam Hussain, Shamsuddin and Hisan; that 
it was being affiliated to the Central Committee and arrangement were be ing made 
to estabUsh such a party in Bihar, Bengal and Bombay and also that tie Central 
Committee was going to publish a Tamil weekly called Thozhilalan^ 
In Bengal with the efforts of Communists and radical leader> 'Labour 
Swaraj Party' of the Indian National Congress was formed on 1 Movember 
•' The manifesto of the Labour and Kisan Party (LKP) began by pointing out the shor comings of 
the INC. It says that LKP would represent both the immediate and the ultimate imerests of the 
workers and peasants. It was short-lived. Sanjay Seth, Marxist Theory ano Nalionalisi 
Politics: The Case of Colonial India, pp. 116-18. For fiill programme see. Acthikari (cd ). 
Documents, Vol. II, pp. 114-133 and Sobhanlal Datta Gupta (ed.), A Documented History of 
the Communist Movement in India 1923-1925, Vol. II, pp. 459-73 ; it is repoited b> Cecil 
Kaye that "the Comintern recognised Singaravelu's "Labour and Kisan Party Comintern 
wrote according to Kaye that "it is the duty of the Labour and Kisan Partv of Hindustan to 
assume the supreme lead of the struggle for national liberation, and subsequent K. for social 
revolution." (Sir David Petrie, Communism in India 1924-1927. pp. 42. 43) 
^ K. Murugesan and C.S. Subramanyam, Singaravelu-First Communist in South Indui. p 4 
' Ibid, p. 103, for detail account of the Manifesto of the Hindustan Labour and Kisan Part\ see pp 
172-87 
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1925,'"influenced by communism, but independently of Roy and the Comintern. 
The 'Labour Swaraj Party' was composed of Communists, a group o ' radical 
literati and a number of Muslim radicals. It declared its goal to be independence 
'based on social and economic emancipation', and this was to be achieved by the 
INC's strategy of 'non-violent mass action', and INC membership was a i:ondition 
of a membership of the Labour Swaraj Party. This party sought to represent the 
workers and peasants in the INC, by putting forward both their 'immediate' and 
'ultimate' demands.'^ David Petrie dubbed the programme of the Laboir Swaraj 
Party as 'distinctly communist'.''* The party started a weekly journal called 
Langal. However, Langal was closed in April 1926 due to shortage of fund A 
new weekly Ganavani (Voice of the Masses), under the editorship of Muzaffar 
'" Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, pp. 77, 414-16. The Bengali name of the party ^ as Bharti> a 
Jatiya Mahasamitir Shramik-Praja-Swaraj Dal. The founding members were (11 Qutbuddm 
Ahmad. (2) Hemanta Kumar Sarkar, (3) Qazi Nazrul Islam and (4) Shamsuddm Hussam 
(Abdul Halim's elder brother, Abdul Halim was a pioneer of the Communist i lovcmcnt m 
India). The first constitution, programme and policy of the Labour Swaraj Part\ were also 
published on November 1, 1925. The documents were printed in the second issue of the 
Langal (The Plough) on December 31, 1925, and formed Exhibit No. P. 54< (13) of the 
Meerut Conspiracy Case (1929-33). The name Workers' and Peasants' Part> had been 
changed two or three times. 
Conrad Wood, 'The Impact of Ultra-Leftism on the Communist Party of Ind a. 1928-36 . 
Journal of Indian History, April 1973, Vol. LI, Part, S.N. 151. p. 360 
' ' Sanjay Seth, Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics: The Case of Colonial Indii. p 18 (For 
the fill! text of the aims and objectives of the Labour Swaraj Party, see Adhikari (ed ). 
Documents, Vol. II, pp. 671-689; Gautam Chattopadhyay, Communism ,md Bengal's 
Freedom Movement. Volume I (1917-1929), New Delhi, 1970, Appendix D. pp. 177-79) 
" Sir David Petrie, Communism in India, p. 128 
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Ahmad took its place."' The famous poem of Nazrul Islam, "Samyabadi'. was 
printed under different sub-headings in the first issue of the journal. 
The second session of the All Bengal Peasants' conference was held at 
Krshnanagar, Nadia (6-7 February 1926). The resolution adopted was that the 
party stood 'for the protection and furtherance of the interests of the peasants" and 
workers', the conference herewith resolved to organise a Peasants' and 'vVorkers" 
Party in Bengal.'^  In February 1926 Roy in one of letter had suggested his scheme 
for the formation of a RepubUcan or "People's" Party. He advised for a dual 
organisation; a legal Nationalist Party with a radical Republican piogramme 
(People's Party), with an illegal Communist Party inside it. According tc him "the 
''* Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.). History of the Communist Movement in India. The 
Formative Years 1920-J933, p. 114; the first issue of the Ganavani came out on August 12. 
1926. Muzaffar Ahmad said: 'The reason for changing the name was that from its name man\ 
people assumed that Langal was exclusively for the peasants, while this paper of ours was for 
the toiUng masses.' (Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI: Years of Formation, pp. 416-17): Muzaffar 
Ahmad attended the meeting of the AITUC which was held at Delhi in March 19 Z7 and there 
he received Rs. 200 from Spratt for the Ganavani, the publication of which was suspended 
towards the end of 1926 by reason of lack of funds, though it reappeared in April 1927 (Sir 
David Petrie, Communism in India, p. 130). 
'"^  Muzaffar Ahmad, CFI: Years of Formation, p. 22 
Details of the constitution, organisational set up and demand are given in Adhikari (cd ). 
Documents, IIIA, 1926, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 155-62; in March 1926 M.N. Rcy wrote that 
'the growth of communist influence over the Trade Union Congress (TIJC) will be 
conditional upon the work that the Communists will do in the Trade Unions- among the rank 
and file of the working class. Every communist must be an active Trade Union worker and 
will endeavour to liberate the labour movement from the harmfiil influence of the Nationalist 
politicians like Lajpat Rai, Moti Lai Nehru, etc. (Sir David Petrie. Communisin in India, p 
99) 
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Communists will take the initiative in calling this conference, not as Conmiunists 
1 7 
but as Nationalists; and the People's Party should publish a legal organ". It 
seems that he advised it because of the apprehension of Government vigilmce and 
suppression of the Communist Party at the very early stage. 
Exactly a year later (after the formation of Labour Swaraj Party», around 
November 1926, a similar party the 'Congress Labour Party', composed of 
Communists and a radical in the Bombay was founded. The meeting of the CPl 
Executive Committee, held in (16-18 January) 1927, decided to form of a workers' 
and peasants' party in Bombay province, which was to be the lirst such 
organisation outside Bengal, and the publication of a Marathi weekly 
Subsequently, on 13 February, six days before the second conference of the 
Bengal Peasants' and Workers' Party in Calcutta, the Workers' and Peasants' 
Party was formed in Bombay with D. R. Thengdi as the president.'^ The name of 
the Congress Labour Party was changed to W.P.P in the beginning of lebmary, 
1927, with S. Mirajkar as its Secretary. The Party started publishing its own organ, 
the Kranti, a weekly in the Marathi language. The WPP of Bombay declared that 
the FNC and its leaders represented the interests of the propertied classes and that 
'^  Sir David Petrie, Communism in India J924-J927, pp. 97-98 
Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.). History of the Communist Movement in India The 
Formative Years 1920-1933, pp. 115-15 
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its aim was to liberate the Congress from the stranglehold of the class intsrests of 
its leadership.'^ 
In February 1927 the Bengal WPP adopted a new programme. It asserted 
that "the imperial Government in India is not only contrary to the wishes of the 
people of Great Britain... doing nothing to better the condition of the peasants and 
workers and of the lower classes...It is therefore, necessary to form political 
association of the workers and lower classes, who must join the INC and arge their 
claim through that body. They must form labour and peasants associations and 
fight the Government determinedly for their rights. The exploitation of the masses 
would never cease until Federal Republic was set up in India in place of the 
Imperial Government'. It further emphasised its 'Immediate Demands' which 
demanded 'women's suffrage; the abolition of race and caste distinction; the 
freedom of the press and of speech; the re-organisation of Trade Unions; the 
abolition of indirect taxation; the nationalization of land; the establishment of co-
operative banks; preferential terms for cultivators borrowing from moneylenders: 
agricultural trade on scientific lines; a worker's week to consist of 5 '/; days of 8 
hours; wages of factory and mill-hands to be fixed by law at 33% above the living 
wage; the education of the masses; and legislation on the subject cf workers' 
compensation and against the employment of women and boys in dangerous 
work."2° 
Shashi Bairathi, Communism and Nationalism in India, p. 96 
'" Sir David Petrie, Communism in India, pp. 131-32 
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In the same month (February 1927) both parties (of Bombay and Bengal) 
held conferences where they adopted the common name, Workers' and Peasants' 
Party, and adopted similar programmes. By now the Communists (including the 
Kanpur prisoners, who had been released) were organised their own party and 
were taking an active role in promoting the development of the Bombay and 
Calcutta parties.^' At the same time Gopendra Chakravarty and Dharani Goswami, 
along with five other former members of the Secret Terrorist Society, Anushilan, 
joined the executive committee of the Bengal Workers' and Peasants' Part) * 
It was under the influence of Communist Party of India that the 
Workers' and Peasants' Party (WPP) of Bombay in 1927 issued a 'Mohurrum 
Manifesto' appealing against a possible communal clash between Hindus and 
Muslims. It was declared that the party was duty bound to call up or Indian 
masses to maintain peaceful and fraternal relations among themselves dunng the 
forthcoming Mohurrum festival. The working masses of both the Hirdu and 
Muslim communities had nothing to gain by communal mobilization, whicli 
would only lead to the advantage of the exploiting masses. It was shameful and 
tragic that the Hindu and Muslim masses who were all exploited peoplt would 
Sanjay Seth, Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics, pp. 118-19; for the fiill text of Partv's 
demand, see Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. IIIB, pp. 166-68. The immediate demands of 
the Party were as follows: (1) universal adult suffrage and responsible governnent; (2) 
Abolition of communalism; (3) freedom of speech, press and the right of associatior; :ind (4) 
removal of all restrictions on trade unions. 
" John Patrick Haithcox, Communism and nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Commtei n pal lev. 
1920-1939,^.46 
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fight amongst themselves. It added that they must realize that ' t t ir^o communities 
together constitute a homogenous body and their suffering were commor which 
resulted from serfdom and their social and political exploitation. 
The 'Mohurrum Manifesto' declared "the WPP, the political vanguard of 
all exploited, considers its duty to advise the Indian masses not to participate in 
religious struggle and communal movement which the religious minded arabitious 
bourgeois politicians of Indian dream of and aspire to kindle on a courtiywide 
scale. The communal movement will only create a disastrous division in tlie ranks 
of masses". '^* The WPP firmly demanded the abolition of communalism.^' 
The extended meeting of the CEC of the Communist Party of India held m 
Delhi in March 14-15, 1927. Muzaffar Ahmad records that "...Comrades form the 
many parts of India came to Delhi."^*' A constitution of the Communist Paity was 
adopted there and a number of resolutions passed.^'' It was in the May CEC 
meeting in Bombay was an important stage in the growth of the Party. Ii was the 
determined efforts of a handful of Communists in different parts of the country to 
create an all-India team functioning collectively and in a disciplined way -an all 
- Adhikari (ed). Documents, Vol. IIIA, pp. 174-76. 
^'Ibid. 
"•' Ibid. 
*^ Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI, p. 441 
''Ibid. 
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India party centre- to guide through its open forum, the workers' and peasants' 
parties, and the rising mass movement of workers and peasants. 
M.N. Roy through the Masses of India was also putting forward the idea of 
building workers' and peasants' parties as an open forum for the Communist Party 
functioning in the face of repression, but he was stressing for creating a People s 
Party as a broad anti-imperialist forum in place of the Indian National C ongress 
which he maintained was ceasing to be a militant political force agamst 
imperialism.^^ 
In the meantime WPPs were formed in various provinces. Besides the 
formation of WPPs in Bengal and Bombay by early 1927, in Rajasthan a V/PP was 
formed by Arjunlal Sethi around this time. 
As a result of the labours of Allison, Spratt and Saklatvala, Workers" and 
Peasants' Parties were formed in Calcutta and Bombay in order "to voice the 
demands of the peasants and working classes within the National Congress, to 
promote the organisation of Trade Unions and to wrest them from their present 
alien control, to advance the organisation of peasants on the basis of their 
economic and social requirements and to present a determined and permanent 
opposition to the Government, thus to secure the social, economic and political 
emancipation of the classes."^" The ultimate object of the Party would be 'to 
' Adhikari (ed), Documents, Vol. IIIB, pp. 56-57 
'' Ibid, p. 57 
'" Sir David Petrie, Communism in India 1924-1927, p. 274 
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obtain Swaraj wherein the means of production, distribution and exchange are 
publicly owned and socially controlled." 
Philip Spratt^ ^ was joined in September 1927 by Benjamin Francis Bradle>, 
also a capable and devoted worker, who took a similar active part m the 
organisation of the 'Workers' and Peasants' Party and worked amongst the 
employees of the cotton mills and the railways. 
In Punjab, a WPP came into existence on 12 April 1928 with the name of 
Kirti Kisan Party, under the leadership of Sohan Singh Josh and Abdul Majid. 
The need for the Workers' and Peasants' Party was shown in the GurumuKlii Kirti 
'^ Ibid. p. 274. At the same timer a letter addressed to the Indian "Comrades' was rectned from 
M.N. Roy. He again suggested dropping the name of "Communist Party of India and 
substituting that of "Workers' and Peasants' Party". The proposition to organise a WPP. Ro> 
explained. "They are two entirely different things. One is veiled Communist Party while the 
other is a revolutionary' Nationalist Part>". (Ibid, p. 107) 
'" After the conviction of George Allison, alias Donald Campbell, who was mainly responsible 
for the organisation of Workers" and Peasants' Parties, a very able and energetic successor 
was found in the person of Philip Spratt. Spratt was a graduate of Cambridge Univrrsit}. who 
came to India in December 1926, ostensibly on behalf of the Labour Research Department. 
London. This organisation was under the control of the Central Council of Trade Unions in 
Moscow, and there was little doubt that Spratt's mission to India was mamh in ( ommunist 
interests. At any rate, it is certain that he was a powerful influence in strengthening the 
organisation of the Workers' and Peasants' parties. Philip Spratt was most active n Bomba> 
until his departure for Calcutta in March, 1928, and, with his Communist anderlings. 
encouraged the Lillooah strikers to stand firm, and induced other railway and jute w orkers to 
down tools. (India in 1927-28\ A report Prepared for Parliament by J. Coatmai, Calcutta. 
1928, pp. 341-42) 
^^ H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 94 
'"* Ibid, p. 43; for detail see, Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement m Punjab (I926-l'>47)_ Delhi. 
1979 
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as far back as April 1927. The WPP of Punjab held its second confeience at 
Lyallpur in September (28-30) 1928.^ ^ The first conference had taken )lace at 
Hoshiarpur/^' Many processions were taken out under the leadership of the Party. 
The Press Workers Union, Amritsar, Motor Drivers Union and some other small 
unions of the workers were formed by the Workers' and Peasants' Party. 
The Punjab WPP aimed at the establishment of the national democratic 
independence through revolution. It was openly a revolutionary bod} of the 
militant workers and peasants, who being disillusioned by the Congress defeatist 
T O 
politics had raised in revolt against it. 
The congress of the Workers' and Peasants' Party held at Meemt. It was 
attended by Spratt, Muzaffar Ahmad, Kedamath Sehgal, Abdul Majid and Sohan 
Singh Josh."*^  The Workers' and Peasants' Party of the United Provinces and Delhi 
was formed at Meerut in October 1928.''° 
As the campaigned progressed, Phillip Spratt, in earnest pursuance of the avowed pohcN of the 
Communist International- the creation of internal unrest as a preliminary to tht Workers 
revolution'- sought other fields to conquer. He enlisted Sohan Singh Josh in an attempt to 
plant the seeds of revolt in the Punjab. In this he was hardly more successfu . though a 
Peasants" and Workers' Party was formed in that province which passed a number of 
objectionable resolutions. The Party conference was held in Lyallpur in the auturin of 1428. 
Communist doctrines were proclaimed with greater candour than on any prev lous public 
occasion. (H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 97) 
'^  Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. IIIC, pp. 282-83 
" Ibid, p. 285 
' ' Ibid, pp. 285-86 
In consultation with these and local leaders a provincial part\ was organised. The follow mg 
were elected the officers leaders: - President: Vishwanath Mukherji (Goraklipur). \ice-
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In the Madras session of the INC, Communists functioning through the 
WPP played a significant role and in an organised manner. Muzaffar Ahmad in his 
report of the executive committee of the WPP of Bengal, 1927-28, records; "Three 
of our members were elected in 1927 to the Bengal provincial congress committee 
and two to the all India congress committee. At the Madras session of the 
Congress (December 1927) with comrades from Madras, Bombay, Ajmer-
Merwara and Punjab, we formed a fraction which was able to give tffective 
expression to our views in the subject committee." 
At the Madras session the "Manifesto of the WPP to the Indian National 
Congress, Madras, (December) 1927" sought to commit the INC to leading a mass 
struggle for full independence, and to fighting for an independent nation where 
universal suffrage and peasant and worker rights were guaranteed. It gave clear cut 
revolutionary answers to the urgent questions before the session'* ,^ i.e. as follows: 
"The programme for the realisation of which the Workers 'and Peasanis' Party 
will organise this campaign is: (1) establishment of free national-democratic state: 
(2) nationalization of land (abolition of native states and landlordism); (3) 
president: Dharambir Singh MLC (Meerut), General Secretary': P.C. Joshi (Allahibad) For 
full text of the Party Resolutions, (see Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. IIIC, pp.28^-^0 
*' Muzaffar Ahmad, Myself and CPI,p. 429) 
'^ Meerut Record, p. 139, Cf, Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. IIIB, pp. 118-19 
"*' Adhikari (ed). Documents, Vol. IIIB, p. 125; the WPPs members worked as a fraction at the 
Madras Congress, seeking support for their manifesto and resolutions. The historic resolution 
of full independence was first moved by Jawaharlal Nehru and seconded b\ Jo^ l^okar. the 
latter a member of Bombay WPP and the CPI CEC. (Sanjay Seth. Marxist Iheory and 
Nationalist Politics, p. 122) 
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abolition of all levies on the agricultural population except land tax not exceeding 
15 per cent of the net income; (4) exemption from taxation of peasants cultivatmg 
'uneconomic holdings'; (5) annulment of peasants' indebtedness; (6) cont ol over 
usury (interest not to exceed 6 per cent per annum); (7) nationalization of public 
utilities (railways, telegraph, waterways, etc.) and mines; (8) minimuni wages 
guaranteed and irreducible standard of living for the industrial workers; (9) 
improvement of labour and housing conditions; (10) eight-hour day and 44-hour 
week; (11) free primary education; (12) insurance against unemployment, 
sickness, old age, etc. and maternity benefit (employers and state to contiibute 75 
per cent to the fund); (13) freedom of press, speech and assembly; (14) right to 
strike and carry arms; (15) freedom of rehgion and worship; (16) abolitior of caste 
privileges; (17) equal political and economic rights for women."^^ 
The Workers' and Peasants' Party took up the campaign and published two 
pamphlets, one in English by S.S. Mirajkar from Bombay and other in Bengali by 
Dharani Goswami from Calcutta. Both the pamphlets figured ir Meemt 
conspiracy case. The prosecution filed a police report of a public meeting 
organised by the WPP in Bombay in Marwadi Vidyalaya Hall on the 28"' 
August."*"* A meeting of WPP members attending the Madras session of INC held 
on 28 December 1927 "decided that a congress should be held for the purpose of 
formation of the AIWPP at Calcutta within the period 10 February-10 March 
Adhikari (ed), Documents, Vol. IIIB, pp. 130-31 
Meerut Record, p. 2311, Cf., Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. IIIB, p. 109 
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1928, arrangements being left to Muzaffar Ahmad." Actually this took place 
only at the end of December 1928 at the time of the Calcutta session of thii Indian 
National Congress when the first all-India workers' and peasants' conference was 
held.''' 
The strikes in textiles mills in Bombay (late April-early October n'28) saw 
the creation of the Communists and WPP led Gimi Kamgar Union At the 
conclusion of strikes, the GKU membership was about 27,000 by December, about 
50,000 by January 1929. The strikes in Bombay and Bengal were hailed with 
delight by Communists abroad, and much space was given in Communist 
publications to the labour troubles in India and to the activities of the Workers' and 
Peasants' Parties. This strike saw the WPP extend its influence by organismg 
workers around economic, class demands. The WPP press organ, Kranti. 
highlighted on the connection between the workers' economic grievances and the 
British rule in India, and the Party sought to effect a practical link amonj. thesez'*^ 
In this regard, the Bombay WPP registered an important success during the 
visit of the Simon Commission to Bombay in February 1928. WPP slogans and 
Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. IIIB, p. 127 
^ Ibid, 
47 For detail press report of Masses of India and Inprecor see, India in 1927-28: A report Prepared 
for Parliament by J. Coatman, pp. 342-44 
•** Sanjay Seth, Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics, p. 124 
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banners such as 'Nothing short of Independence' and 'Living Wage' v ere the 
49 
prominent at the demonstrations. 
Thus, the WPP of Bombay's by late 1928 succeeded in organising and 
estabhshing its influence over a significant section of Bombay workirg class. 
Amongst the mill workers the party had strong base, with the GKU being an 
organisation of the WPP, and its Executive Committee composed entirely of WPP 
members. 
A significant move on the part of Communists and WPP activists *vas their 
involvement in the growing and organized youth movement, especially in Bengal. 
Punjab and Bombay provinces. The first formal decision to organise youth wings 
was taken by the enlarged executive meeting of the Workers' and Peasants' Part> 
in Bombay on January 29, 1928, in the backdrop of the anti-Simon Commission 
boycott movement. The document resolved that the WPP 'should attiact to its 
banner the newly organizing forces of the youth and must establish an 
'independent youth organization' by recruiting working class and peasant youth 
'to broaden the social base of the traditional youth organization'.^'^ 
It has also charted out a six-point programme of action for sut h a youth 
organization: 
(i) Participation in the political nationalist movement 
* Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. IIIC, pp. 187-89 
'" Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.), History of the Communist Movement in India. The 
Formative Years 1920-1933, p. 126 
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(ii) Advance the cause of trade unionism among young workers, ard study 
their working conditions, 
(iii) Fight for the redress of the special grievances of the youth, especially 
the unemployed, 
(iv) Political study and self preparation. 
(v) Conduct of education in political and economic subjects among 
workers, villages and students, 
(vi) Acts as a centre within the existing general youth organizatior s for the 
propaganda of radical ideas and the advancement of a sound policy.' 
In Punjab, the organizers of Workers' and Peasants' Party played m active 
role in mobilizing the Naujavan Bharat Sabha in April 1928. Though Naujavan 
Bharat Sabha was formed as a broad based organisation, WPP had been its guiding 
spirit. ^ ^ 
The first Conference of the All-India Workers' and Peasants' Part> 
(AIWPP) held in 21-23 December, 1928 in Calcutta, was presided by Sohan Singh 
Josh. In Calcutta, however, it took up a defiant line of action. In order co prepare 
the peasants for revolution, the Party placed before them a programme of their 
immediate needs of life, and for the workers need was felt for strengtliening the 
trades' union movement by all means on the basis of forward economic and 
political demands and by resorting to "direct action ". All occasions were to be 
seized to draw the workers into political action by demonstrative means, stiikes 
etc. While acknowledging the utility of non-violence, the party made ro fetish of 
'^ Ibid. 
''Ibid. 
-^ Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. IIIC, pp. 708-11, 740 
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it, though it acknowledged that the methods of secret preparation for an armed 
uprising were quite useless in prevailing conditions. In short, the party's imnediate 
objective as revealed at these meetings was the creation of an aggressive attitude 
among the workers, the peasants and the petty 'bourgeoisie with a view to l^ringing 
about a revolution, first of a political and then of a social and econoniic kind. 
Even when the usual allowances are made for the excessive exuberance which 
such occasions engender, there is still no doubt that a year's successlul work 
coupled with a lavish display of foreign interest, had enormously increased the 
prestige and confidence of the Communist Party of India and had encouraged them 
to make still further efforts in pursuit of their goal.'^ '* 
In his presidential address of the First All India WPP Conference, Sohan 
Singh Josh said that "If our enemies (colonial government) call us Bolsheviks, we 
accept the epithet, because we know that Bolshevism stands for liberty, equality 
and fratemity."^^ Further he defined the task of the party as follows: (1) 
unceasing war against exploiter...without this tactics it is difficult to win 
economic freedom; (2) our watchword should be complete independence; (3) 
abolition of landlordism and the Indian states; (4) to secure international 
'^  H. Williamson, India and Communism, pp. 99-100; For full documents of the l" AJ India WPP 
Conference see, Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. IIIC, pp. 730-76; the M orkcrs' and 
Peasants" bodies also attended the All Parties Conference held at Calcutta in Dec ember I92H 
Gautam Chattopadhyay. Bengal Electoral Politics and Freedom Struggle 186 2-1947. New 
Delhi, 1984, p. 113 
"^  Jyoti Basu and others (eds.), Documents of the Communist Movement of India. \ oi. 1. (191 y-
1928). p. 362 
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affiliations those who are bent upon destroying imperialism; (5) to disscmmate 
our ideas among the young men; (6) we should carry on an active propaganda 
against the coming war and preach masses not to supply recruits and other 
assistance to the Government; and (7) to look to your organisation and sclidarity 
ofrankandfile."^^ 
Thus, in the 'Political Resolution' adopted at the AIWPP Conference, the 
old task of working within the Congress was abandoned. WPPs members were 
instructed to remain in the INC for the moment, but only for the purpose of 
'exposing its reactionary leadership'.^^ 
The Executive Council of Communist International in its message of 
greeting to the AIWPP Conference, called upon the conference to discuss the 
question of separating the workers' organisation from the peasants' 
C O 
organisations.' For the weaknesses of the Party no one was to be blamed, except 
the historical conditions in which the workers' and peasants' movement, as a 
disguise for CPI, developed and disappeared. D.N. Dhanagre observed, 'Since 
force was superior to logic, CPI and WPP, being under constant surveillance and 
* Ibid, p. 364 
" 'Political Resolution' of the AIWPP Conference, Adhikari (ed.). Documents^ Vol. IIIC. p 712; 
the All-India Workers' and Peasants' Party congress passed a resolution calling for a struggle 
for the complete independence of India, It also said that for the success of the strui;gle it was 
necessary' to develop working class leadership and called upon workers under the n flucnce of 
the Communists to increase their activity among the peasants and the \outh. B T. Ranadivc. 
"The Role Played by Communists in the Freedom Struggle of India". Social Scumist. Vol 
12, No. 9, September 1984, pp. 12-13 
'^ Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. IIIC, p. 764 
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repression, were compelled to resort to the politics of survival in which ideclogical 
issues and inconsistency in programme tended to be compromised, if not 
sacrificed, first." 
Finally in March 1929 the Government arrested 31 CPl and WPP leaders 
Which completely left CPI and WPP important leaders out of the work and the> 
were put behind the bar in the famous Meerut Conspiracy Case. 
III.2. The Meerut Conspiracy Case 1929-33 
The Meerut Conspiracy Case marked a significant landmark in the history of 
India's freedom struggle. It was instituted at a time when the entire world 
capitalism was passing through the Economic Crisis, and the newly bom socialist 
state of Soviet Russia was registering significant advances. The British attacked 
the leadership of the rising working class, peasant and revolutionary movements 
(called the terrorist movement) by launching the Meerut Conspiracy Case 
(directed against the rising communist movement). 
The year 1928 witnessed a much greater increase in the strenj^ t^h and 
influence of the Communist Party of India.''° It was towards the end of 1"28 that 
' ' D. N Dhanagre, Peasant movements in India. 1920-1950, Delhi, 1983, pp. 136-37 
''" It was towards the end of 1928 that the Communists had established their predommant position 
in the Trade Unions by organising the Bombay Cotton Mill Workers in the form ihc Girni 
Kamgar Union, and the workers of the Girni Indian Peninsular Railway in the powerful G I P 
Railway Men's Union. Similarly G.I.P. Railway Men's Union was also in the lands of 
orthodox Communists. Home Department Poll, F.No. 95/1930, p. 84. (Cf Arvind Kumar 
Sharma, "The Critical Years of the Indian Trade Union Movement: The Communis and the 
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the Communists had established their predominant position in the Trade Unions 
by organising the Bombay Cotton Mill Workers in the form the Girri Kamgar 
Union,^' and the workers of the Gimi Indian Peninsular Railway in the powerful 
G.l.P Railwaymen's Union.^^ Likewise the Communists had also established 
themselves in many other important industrial cities of the North/''' 1 he Royal 
Commission on Indian Labour has put it in the following words: 
'For some time efforts had been made by the Communists in india and 
from beyond its borders to capture the Labour Movement. These met ^vith their 
greatest success in Bombay in 1928'/"* 
It is interesting to note that the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' 
Party in Bombay and Calcutta was followed by a wave of industrial stiikes 
throughout 1928 and 1929^^ on the railroads, in ironworks and in the textile 
Trade Unionism 1929-33', Quarterly Review of Historical Studies, Vol. 24, No 1-4, I984-S5. 
p. 10) 
The Gimi Kamgar Union or the "Red" flag Union was a Communist body, ab ini id It was 
further developed and by the end of July, 1929, its membership was over 96,000. 
^' Similarly G.l.P. Railway Men's Union was also in the hands of orthodox Communists (Home 
Department Poll, F.No. 95/1930, p. 84) 
" N.P. Raman, Political Involvement of India's Trade Unions, Bombay. 1967. p. 3 
Royal Commission on Indian Labour, Delhi, pp.318-20 
In the year 1928 there had been much labour unrest in various parts of the countr>. of which 
Communist workers had been quick to take advantage. In particular they succeeded in 
exploiting the discontent felt by the cotton operatives in Bombay and the railvva\ v orkcrs in 
Lillooah near Calcutta in such a way as to bring about a temporary parahsis of essential 
services and important industries; riots and attacks on the police were frequent, and c\cr\ 
effort was made to stir up hatred not only against servants of the Crown but agamst 
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industry. 31 million working days were lost in 1928, through industrial disputes, 
Williamson writes that 'by the end of 1928, therefore, hardly a single public utilit\ 
service or industry remained which had not been affected by the wave of 
Communism which swept the country during the year'.^^ The dislocation of the 
jute and cotton industries and the railway services naturally focused the attention 
of the press and public on the activities of the Workers' and Peasants' parties. It 
became evident that the theory of Communism was being translated mto 
practice.^^ Trade unions nullified during this period. 
Moreover, under the new guidelines, given by the Sixth Congi ess of the 
Communist International the Indian Communists had been asked to pursue an 
ultia-leftist line,^^ that is to build up revolutionary trade unions, and to jeopardize 
the reformist trade unions. They were directed to organise local strikes and then to 
employers of labour, landlords, and the propertied classes generally. Agents sent from Britain 
had taken a prominent part in working up this situation, and had joined force^ \\ith Indian 
Communists recently released after serving sentences in connection with tl e Cawnporc 
Conspiracy Case of 1924, and with agitators in the rural areas of the United Provinces and 
Punjab. {India in 1932-33., A report Prepared for Parliament [the] Governmen of India Act 
(govt & econ conditions), Delhi, 1934, pp. 48-51) 
H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 98, observed, Transport, mdustrial and agricultural 
workers of every description, policemen, colliers and even scavengers were all subjected to. 
and many fell under, the baneful influence of this whirlwind propaganda campaign which 
promised them the sweets of revolution if they would but raise their hands tc grasp them 
Even youths of all classes were to be harnessed to the communist car of destojction and a 
network of study classes made its appearance alongside the shop and factor, committees 
which the campaign had brought into being. 
^^  India in 1927-28; A report Prepared for Parliament by J. Coalman, p. 342 
"^ V.B. Kamik, Indian Trade Unions: A Survey, Bombay, 1966. pp. 64-65 
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develop them into general revolutionary struggle for the establishment of a Soviet 
type of Government. ^ ^ 
It was in January 1929, that the Government's apprehensions about the 
growing communist movement and their influence among the worMng class 
became evident from the secret report of the Government. It reported that "the 
situation arising from the communist activities...is grave. The govemmei\t policies 
toward Communists are deplorable and it will encourage the Comminists and 
intensify the distrust of the Government's ability to maintain order which is 
already strongly felt in Bombay. In Calcutta also the Communists are 
strengthening their position and the very large gathering of labourt'rs under 
communist auspices invaded Congress Pandal...was a striking demonstiation of 
the degree to which the Communists were succeeding in getting hold of industrial 
labour." It suggested for action that could be taken against the Communist 
Movement such as:-
(a) Public Safety Bill to get rid of non-Indian Communists agents.. interceotions and 
confiscation of remittances from abroad in support of Communist movement 
(b) the Home Department successful prosecution of a comprehensive conspiracy case 
which would embrace all leading Communists 
(c) if emergency arises, for instance the outbreak of a general strike, which is 
apprehended in Bombay, the sub-committee consider it would be justifiable to use 
Regulation III for the purpose of detaining those persons whose act vities are 
dangerous to the state 
^^Ibid. 
"^ January- 9, 1929, Home (Poll), F. J8/XV11928 
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(d) possibility of using section 144 of CPC for particular areas and of tne Criminal 
Law Amendment Act Part II, which would enable dangerous associations to be 
declared unlawful 
(e) While the contempted conspiracy case will test the resources of the aw fully in 
regard to the specific communist activities now in progress. The Con^munist Bill 
71 
should be made as comprehensible as possible. 
The British Government initiated a Committee headed by Sir Charles 
Fawcett. The immediate result of their new tactics was the arrest of the 
Communist-cum-Labour leaders in the famous Meerut Conspiracy case The aitest 
of the well known communist leaders framed in the case meant remo\ al of them 
from the field of trade union activity. 
The colonial government also started other repressive measures ' o suppress 
the anti-imperialist upsurge accompanying the growth of the strike-struggles. The 
government introduced the Public Safety Bill in 1928 to curb Communist 
activities in India. It was rejected by the Legislative Assembly in \9.19 but was 
later issued as a special ordinance. The Trade Disputes Act was passed to provide 
conciliation machinery, prohibit sympathetic strikes and limit the right to strike in 
public utility services. This was an attempt to anticipate coming de> elopments 
which, under the leadership of the Communists, were turning towards a general 
strike in all industries to support the nationalist struggle. The Commanist Party 
was popularizing the idea among the workers and its increased influence on trade 
'' Ibid. 
" For detail see N.P. Raman, Political Involvement of India's Trade Unions. Bomb;,v 1967 pp. 
70-73 
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unions, and more especially among railway unions, created concern in official 
circles. 
The growing communist influence was perceived as a real dange to society 
in the eyes of the colonial Government and the mill owners/'* Tht measures 
against Communists came on the 20"" March, 1929 when, under instrut tions from 
the Government of India, were arrested thirty-one prominent labour le&ders (from 
trade union, peasants and youth leaders, including all prominent Communist 
leaders) in different parts of India and were brought to Meerut for trial, and thus 
commenced the famous Meerut Conspiracy Case. The charges were framed as the 
resuh of the inquiry into a complaint (P 2485), filed on March 15, n29. in the 
Court of the District Magistrate of Meerut Mr. R.A. Horton, Officer on Special 
Duty, imder the Director, Intelligence Bureau, Home Department of India. It runs 
as foliows:-
1. That there exists in Russia an organisation called the Communist International The 
aim of this organisation is, by creation of armed revolution, to overtlirow all the 
existing forms of Government throughout the world and to replace them by Soviet 
' B.T. Ranadive, 'The Role Played by Communists in the Freedom Struggle of India . Social 
Scientist, Vol. 12, No. 9, September 1984, p. 15 
Tlie situation was that the certain communist agitators had produced conditions o 'great unrest 
among the industrial population in Bombay city...In these circumstances the Go\emmcnt of 
India recognised that the situation in Bombay might at any time render it imperative to arrest 
these communist leaders. The situation has now completely changed. Thus ho case was 
launched and all prominent communist agitators in Bomba> have been arrested under the 
ordinary law and removed from Bombay for trial at Meerut. 'Letters to the Goxcmment of 
Bombay", Home (Poll) Department. F. No. I8/XVI/J928 
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Republics subordinate to, and controlled by the central Soviet adminisration in 
Moscow. 
2. That the said Communist International carries on its work and propaganda through 
various committees, branches, and organisations, controlled by and subject to itself, 
e.g., the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E C C I ). and 
various sub-committees of the same, including a sub-committee concerned with 
Eastern and Colonial affairs (Colonial Bureau); the Communist Party of Great 
Britain (C.P.G.B.), which is a section of the Communist International the Red 
Internationa] of Labour Unions (R.I.L.U.), the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, 
the League Against Imperialism, the Young Communist League (Y.C.L.) and various 
other bodies. 
3. That the ultimate objective of the said Communist International is the complete 
paralysis and overthrow of existing Governments in every country (including India), 
by means of a general strike and armed uprising. It bas outlined a programme or plan 
of campaign which should be followed for the achievement of this ultimatt objective 
Among the methods so ordained are: 
a) The incitement of antagonism between Capital and Labour. 
b) The creation of Workers' and Peasants' Parties, Youth Leagues, Unions, etc . 
ostensibly for the benefit of the members thereof, but in fact for the purpose 
of propaganda: the domination of such parties by Communists pledged to 
support the aims of the Communist International and the unificat on of such 
bodies under one control subservient to the Communist International 
c) The introduction of fractions or nuclei of such Communists with illegal 
objects as aforesaid into existing Trade Unions, Nationalist bodies and 
political and other organisations, with the object of capturing tie same or 
obtaining their support in the interests of the Communist International 
d) The encouragement of strikes, hartals, and agitation 
e) Propaganda by speeches, literature, newspapers, and the celebration of 
anniversaries connected with the Russian Revolution, etc., etc 
f) The utilisation and encouragement of any movements hostile to the 
Government 
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4. That in the year 1921 the said Communist International determined to ertablish a 
branch organisation in British India, and the accused Sripad Amrit Dange Shaukat 
Usmani and Muzaffar Ahmad entered into a conspiracy with certain other i^ersons to 
establish such branch organisations with a view to deprive the King Emperor of his 
sovereignty of British India. 
5. That thereafter various persons, including the accused Philip Spratt and Benjamin 
Francis Bradley were sent to India by the Communist International through the 
medium of one of its branches or organisations, and with the object of furthering the 
aims of the Communist International 
6. That the accused named in this complaint reside at different centres ihroughout 
British India. They have conspired with each other, and with other persons known or 
unknown within or without British India, to deprive the King Emperor of the 
sovereignty of British India, and for such purpose to use the methods and carry out 
the programme and plan of campaign outlined and ordained by the Communist 
International, and in fact they used such methods and carried out suzh plan of 
campaign with the assistance of, and financial support from, the Communist 
International. 
7. That the accused have met and conspired together as aforesaid at var ous places 
within and without British India, and amongst other at Meerut, and in pursuance of 
such conspiracy as aforesaid, the accused formed a Workers and Peasants' Party at 
Meerut and there held a Conference thereof 
8. That the above named accuseds have committed an offence under section 121A of 
the Indian Penal Code and within the jurisdiction of this Court It i^ , therefore, 
prayed that the Court will enquire into the above named offence " "^^  
The arrests were made under Section 121-A of the Indian Fenal Code 
which declares: "Whoever within or without British India conspires to t ommit any 
N.N. Mitra (ed.). The Annual Indian Register, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 67-68, Meenl C( 
Conspiracy Case (Sessions trial no. 2 of 1930), Vol. 1, 1932. pp. 3-4 Cf C.H. Philips (cd ). 
The Evohition of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947: Select Documents, London. 1962. pp 
258-59 
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of the offences punishable by Section 121 or to deprive the King of the 
sovereignty of British India or any part thereof, or conspires to overawe, by means 
of criminal force, the Government of India or any local Government shall be 
punished with transportation for life or any shorter term, or with impriso nnent of 
either description which may extend to ten years".^^ The charges made on behalf 
of the Crown were supported by a vast mass of documentary evidence For the 
purpose a comprehensive search operations were carried out simultaneously prior 
to the institution of the case. Communist books and papers, leaflets and other 
literature, letters couched in cryptic terms or written in invisible ink. j^lans of 
campaign, and codes and ciphers for use in communication with agencies in 
foreign lands, were amongst the documents seized and later exhibited liefore the 
courts.^^ On 29* April 1929, Haig wrote to Langford James mentioning Petiie's 
letter for an early decision. He further wrote that "(a) a judicial pronouncement is 
required as early as possible which will enable us to deal with the further 
manifestations of Communism and to prevent the Communist movement 
recovering from the blow which the arrest of the leaders has dealt it (b) From 
political point of view it would be able to convince the public in geneiai as eariy 
as possible that Communism is not the kind of movement that should eceive the 
Clemens Dutt, Conspiracy against the King, p. 19, Cf. L.P. Sinha, The Left-Win^ m India, p 
225. For detail charge sheet see pp. 225-228 
'''' H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 101. See for details, pp. 101-106 
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sympathy of the Nationalists. The opposition to the Public Safety Bill has created 
artificial and false atmosphere, and we want to set that right as soon as possible." 
The choice of Meerut as the place for launching a conspiracy was curious. 
Only two accused hailed from Meerut. Officially choice of Meerut was justified 
on the ground that in 1928 a conference of the Workers' and Peasants' Paity had 
taken place there. But the real motive behind the choice was that at Meerut there 
was no trial by jury; where as in Bombay and Calcutta (the two centrtis of the 
alleged conspiracy), in the face of frequent strikes, it was not considerec ))rudent 
to choose the place for trial.^ *^  
The Additional Sessions Judge, who then took up the hearing of the case on 
the 30"' January 1930, the judgment being awarded by justice Yorke en the 16 
January 1933 . The judge observed, 'there has been in existence in Russia an 
organisation known as the Communist International, which has its aim to bring 
about throughout the world a revolution or revolutions for the overthrowing of 
existing Governments and the establishment in their place of Soviet Republics 
similar to that established in Russia. This overthrow is expected and intended to be 
brought about by armed uprisings'. 'Secondly it has been clearly established that 
^^  To Langford James from Haig, 29 April, 1929, Home (Poll), F.No 10'iv 29-Poll 
''" LP. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, p. 228; the two Workers" and Peasants" Part> of United 
Provinces held their inaugural conferences one at Jhansi and the other at Meerut in October 
1928. H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 97 
*"' H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 103. Sentencing all but four of the thirt\-onc to 
varying terms of transportation and rigorous imprisonment 
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the Communist International works to that end through (1) various committees of 
its ovm, as for example the E.C.C.I. and its sub-committees, such as the Colonial 
Committee, (2) branches, such as the Communist Party of Great Britain, and (3) 
auxiliary organisations, as for example, the R.I.L.U., the National tvlinority 
Movement, the P.P.T.U.S, the League against Imperialism, the Young Communist 
League, the W.W.L.I. and other bodies. Some of these bodies are nominally 
independent, but in reality they are all controlled by the Communist International 
and are subject to it'.^ * 
It further stated that 'the method which have been laid dovn as a 
programme of work for the revolution in India, include (a) incitement gene rally of 
antagonism between Capital and Labour; (b) the creation of Workers' and 
Peasants' Parties, Youth Leagues, etc., but mainly in only for the purpose of 
propaganda; such parties to be organised and run by Communists; (c) in he case 
of existing Trade Unions, political bodies and their capture in the Communist 
interest by the introduction of fractions consisting of Communists; (d) 
encouragement of strikes, hartals and similar demonstrations; (e) propag.mda by 
speeches, newspapers, articles, leaflets, celebration of anniversaries and 'diys ; (f) 
Delivered by R.L. Yorke, Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut Communist Compinicv Case 
(Sessions trial no. 2 of 1930), Vol. 1, 1932, pp. 312-13, Cf. C.H. Philips (ed.). The jXo/utioii 
of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947: Select Documents, pp. 260-62 
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mutilation of any other movements hostile to Government, such as liardoli. 
Independence League etc ' 
It was the costliest Labour trials.^ ^^  Like the Cawnpore case earlier 
Nationalist Press and Nationalist leaders in India regarded the arrested p^irsons as 
nationalists and, therefore, deprecated the wholesale arrests. The Working 
Committee of the Indian National Congress even passed a resolution to the 
effect.'*'* Mahatma Gandhi held that the arrests were made by a panicky 
government to strike terror. 
In general, the Communists among them defended Marxism, proletarian 
internationalism and admitted that they were Communists and had been members 
oftheCPI.^^ 
Muzaffar Ahmad, a convict in the case, proudly mentions that the 
communist ideology came to be established in India from the time ol Meerut 
'' Ibid, 
This important trial, which lasted for nearly four and a half years and cost Government over Rs 
18 lakhs, was concluded before the Sessions Court on 15th January 1933. India in I )S2-33: A 
report Prepared for Parliament [the] Government of India Act (govt & econ ccnditions). 
Delhi, 1934, pp. 48-51 
'^ Indian Annual Register. 1929, p. 31. Even men like Jawaharlal Nehru and Kailash Nath Katju 
were on the Legal Committee which defended the accused. 
**' D.G. Tendulkar: See Mahatma, Vol. II, pp. 468-69; Gandhiji visited the Meerut jail tc meet the 
Meerut Conspiracy Case prisoners (mostly Communists) and to tell them that the Congress 
had decided to complete independence as its goal. "Now you should have no (omplamt 
against me", Gandhiji had remarked, and asked for the support of the Meerut prisoners M 
Farooqi, India's Freedom Struggle and the Communist Party of India, 1974. New Dt Ihi. p 49 
' ' L.P. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, p. 236 
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Conspiracy Case".^^ On the other side a high official of the Govemmem of India 
had written of the judgment that "it is satisfactory that by this d(.cision a 
conspiracy, fraught with the gravest dangers to the well-being of India, has been 
stopped at an early stage; it is even more important that it has been held ihat these 
activities, which might be regarded by some as harmless or even beneficial, have 
been revealed in their true light as an attempt to overthrow by revolutionary 
methods the Government established by law in India". 
Thus, we see that the case was concluded by saying that 'moreover i became 
increasingly evident during 1933 that the agitators who carry out the policy of the 
Communist International and the Indian terrorists whose activities we will 
consider in a moment have nowadays a great deal ideologically in common, and. 
SO far as they differ, do so over means rather than ends'. 
III.3 Draft Platform of Action for India 
The Meerut arrests created inexperienced communist leaders out of jail, 
while the prominent leaders were behind the bar and subsequent repression had 
" Muzaffar Ahmad, Communist Party of India (Years of Formation) 1921-1933, Calcutta. 1959. 
p. 35; According to B T. Ranadive, the Meerut case was 'a tribute to the anti-imperialist 
political work' done by the Communists among the Workers, peasants, and >outh BT 
Ranadive, 'The Role Played by Communists in the Freedom Struggle in India" in B T 
Ranadive and Jyoti Basu, Role of Communists in the Struggle for Independent e Fiftieth 
Anniversary- Independence Series No. 2, CPI (M) Publications, New Delhi, n.d.. p. Id 
H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 105 
India in 1932-33: A report Prepared for Parliament [theJ Government ol India Act (govi A-
econ conditions), Delhi, 1934, p. 51 
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90 posed a serious challenge before the communist movement in India. At the same 
time the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) was launched by Gandliiji but it 
did not remain non-violent.^' Riots broke out in India's major cities and numerous 
confrontations were reported between local demonstrators and police. Two of the 
most serious threats to British authority occurred in Bombay Presidency and the 
North-West Frontier. In May 1930, the Textile Workers of Sholapur, a textile 
centre in Bombay, managed to establish their own regime for few days. 
Even in 1930, when the Comintern was passing through the phase of left 
extremism, Kuusinen contested the claim that the time of armed upr smg had 
arrived in India and warned against the too simple estimation of the Indian 
situation, since in India the Communist Party was very weak and hardh had any 
presence.^^ 
" In Bengal, Abdul Halim was the only leading figure that the British police did not put behind 
the bars. In Madras, Singaravelu came out of jail after 18 months in August 193(. when the 
Civil Disobedience Movement was in full swing in Bombay, S.V. Dcshpand( and B T 
Ranadive tried to keep the trade union front going. Harkishan Singh Surjeet ot a! (cds ). 
History of the Communist Movement in India: The Formative Years J 920-1933. p 192 
Civil Disobedience Movement was started against the British government exploitati^ e ailc. For 
detail see, Sumit Sarkar, Modern India; Bipan Chandra, India's Struggle for Independence 
and also papers of the period are full of ever>' noting of the movement. We are not concern 
with CDM in detail 
''' Walter T. Wallbank, A Short History of India and Pakistan. Cf, Pankaj Kumar. \>mmunisi 
Movement in India, New Delhi, 1989, p. 142 
Sobhanlal Dutta Gupta, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India 919-1943: 
Dialectics of Real and Possible History, pp. 40-41 
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But the Comintern called Civil Disobedience Movement merely as an 
'oppositional manoeuvre' forced on a reluctant Congress by the "pressure of the 
masses." '^* In December 1930 there appeared, first in the Infematicnal Press 
Correspondence, the official organ of the Communist International, and later in 
the London Daily Worker and the Moscow Pravda, a thesis on Indian 
Communism entitled "Draft Platform of Acfion of the Communist Paity of India" 
while the Meerut trial was on Draft Platform of Action was a comprehensive 
document^^ and was based on the new orientation decided upon by he Sixth 
World Congress. It was later translated into Urdu by an Indian member of the 
Comintern staff in Moscow. A reprint made in Bombay was widely circ ulated at 
the Karachi Congress in March 1931.^^ 
The Draft Platform of Action basing itself on Marxism and Leninism. 
marked departure from the poUcy of bourgeois-feudal outlook and linked the 
success of anti-imperialist struggle with the agrarian revolution and the aboHtion 
of all social inequalities. In a forthright manner it declared war on all inherited 
inequalities and linked this struggle with the fight against imperialism, c ailing on 
'^ ^ Inprecor XI. 33, 1929, pp. 589-95, Cf. Pankaj Kumar, p. 143; MR. Masani in his article. The 
Communist Part\' in India', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, March, 1951. p. 20. wite that the 
Indian Communist Party stood apart from the Civil Disobedience movements of 1 J30-31 and 
1932-34. They concentrated on the small urban working class. They indeed denounced them 
as bourgeois, reactionar>' and calculated to distract the Indian masses from the re il struggle. 
presumably led by the Communists themselves. 
''^  H. Williamson, India and Communism, p. 119; ft)r fiill text see, 'Draft Platform o ' /\ction of 
the Communist Party of India', International Press Correspondence, 18 December : 930 
""^  L.P. Sinha, 77?^  Left-Wing in India, p. 245 
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all sections to join the battle for freedom. Never before did India sec such a 
revolutionary document directly addressing the problems of all sections of Indian 
people, as well as the immediate needs of the revolutionary struggles to overthrow 
the British rule.'^ ^ 
After vigorous denunciation of Gandhism and the Indian National 
Congress, this document advanced the following as the main tasks of the Indian 
Communist Party:-
1. "The Complete independence of India by the violent overthrow ot British 
rule. The cancellation of all debts. The confiscation and nationalization of all 
British factories, banks, railways, sea and river transport, and plantation. 
2. The establishment of a Soviet government. The realisation of the right of 
national minorities to self-determination including separation. Tht abolition 
of the Native States. The creation of an Indian Federal Workers" and 
Peasants' Soviet Republic. 
3. The confiscation, without compensation of all lands, forests and other 
property of the landlords, ruling princess, churches, the British Government 
officials, and moneylenders, and the handling of them over for jse by the 
toiling peasantry. The cancellation of slave agreements and all indebtedness 
of the peasantry to moneylenders and banks. 
Harkishan Singh Surjeet and Basu et al.(eds.), History of the Communist Movemem m India: The 
Formative Years 1920-1933, p. 199; B.T. Ranadive, 'The Role Played b\ Comiminists in the 
Freedom Struggle of India\, Social Scientist, Vol. 12, No. 9. September 1984. p. ) 
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4. The eight-hour working day and the radical improvement of cond tions of 
labour. Increase in wages and State maintenance for the unemployed.' 
The Platform declared: "In order to destroy the slavery of Indian people and 
emancipate the working class and peasant from the poverty which is crushing then 
down, it is essential to win the independence of the country and to raise tfe banner 
of agrarian revolution which would smash the system of landlordism surviving 
from the middle ages and would cleanse the whole of the land from the medieval 
mbbish. An agrarian revolution against British capitalism and landlordism must be 
basis for revolutionary emancipation."^^ 
However, due to the serious sectarian understanding and the absence of a 
rousing call for joining the movement in the draft platform and becaase of its 
attitude towards the Congress leadership particularly its right wing- Communists 
in general more or less kept aloof from the movement.'*'° 
*^ H. Williamson, Indian and Communism, pp. 119-20;, Jyoti Basu and others (eds.), lk)cnmenis 
of the Communist Movement of India, Vol. Ill, 1929-38, pp. 75-91 
Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.). History of the Communist Movement in India. The 
Formative Years 1920-1933, p. 200 
"" In Trade Union we see that there appeared two split within a period from 1929-31 The first split 
appeared in November-December 1929 at Nagpur and another when the communist ot at all 
cost wanted to wrest control of the unions from the hands of the "agents of the bourgeois" 
whether 'moderate' or nationalist culminating in a fiirther split in the AITUC ;it the Calcutta 
session of July 1931. For detail study on these splits see, B.L. Mehta, Trade Unon Movement 
in India, Delhi, 1991; the Gimi Kamgar Union, the mainstay of the Communist Part> in 
Bombay, split into two groups, the reformist and communist, the former advoca ing support to 
the National Congress, the latter regarding it as inimical to the "interests of th* workers who 
were being deceived by the Congress. The second communist group was led b\ S V 
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B.T Ranadive made a self criticism of the Party 'Draft Platform ol Action" 
argued that the Platform contained very mistaken and wrong notions abou the role 
of the Indian bourgeoisie. This led to sectarian attitudes in 1930 which did great 
damage to the Party's image among the people, leading to a misunderstanding 
about its revolutionary outlook and programme. The Party, however, :onected 
these mistakes and did not repeat them when it adopted its prog ammatic 
document in 1934. The second error in of the Platform consisted in not uroviding 
for a transitional state from Uke the one based on the Constituent Assembly It 
talked only of Soviet State. Notwithstanding these errors, the Communist Part> 
was armed with a proper revolutionary understanding and programme for national 
liberation, which was based on the class realities of Indian societies.' 
Thus, by the mid of 1932 the Indian communist movement was in serious 
trouble. There was little Communist activity outside of Bombay, Ca cutta and 
Nagpur, and almost no coordination of efforts between these centres. Tie Meerut 
prisoners wrote several memoranda to the Comintern during tfis period 
complaining of the weakness of the Communist Party of India and suggesting the 
Deshpande and B T. Ranadive, who claimed to represent the "Official" Communist Part\. The 
Deshpande-Ranadive group organised the Young Workers" League in June 19.'0 before their 
expulsion from the Gimi Kamgar Union. Home (Poll.) File No. 7/20 1934 and K W. of l'-)34. p 
2. Cf, B.B. Mishra, 77?^? Indian Political Parties: An Historical Analysis ofPolit cal Behaviour 
iipto 1947, Delhi, 1976, p. 256 
"" B.T. Ranadive, 'The Role Played by the Communists in the Freedom Struggle of India". Social 
Scienti.vt, Vol. 12, No. 9, September 1984, pp. 11-12 
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formation of a Provincial Central Committee, the adoption of a new constitution, 
and the establishment of a regular party apparatus on all-India basis. 
Soon thereafter an article appeared in the InlematiomJ Press 
Correspondence which purported to be an "Open Letter" to the Communist Paity 
of India from the Communist Party of China, Great Britain, and Geimany. It 
criticised the Indian Communists along lines similar to the Meerut critiques and 
urged to form an effective underground Communist Party, while at the same time 
working through various legal organisations. Although the Communist Party of 
India was advised to continue its exposure of "left national reformist," the Paitv 
was warned that it would be "a great mistake to continue the practice of self 
isolation from...the mass trade unions which are under the infuence of 
reformists."'^^ 
"'" H. Williamson, Indian and Communism, pp. 182-83 
"" Inprecor, XI, 1932, p. 347, Cf., Pankaj Kumar, p. 145; This letter made criticism of 
Communists' isolation from the mass movement. It sa>s 'the general pii turc of the 
Communist movement is not satisfactor>'...it consists of a small number of x e^ak groups. 
often isolated from the masses, disconnected with each other...now represeits the mam 
danger to the revolutionary proletarian movement.' It further noted that "the bu,gest mistake 
made by Indian Communists consists of the fact that in reality they stood aside f om the mass 
movement of the people against British imperialism... the self isolation of Communists from 
the anti-imperialist mass struggle as a movement alleged to be purely a Congre; s movement. 
has created confusion among the communist movement, 'The Parties Letter to the Indian 
Communists" An open Letter written by the Communist Party of China, Gre; t Britain and 
Germany, May 1932, (Jyoti Basu and others (eds.), Documents of the C ommurisi Movement 
of India. Vol. Ill, 1929-38, pp. 18-20) 
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Conrad Wood writes that the CPI failure in the trade union movement m 
1929-32 is shown to have been basically a result not only of the Party's leftism m 
general but also of CPI antagonism to the national movement in partici lar. The 
party followed negative attitude to the Indian national movement as well as 
considered Congress as the bourgeois organisation and kept aloof from it. 
But when the Meerut prisoners came out of jail in August 1933, and later 
formed their Provincial Central Committee in December that year, they faced a 
situation which was somewhat different. The political theses adopted by the 
Provisional Central Committee in December 1933 states that "the supremacy of 
British imperialism is the basis of the backwardness, poverty and endless suffering 
of our [Indian] people. Only by the merciless and violent destruction of the 
political and economic supremacy of the British Imperialist will the working class 
of India succeed in rising to their feet, achieving independence."'*^^ Die strike 
figure, which had fallen shortly in 1932 after rising steadily during 1929-31. 
picked up again in 1933, so that the Government had to admit ruefully that though 
the Meerut leadership was in jail. Communist "menaces remains and intensified." 
'"^  Conrad Wood, The Impact of Ultra-Leftism on the Communist Party of India. 1^28-36 . 
Journal of Indian History, April 1973, Vol. LI, Part, S.N. 151. p. 350 
"Draft Political Theses of the CPI adopted by the Provisional Central C ommittcc in 
December", Jyoti Basu et al. (eds.). Documents of the Communist Movement if India. Vol. 
Ill, p. 143 
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III.4 Government's anti-Communists measures 1934-1937 
The Communist movement started in India in the 1920s. The British 
government determined to suppress the burgeoning movement, came down 
heavily on the Communists, especially in the context of the Peshawar Case 
(Moscow conspiracy Case, 1922-23) and the Kanpur Conspiracy Case (1924). 
After the introduction of the Public Safety Bill (September 10, 1928), it batched a 
conspiracy case against the Communists as is exemplified in the Meerut 
Conspiracy Case (1929-33) leading to the arrest of almost all the prominent 
Communists. The year 1933 opened a new chapter in the histor/ of the 
Communist Movement; as it moved towards reorientation and reorganisation. This 
growing popularity of the Communist Party of India (CPI) alarmed tht colonial 
authorities, which took several measures against Indian Communists. 
The British government's hostihty heightened in the wake of the 
communist perception that their movement was likely to develop and succeed as a 
strong anti-imperialist movement. Time and time again, Colonial authonties and 
officials expressed their anxiety against the Communists. Thus, for instance, the 
All-India Council of the European Association opined that 'Commun sm. in its 
revolutionary stage, makes use of every weapon to overthrow the "Ordered 
government'. It further asserted that 'in Bengal the two movements i e. the 
terrorist and communist, both actuated by a quasi-religious fervour sought to upset 
imperialist capitalist regimes.' Further 'at present time very considerable support 
would be forthcoming for legislation designed to meet the kindred menaces of 
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terrorism and communism'.'°^ The General Secretary of the Association wrote to 
the Secretary of State for India, on 27 May, 1934, that the present conditions of 
unrest all over the world, coupled with an agrarian and industrial crisis in India, 
would inevitably strengthen the communist doctrines. He highlighted that the 
strikes in the last year in the Bombay Cotton Mills and of the Calcutta Stevedores 
Labour were aggravated by communist activities'. Further, he aski^ d for the 
extension of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (1932) in order to enable the 
government to combat communism.'"^ M.G. Hallet recognizing the danger of 
'communist menaces', to the European Association wrote that all India legislation 
may be needed to counter it. 
To celebrate the anniversary of the Greater Indian Peninsula Railway 
strike of 1930, a meeting was held in Bombay on 4^^ February 1934 under the 
joint auspices of the Gimi Kamgar Union, the Lai Bavta Gimi Kamgar 1 Jnion and 
the Young Workers League. A resolution supporting the All-India Textile 
Workers' Conference's decision to declare a general strike was passed. In 
reaction, the government arrested the strike leaders; i.e. V.B. Karnik. R.S 
Nimbkar, and Lalji Pendse under Section 3 of the Bombay Special (Emergency) 
Powers Act of 1932. On 30* August, 1934 Dange, Maniben Kara and P B 
^"^ Home Poll. 7/13/34: All India Council of European Association. 15 Mar:h. 19.^ 4 
Home Poll, 7'11/34: General Secretary of European Union to the Secretar\ of 
State, India (SOS), 27 May, 1934. 
"" Home Poll 7/11/34: M.G, Hallett (S.O.S.) to General Secretary. European 
Association, 30 May, 1934. 
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Kanpule were arrested and charged under Section 17(1) of the Indian Trade 
Dispute Act 'for having declared, instigated others to take part in st ike, which 
was illegal under Section 16 of the Act.''°'^ Similarly Muhammad Yusuf was 
sentenced to fifteen days' imprisonment for causing obstruction to tiaffic while 
distributing leaflets'. He was the General Secretary of Mill Mazdur Union. 
Ahmadabad and a member of the CPI. Found in possession of twenty e ight copies 
of the Communist and prosecuted under the Indian Press (Emergency) l^ owers Act 
of 1931, he was sentenced to IV2 months 'rigorous imprisonment'. R.D Bhardwaj, 
a Bombay communist was sentenced to two years imprisonment under Section 
124-A, IPC for delivering a speech at Ahmadabad. Similarly, S.G. Tanibitkar was 
sentenced to three months' 'rigorous imprisonment', on 29 May, 1934. for 
delivering a speech at a meeting of mill strikers.'^'' 
The communist activities posed a severe threat to the government. On 20 
July, 1934, the Secretary of State asked the Governor of Bombay to intioduce an 
anti-Communist Bill at a time when memories of the strike were still fresh. " 
Finally, on 23rd July, the Government of India issued a notification declanng the 
Communist Party of India, its Committees and branches, as 'unlawful associations 
™Home Poll. 7 120/1934: April 1934. 
'^" Home Poll. (KW) 7/20/1937: May 1934. 
Home Poll. 7/2/1934: Letter from the Secretary of State to His E\ccllcncy 
Government of Bombay, 20 July, 1934. 
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within the meaning of part 2 of Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908\ 
The reason for this action were given that 'the Meerut Conspiracy case had proved 
that the Communist Party of India was a revolutionary party with tne avowed 
object of overthrowing the existing order of society and bringing about India's 
independence by means of violent revolution, seeking to secure this object by 
mass revolutionary action, strikes, demonstrations etc. culminating in general 
strikes and armed insurrections.''^^ This was in light of the Commanist Party 
emerging on an altogether new and ambitious scale, and its efforts to secure 
control over workers organisations in various parts of India. Consequently, the 
Central government recognized the necessity to declare the CPl and its subsidiary 
organisations as 'unlawful'.'*'* The result was inevitable. The government ban 
^^-Indian Annual Register (lAR) 1934, Vol. II, New Delhi, 1990. p.27. . The reason 
for the ban was that the 'association and its branches had for t icir object 
interfered with the administration of law and constituted a dangei to public 
peace"; Subodh Roy, ed. Communism in India, Unpublished Documents l'-)35-
1945., Calcutta, 1972, p. 89 
Subodh Roy (ed.). Communism in India. Unpublished Documents 193:-1945. pp 
89-90. The Central Government's intention was to give a lead in dechinng a war 
on Communism in India root and branch and to show to the country a large that 
there was no intention of temporizing with the forces of communism m India. It 
was recognised at the time that, apart from the psychological effei t the ban 
would act as deterrent by obstructing and impeding Communist activit\ in India 
in forcing the movement (if it continued) underground, and thereby prc\ cnting 
it from developing into the open mass revolutionary movem-nt which 
Communism in its later stages aims to become in order to succeed 
"•*//owe Poll, 7/5/39. 
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achieved its purpose; it was able to prevent communism from developing into an 
organised movement all over India. 
Yet, the Communists were not disheartened. Not surprisingly, tlie Bombay 
Provincial Branch of the CPI issued a leaflet urging the people to "Unite under the 
Banner of the Communist Party", despite the government's proclamation of the 
ban. It further maintained that the Communist Party 'Strenuously opposes the 
naked dance of the Czarist rule started by the British imperialists'. It lighlighted 
the colonial government's policy of crushing all labour organisations unctioning 
on communist lines. 'This policy of government had been fully supported by the 
capitalists, zamindars, and sawkars of India', it added. Further, the chief problem 
in India was to overthrow imperialism and to establish the workers' and peasants" 
rule'."^ 
In Punjab, the "Kirti" group was recognised as the Indian counterpart of the 
Ghadr organisation in America. Inspired by communist beliefs, over 5( Kirti Sikh 
Communists had undergone expert training in Moscow as representati\es of the 
Ghadr Party.'^^ The Punjab Government, on lOth September 1934, declared five 
associations as unlawful under Section 16(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
' "Translat ion of a Marathi Leaflet issued by the Bombay Provincial Branch of the 
CPI, Home Poll. 7 14/34 
^^^Home Poll 216 1940 
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of 1908."^ Under the same provision, the Bombay government d<.>clared ten 
organisations as unlawful. 
A conference of the Police held in November 1934, which established that 
the notification under the Criminal Law Amendment Act had some immediate 
effect in checking the movement. Yet in Punjab, the movement was agrarian in 
nature and prompt internment of prominent organisers had actually contiibuted to 
its great success. However, similar colonial control in Madras had ctiecked the 
development of the movement. The conference thus, recommended 'the passage of 
draft revolutionary movement Bill as essential if communism vv'as to be 
checked.'"'' 
The government introduced another measure to combat communism, i.e. 
through propaganda material. For instance, the U.P. Publicity Department issued a 
pamphlet entitled "Communistic Likes and Dislikes" in which Jawaharlal Nehru 
was projected as the high priest of communism in India and as having no faith in 
religion.'^'' Likewise, "The Communist Solar System"'^' and re\ision and 
' " O n these associations see. Home Poll (K.W.). 7/20/1934: Letter of Government 
of Punjab to Under Secretary of State for India, London, 17"" September. 1934 
'"^On these associations see Home Poll. (K.W.) 7/20/1934 Letters from Secretary to 
the Government of Bombay, 24 September, 1934. 
^^'^ Home Poll, 7^25/34: Extract from Para 18 from the report of the Conference of 
Police. 14 December, 1934. 
^-"Home Poll. 7/J3/1934. 
^-^ Home Poll, 4/11934 
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reprinting of "India and Communism"'^^ were circulated. As a deliberite attempt 
to prevent the extremist labour leaders and Communists from intermeddlmg in the 
affairs of the textile industry of Bombay city, Bombay Trade Disputes 
Conciliation Bill was submitted to the Bombay Legislative Counc 1 on 14th 
August, 1934.'2^ 
In Calcutta, thirteenth working men's organisations (according to Colonial 
administration had interference with the administration of the law an i with the 
maintenance of law and order and constitute a danger to the public), directly or 
indirectly, affiliated with the Communist Party were banned in 1935 unaer Section 
16(1) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908. These orj.,anisations 
were as follows:- (I) The Calcutta Communist Party, (2) The Calcutta Port and 
Dock Workers' Union, (3) The Workers' and Peasants' Party (Bengal Branch). (4) 
The Calcutta Committee of the CPl, (5) Kirti Dal, Bengal, (6) The Workers^ Party 
of India, (7) The Indian Proletarian Revolutionary Party, (8) The B(mgal Jute 
Workers Union, (9) The Bengal Match Factory Workers' Union, (10) The Cit> 
Motor and Transport Workers' Union, (11) The River Steam Navigation and India 
General Navigation and Railway Companies Workers Union.,(12) The Youth 
League, Bengal, and (13) The Chhatra Juba Samsad.'^" 
'^^//owe Poll 1-7,21/34 
'" Dick Kooiman, Bombay Textile Labour. Managers, Trade Unionists ana Officials 
1918-1939, Delhi, 1989, pp.90-92 
'-'* Home Poll. 7/20/37: 'Notification by the Government of Bengal. Political 
Department, No. 1110-P.S., Calcutta, 1 March, 1935. Where as the Governor-General 
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After these organisations were declared as 'unlawful', their olfices were 
raided and searched. The police seized a large quantity of 'objectionable' 
literature. About twenty men, including Bankim Mookerji, Somnath Lahiri, K.C. 
Mitter, Phani Dutt, Gopen Chakravarty and Dharambir Sirgh, were 
interrogated. ^ ^^  In Punjab, during the course of three years 1933-55) eight Moscow 
trained members of the Ghadr Party were intercepted and interrogated by the 
police. Till 1935, the police identified twenty to forty trained Commanists who 
had returned to India and were working in different places. Sim larly. S.S. 
Mirajkar, who had left India in March 1935, to attend the Third International at 
1 27 
Moscow was arrested and sent back to India from Singapore. 
The British government was given a memorandum by the Central 
Publication Branch, Delhi for dealing with; (I) the suppression of oommunist 
agitation in India, (II) restricting the entry of Communists into India. Though there 
in Council is of opinion that the associations specified in the schedule hereto appended ha\c 
for their object interference with the administration of the law and with the maintenance of 
law and order and constitute a danger to the public peace. 
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Sect on 16 of the 
Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (XIV of 1908), the Governor ii Council is 
pleased to declare the said associations to be unlawful associations within the meaning of Part 
II of the said Act'. 
'-'Home Foil, 24/15/35; Statesman, Delhi, 8 March 1935. 
'"" Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement in Punjab, p. 109 (The number of the Ghadr Part> 
students in Moscow in 1935 was 60, according to Williamson. See hi; India and 
Communism, p.270). 
^-^ Home Poll, 44 32/1942 
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was a special enactment for dealing with 'Communism' in India, following 
provisions of the general laws were enforced in times of emergency: 
1. Section 121A and 124 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 
2. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. 
3. The Regulation III of 1818, 
4. The Foreigners Act, 1864, 
5. Provisions for detention under certain provincial enactment, e.g. Madras 
and Bombay Regulation, the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act, 1932 In 
addition, the entry of Communists and other 'undesirable persons' into ndia, was 
controlled by the Passport Act. 
On 17*^ ^ October 1935, Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Bill was 
extended, in view of its expiry on December 15, 1935. Sir Robert Bell, Home 
Member, maintained that the object of the Bill was to deal effectively with 
communism and terrorism. More so, communism posed the greatest danger to the 
British as it was steadily growing and 'taking a firm footing in large industrial 
cities exploiting the grievances of industrial workers'.'^^ In a similar vein, the 
Punjab Criminal Law Amendment Bill was passed by the council.'^*' 
Despite the ban on the Communist Party, the government remained highly 
suspicious and insecure. Thus, on 8 January 1936, the Bombay Police carried out 
-^ Memorandum from the Central Publication Branch, Delhi. No s.p <'235 7. 12 
March \935,Home Poll, 7/3/35 
^^^'^Indian Annual Register, 1935, Vol.11, p.29. 
''"Ibid., p. 197 
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house search and raids arresting four persons with the assistance of ttie Lahore 
Pohce, accusing them of carrying on Communist activities in the city and 
distributing communist Uterature.'^' On 5th February 1936, the ( ID made 
investigations in Lucknow, with the help of the police. Similar probe were 
conducted in Allahabad.'^^ On 12 May 1936, twenty one houses in Lahcre and six 
in Amritsar were raided, but nothing 'incriminating' was found.'^^ In Calcutta the 
shop of "Messrs Books of the World" was inspected and books were recovered. 
Communist literature was found in Ajay Kumar Ghosh's house. A case was 
registered against him under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, but ae evaded 
arrest. The headquarters of the CPl was also raided and the papers seized 
demonstrated a close coimection between the CPI and the Comintern.''*^ 
This was not all. The Jail guards and officers even found Communists 
activities in the Deoli Detention jail, especially the communist meeting that was 
being organised. They got hold of the placards bearing the words "workers of the 
world unite." They found that the 'organisation though not effective was in the 
process of formation'; and hence they took steps to prevent the giowth of this 
'''Ibid, 1936, Vol.1, p.4 
" '76 /J , p.6 
'^'Ibid, Vol.11, p. 186 
134 Ibid, p. 187 
''•Home Poll 44'32/43 
''''Home Poll. 7/6'36. 
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organisation by prohibiting inter-camp entry and restricting the time allotted for 
1 ^7 
playing in the field. 
Reviewing the 'terrorist situation' in India during 1936, the official report 
highlighted that the 'terrorist leaders' had, in fact, accepted somt form of 
communist creed, as the communist programme included not only violent mass 
revolutions but also the desire to obtain the assistance of peasants and workers as 
their allies. It was difficult to differentiate between the terrorists and Communists 
as the former's literature was full of 'hackneyed communist phrases'. In Bengal 
and the United Provinces the chief characteristic of 'terrorism' during i 936 was a 
continued shift of the so-called terrorists towards communism. One time teiTorists 
came to form communist organisations in Kanpur, Lucknow, Allahabad, Benaras. 
Meerut and Jhansi. Even in Delhi communism intermixed with terror sm.'^ *^  and 
the government kept a vigilant eye on them. 
The C.I.D. reports on Police Administration in Punjab (1936) establish that 
the ban on the main communist organisation had in fact, failed to check the growth 
and spread of communist doctrines. The underground activities of the communist 
agents, however, continued unabated. The Punjab Criminal Law Amendment Act 
proved effective in combating these activities. The report appreciated and lauded 
the capture of Gurumukh Singh, a convict in the 1914-15 conspiracy cases. The 
' " / / o w e Poll. 43'37/36: Review of the Terrorist Situation in India duriiig the year 
1936. 
^'^Home Poll. 43'37/36 
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police continually monitored and controlled the 'subversive activities of potential 
terrorists and active Communists'. ^ 
The Director of the Intelligence Bureau dispatched letters to the local 
government asking them to proscribe the All India Press Workers Federation, a 
communist organisation and other branches under the Criminal Law A nendment 
Act, 1908 and to keep strict vigilance over the activity of the Federation.'^" The 
police, in its confidential report, supported the proposal for declaring this 
organisation and its allied bodies as unlawful; especially as the activi ies of the 
union and the federations were indistinguishable from those of the C ommunist 
Party. After all, they actively participated in the observances of "May Day". 
"Russian Revolution Day", Lenin Day", Paris Commune Day", etc. Tlie guiding 
principle of the federation was to organise the press workers on the basis of "class-
consciousness" to fight the capitalist and imperialist offensive.''*' 
The formation of the Progressive Writers' Association (1936), heightened 
the administrative anxieties, in the light of 'its avowed purpose of spreading 
communistic ideas'. Thus, its activities were seriously monitored and carefully 
reported by colonial officials.'''^ 
" ' Home Poll. 113/1937: Extract from Report on Police Administrat on in the 
Punjab for the year 1936. 
*' Home Poll. 7.5/36: Director of Intelligence Bureau to all local Governnicnt 
^^^ Home Poll. 7'5/36: Head Police Office, Confidential 12 June. 1936. 
^"•'-Home Poll 7/9/1936 
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On the eve of the Faizpur session of the Congress, in December 1936, 
International Communism called upon the Indian Communists to issist and 
support the Indian National Congress's movement for liberation. "* It held that the 
CPI was playing a major role in moulding and organising the worken, peasants 
and middle classes against imperialism. It laid emphasis on the unity of all the 
anti-imperialist forces.^ '*'* In early 1937, the Home Department in India declared 
the Communist Party of India as a section of the Communist Intematicnal and as 
being supported and guided by the Comintern. It further maintained that the 
'menace of Communism in India must be judged on these, as well as on purely 
internal considerations.'^'*^ 
The British government's hostility continued thereafter. On June 12, 1937, 
for instance, twelve men were charged with conspiracy for having assisted the 
operations of the CPI in Calcutta.''**' Likewise, in the same year a number of 
houses were searched at Kanpur soon after the celebration of "May Day", and 
communist literature was found.''^ ^ In another instance, two students ol Allahabad 
University were arrested for their links with the 'banned Communist Party' on 
Harry Pollit, R. Palme Dutt, and Ben Bradley, 'The United National Front . 
Inprecor, Vol.16, No.50, 7 November, 1936, Cf. Shashi Bairathi, Communism 
and Nationalism in India, A Study in Inter-Relationship 1919-1 "47. Delhi. 
1987, p.51. 
'^Ibid. 
145 Home Poll 7'7/1937 
1-16 
147 
Indian Annual Register, 1937, Vol.1, p. 15 
Ibid., p.231 
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14th June 1937.''*^ And this was not all. The Punjab government did not issue a 
passport to M.A. Majid, convicted and sentenced in the Meerut Conspi acy Case, 
to go to Australia.'"*^ 
In a similar vein, the Bombay government found Chaman Lai to be in 
possession of 'prohibited books banned under the General Communist and another 
notifications', after his arrival in Bombay on November 1, 1937, by the S.S. 
"Conte Biancamano."'^° The Chief Secretary wrote to the Madras government for 
the confiscation of literature under the general communist notification; as the 
existing notification was not adequate for checking 'the continuous, urderground 
and subversive communist literature'. In addition, section 4(1) of the Irdian Press 
(Emergency) Powers Act, 1931 was not effective enough to deal with the 
communist propaganda which had acquired an international character. So strict 
controls were employed to scrutinize and monitor the list of oommunist 
publications and dispatches.'^' 
Despite the CPI and its affiliated organisations being declared unlawful in 
1934, the Communist movement did not die down. Neither did it lose its 
momentum. In fact, in many ways, it strengthened itself against all odds.' And yet 
its mode of operation and strategy underwent some transformation, is it allied 
'^'ibid., p.232 
'^^Ihid.. p.233 
'"'Home Poll, 41'27/37 
Home Poll. 37/J2/37: Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras. 2 7 
November. 1937. 
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itself strongly with the Congress Socialist Party, the Indian National Congress and 
other mainstream Left parties, in their never ending struggle against imperialism. 
And the commmiist influence had markedly increased in Bengal revolutionaries, 
workers, peasants, students and youth. 
The British government's efforts to crush them did not diminish their 
commitment and conviction to socialism, anti-imperialism and comnmnism. In 
fact, the British repression hardened their resolve to oppose imper alism and 
capitalism, and sharpened their commitment to the idea and vision of an 
independent and socialist India. This reality was not lost out to a colonial official, 
M.G. Hallet, who wrote that "as for M.N. Roy, every little act of a real ('ommunist 
is a blow to Imperialism, so too, I suppose it right be said that every little act of a 
1 S9 
real Imperialist is a blow at Communism." 
III.4. United Front 
The later half of the 1930s witnessed sharp changes in the irtemational 
situation, and following them, the situation in India changed as well. Iri fact until 
1933 the communist movement was virtually deprived of an all India Centre. In 
1933, a new Central Committee was elected which took over the leadership of the 
Party on a national plane. The Party also joined the Comintern in 193 ?.'^ ^ It was 
during this phase which marked the unification of the anti-fascist fort es all over 
^'-Horne Poll. 7'6/1936. 
153 Harkishan Singh Surjeet, 'Importance of Dutt Bradley Document", The Marxist. Volume 13. 
No. 01, Jan-March 1996 
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the world for which the call was given by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern 
met in July-August 1935 at Moscow. Recognizing the emergence of fascism as a 
worldwide phenomenon of extreme danger, especially after Hitler's ris.^  to power 
in Germany in 1933, G. Dimitrov, in his report to the Seventh Cong ess to the 
Communist International (1935), called for an extensive, "people's united front" in 
the struggle against fascism, which was to include Social Democrats and other 
anti-fascist forces/^"* In the course of report, Dimitrov said: 'In India the 
Communists have to support, extend and participate in all anti-imperialist mass 
activities, not excluding those which are under national reformist leadership. 
While maintaining their political and organisational independence, they must carry 
an active work inside the organisations which take part in the INC, facilitating the 
crystallization of a national revolutionary wing among them, for the puipose of the 
Indian peoples against British Imperiahsm"/^^ In October 1933 R.P. Datt wrote to 
PoUitt to announce that the idea of bourgeois democracy as simply a sham and 
'out of date'/^^ 
""* For the full text of Dimitrov's report, see G. Adhikari (ed), From Peace Fror t to People v 
War, Bombay, 1944, pp. 142-49; Jagannath Sarkar, A.B. Bardhan and N.E. Bilaram (cds ). 
India's Freedom Struggle: Several Streams, New Delhi, 1986, pp. 207-08 
" ' G. Adhikari (ed.), From Peace Front to People's War, Bombay, 1944. p. 68. Zf. Jagannath 
Sarkar, A.B. Bardhan and N.E, Balaram (eds.), India's Freedom Struggle: &A eral Streams. 
New Delhi, 1986, pp. 207-08 
^ Quoted in John Callaghan, 'Rajani Palme Dutt, British communism, and the Communist Part\ 
o^\ndi\2L, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Polities', Vol. 6. No. 1, p 62 
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The report on India was made by a Chinese Communist Wang Ivling, who 
in his report on the colonial countries'" especially on India he criticised Indian 
Communists for 'left sectarianism', and for not participating in the 
'demonstrations' organised by the National Congress, thus, isolating ihemselves 
from the masses in the national movement.'^^ At the same time, asked Indian 
Communists not to "disregard work within the National Congress as a genuine 
part of the anti-imperialist united front. The specific implications were ^vorked out 
in an important article "The Anti-Imperialist People's Front in India" written by 
Rajni Palme Dutt and Ben Bradley, popularly known as the Dutt-Bradley thesis 
(February, 1936). Both of them were leaders of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain. In this document, while giving an analysis of the situation prevailing in 
India at that time, they also project the strategic alliance that would be required in 
the struggle against imperialism as well as the tactical approach that v ill have to 
be worked out in different stages. The role of the various classes in this struggle 
against imperiaUsm and the varied forms to be adopted, the role of the working 
"Report on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries", presented )n August I. 
1935, Wang Ming said: "...our comrades in India have suffered for long timi from "Left" 
sectarian errors; they did not participate in all the mass demonstrations organised b\ the 
National Congress or organisations affiliated with it. At the same timt the Indian 
Communists did not possess sufficient forces independently to organise a powei ftil and mass 
anti-imperialist movement." He further added that "it was only recently that he All India 
Communist Party, which has already taken shape, began to rid itself of its sectarian errors and 
made the first step towards the creation of an anti-imperialist united front." MR. Masani. 
'The Communist Party in India', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1. Mar.. 1951. p. 2 I 
Quoted from L.P. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, p. 419 
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class in the struggle as well as the necessity of its intervention enabling it to 
acquire the leadership of the struggle in the process, has been pointed out.''' 
The theses contained the following major propositions: (1) the mast broad-
based unity was desirable on the basis of (a) "a line of consistent strugj. le against 
imperialism", and (b) "struggle for the vital needs of the toiling masses'. (2) The 
Congress was "the principal existing mass organization of many diverst elements 
seeking national liberation". (3) Several previous actions of the ('ongress 
leadership had been "disastrous" and "equivalent to surrender to imperialism". (4) 
There was thus, need to criticize Congress leadership, but only with the ])urpose of 
assisting the Congress to play its role, and not to weaken the unity of tht elements 
already in the Congress. (5) The Congress had the potentiality "by tae further 
transformation of its organisation and programme" to "become the form of 
realization of the Anti-Imperialist People's Front". (6) "Mass organisations of 
workers and peasants", of youth, etc., should be developed and their affiliation to 
the Congress striven for. (7) Democratization of the Congress (e.^., elected 
Working Committee) should be demanded. (8) A minimum programme to be 
presented to the Congress, based on "complete independence", ci>il libert> 
(including right to strike), repeal of repressive laws, release of political prisoners. 
'^ ' Harkishan Singh Surjeet, 'Importance of Dutt Bradley Document', The Marxist, \ olumc 13. 
No. 01, Jan-March 1996; Communists in India had changed their strategy after the change in 
the tactics of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. They no longer dismissed tl e Congress 
as a bourgeois agency of the imperialists. S.M. Ganguly, Leftism m India: M. V. Roy and 
Indian Politics 1920-1948, Calcutta, 1984, p. 165 
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protection of rights of workers (including 8 hour day), 50 per cent rent reduction 
for peasants and security from seizure of their lands by landlords and 
moneylenders. (9) The question of whether "Non-violence" should be a requisite 
dogma for the Congress should be raised, but the issue "should not be allowed to 
split the national front". (10) There should be a consolidation of the left-wing 
comprising "Congress Socialists, Trade Unionists, Communists and Left 
Congressmen", in which "the Congress SociaHst Party (CSP) can play an 
especially important part". (11) The Left Wing should try to have a number of its 
candidates run in the ensuing elections [under the Act of 1935], while preventing 
"a splitting of the National Front [votes] in the elections". (12) The slogan of a 
Constituent Assembly to make free India's own constitution was to be presented 
as a central slogan.'^ *' 
In accordance with the Dutt-Bradley theses, the CPl declared that the 
agitation was to be carried on both from inside and outside the Co igress and 
emphasised a new concept of "collective affiliation", which aimed at transforming 
the Congress into a people's front.'^' The theses accepted by [he Indian 
Communists, began to bear fruit almost immediately.'^^ Already under the 
161 
162 
Quoted from Irfan Habib, 'The Left and the National Movement", Social Scientist. Vol 27. 
Nos. 5-6, May-June 1998, pp. 15-16 
S.M. Ganguly, Leftism in India, pp. 165-66 
Bhagwan Josh's criticism of the Communist policy followmg the Dutt-Brad e\ theses is 
characteristic. No success could arise out of ''the policy of building a separate independent 
mass Communist Party and a united front simultaneously" (The Indian J eft: Crilica/ 
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influences of the Seventh Comintern Congress, the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) 
National Executive, meeting at Meerut in January 1936, had decided to withdraw 
the earlier formal ban on Communists' entry into the CSP, originally imposed in 
1934, and allowed Communists to seek admission on an individual basis. 
Communists thereupon began to enter the CSP from April 1936 onwards; and this 
gave them effectual entry into the Congress as well. 
The United Front of the left started working in a concerted manntr from the 
Congress general session at Lucknow in April, 1936. Nehru spoke of socialism, of 
the need for "ending private property, except in a restricted sense", and of "the 
new civilization" represented by the resurgent Soviet Union.'^ '^  Thouj^ h^ the left-
sponsored resolutions for affihation of mass organisations, rejection of ministerial 
office after elections under the 1935 Act, and a proportionally elected Working 
Committee, was rejected, the votes in favour were respectable in number. *'' 
Simultaneously, the CSP, the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) and Progressive 
Writes' Association^ ^ were founded at the conference held in Lucknow about the 
Appraisals, pp. 147-200). In other words suicide by the Communist Party to fiirther the united 
front was requisite. Josh also ignores the success which the CPI obtamed in 1^36 and 
subsequent years, while pursuing the new "tactical line" of the united front 
'"^  Quoted from Irfan Habib, 'The Left and the National Movement', p. 16 
' " Ibid, pp. 16-17 
"''^  For example, 225 members of the AICC voted for the rejection of the ministeriil office, and 
487 against. Irfan Habib, 'The Left and the National Movement', pp. 16-17 
'**' The Intelligence report writes that "in India this growth of intellectual commun sm is show n 
by the Indian Progressive Writers' Association. Subodh Roy (ed.), Commiin sin in India: 
Unpublished Documents 1935-1945, Calcutta, 1976, p. 84 
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same time. In both these organisations, the Communists rapidly became the main 
force, rallying peasants and writers behind the national movement, while also 
expanding their own ideological influence.'^^ Besides this the Communists also 
decided to dissolve their Red TUC and affiliate all their unions to AITU( 
Through the United Front tactics it attempted to work in mass organisations 
and radicalise them. According to an official report "...the infiltration by the 
Communists into right-wing bodies and other progressive organisations within the 
Congress has since 1935 became a marked feature of the CPl. and the 
crystallization of a revolutionary wing within the anti-imperialist front forms the 
keynote of the present Communist attitude towards the Congress left wir g. '" ' 
When the Congress decided to participate in the Election based o i the 1935 
Act, the Communists despite their opposition to 'Slave Constitution' issued "Draft 
Election Platform' for Communist candidates which were as follows;-
1. "For workers and peasants Soviet Republic 
2. Repeal of all Anti-National, Anti-Peasant and Anti-Working class laws 
169 
Irfan Habib, p. 17; delegates of Kisan organisations at Lucknovv on April 11 193*' at the same 
time of the Lucknow session of the INC; Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, Indulai Yagnik and 
N.G. Ranga joined hands with Communists like Bankim Mukherjee. Z.A Ahmad. E M S 
Namboodripad and Karyanand Sharma. Rakesh Gupta, Bihar Peasantry! and the Kisan 
Sahha, New Delhi, 1982, p. 132; the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha ideological position 
moved from the Congress to the CSP and finally to the communist understanding, p 128 
Madhu Limaye, Communist Party: Fact and Fiction, Hyderabad, 1951, p. 29 
'Review of the Recent Communist Activities in India" compiled by the Intelligence Bureau. 
Government of India, (Home Political Department F. No. 7/1937, in Subodh Rov (cd ). 
Communism in India: Unpublished Documents J933-J943, p. 77) 
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3. Unconditional release of all political prisoners, state prisoners, imemees and 
detenues. 
4. Freedom of speech, press and association 
5. Withdrawal of army of occupation from India, existing army and police to be 
replaced by arming the workers, peasants and all toilers. 
6. Abolition of native states, property of the princes to be confiscated 
7. Repudiation of the working class and peasant indebtedness 
8. Confiscation of the large estates. Land to the tillers of the soil. 
9. Repudiation of Imperialist Debts. 
10. Confiscation of British capital in India. 
11. Nationalization of all key and large industries, plantations and banks. 
12. Revolutionary fraternal support to the British working class in its struggle 
against British capitalism. 
13. Active opposition to the Imperialist war 
14. Active supports to all costs to the Soviet Union, the hope of the toilers of the 
world."''° 
The main purpose of the electoral actmty of the CPI was to develop and 
build the mass movement, based on the partial demands of toiling masse s. and for 
destruction of 'slave constitution'. Imperialist terror was suppressing ever\' sign of 
mass activity. The CPI would use the legal opportimities provided by the elections 
and endeavour to transform the election into a mass movement against iripenaiist. 
'^ " 'Draft Election Platform", Communist, July 1936, pp. 15-16, Cf Jyoti Basu and othc rs (cds 
Documents of the Communist Movement of India, Vol. Ill (1929-38), pp. 253-54 
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The CPI believed that an effective struggle against the 'slave constitution' must be 
based on the policy of united front and equally firmly insisted that it should be an 
anti-imperialist united front. 
The CPI emerged by 1937 as a force to reckon with. The statement made in 
1937 by the Polit-Bureau of the CPI wrote that 'the United Front has already had a 
certain degree of success. The Unification of the GKU in Bombay foUoAved by the 
unification of the both Trade Union Congress is playing an important < ole in the 
consolidation of the united front of the working class."'^^ The demand for a 
Constituent Assembly was the main slogan of the CPI and it regarded it as a 
practical and important for all organisations who were possible participants in the 
United National Front.'^^ 
The popularity of the left that followed was reflected by the ex])ansion in 
the membership of the AIKS and rising tide of strike movement. By the ime of its 
Congress at Camilla (Bengal) in May 1938, the membership of the AIKS had 
crossed half a million; by its Gaya congress in April 1939, it had reached 
800,000.'^'* This was not all, but the AIKS observed 20 March 1938 as the All 
India Day for demanding the legalization of the CPI and Swami Sahajanand issued 
'Communist Part> and the Coming Election', Commumst, Vol. I, No. 10, JuK 19 >6. m J\oti 
Basu and others (eds.). Documents of the Communist Movement of India, Vol. Ill, pp 258-59 
'^' 'For the United National Front', Communist, Vol I, No. 15, February 1937, Cf. Ibid. p.328; for 
detail programme see the CPI tasks entitled 'The Present Situation and Our Task". 
Communist, June 1937 
'"Ibid. 
™ Irfan Habib, 'The Left and the National Movement', p. 17 
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the following statement for the legalization of the CPI. "I hasten to endorse whole 
heartedly the appeal issued by Comrade Jaya Prakash Narayan (thtn General 
Secretary of the CSP) to observe 20 March as the All India Dii> for the 
legalization of the CPI in the name of civil liberties."'^^ It is evident that by 1939 
the CPI had come to occupy an influential position in the AIKS and gave it a 
radical orientation. 
The thirties marked the height of growing influence of the socialist ideas 
over the national movement. The growth in the mass influence of the left found its 
reflection in the increasing strength of the left within the Congress, especiall> the 
AICC. The Congress election manifesto it prepared at the Faizpur Congress was 
based on the Karachi resolution and had a manifestly left orientation. By 1939 the 
Communists had as many as 20 seats in the AICC, communist influence was on 
the rise as well, with EMS Namboodripad and Sajjad Zaheer as joint secretaries of 
the CSP. The greatest triumph of the left was the re-election of Subhas Chandra 
Bose as Congress president early in 1939. However, this triumph was short-
lived. However, the communal question at this stage of the deve opment of 
communist movement had not occupied the centre stage. 
III.6 The Communist Party and the Communal Question 
The peculiar communal problem in the country has always oaffled the 
nationalists. As early as beginning of the 1920, M.N.Roy then a prominent leader 
' ' ' Quoted in M. A. Rasul, A History of the All India Kisan Sabha. Calcutta. 1974. p. 21 
176 Irfan Habib, 'The Left and the National Movement', p. 17 
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of Communist Party of India had drawn attention to the problems of communal 
riots and its adverse impact on class struggle. He suggested that the only remedy 
to communal divisions was class unity. This meant the bringing together of all 
working people belonging to diverse castes and communities in tl e struggle 
against imperialism. According to him, class unity through struggle agamst the 
oppressing classes was the only solution to the communal problem The 
Communists talked of masses, their common economic demands, end of 
exploitation etc., the unity between the Hindus and the Muslims, forged during 
Khilafat and non-cooperation days, showed increasing signs of cracks after the 
1 78 
withdrawal of the movement and the squabbles that followed. 
The communal problem had become a serious political issue in the last 
phase of the non-cooperation movement'^^, when riots broke out in places like 
Multan and Malabar. Some important nationalist leaders including Madan Mohan 
Malviya and Lala Lajpat Rai joined the Hindu Mahasabha, while many Muslim 
leaders joined the Muslim League. These same leaders had stood shoulder to 
shoulder in the Non-Cooperation Movement just a couple of years ago. Issues 
such as the playing of music in front of mosques or the slaughter of ccws became 
' " Jyoti Basu and others (eds.). Documents of the Communist Movement of India, Vol, I. 1917-
28, Calcutta, 1987, pp. 14-16 
" ' L.P. Sinha, Left-Wing in India, p 163 
'^' Sukhbir Chaudhary, Growth of Nationalism in India (1919-1929), Vol. II, New Delhi. 1973. p 
373. Old prejudices, grievance and bickering of communal politics began to api)ear in public 
life after the suspension of non-cooperation movement. 
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communally charged. According to official estimates, 112 communal liots broke 
out between 1922 and 1927, leaving 450 dead and more than 5,000 injured. Of 
1 RO 
these 112 riots, 21 took place in 1926 alone. 
According to M.N.Roy, the upper classes of the both communities were 
trying to serve their own rights and privileges, whereas the masst s of both 
communities were exploited by the upper classes of respective communities 
jointly. He added, "Hindu and Muslim workers sweat in the same f actoiy and 
peasants toil on the land but all of them are robbed by the landlords, money-
1 Q 1 
lenders and the agents of the imperialism". 
Roy further argued that setback suffered by the nationalist movement 
during the post Non-Cooperation Movement had given an impetus to the 
communal conflict. Therefore, he advised re-organization of the nationalist 
movement with a programme of militant mass action. He suggests d that the 
masses should be mobilized under the banner of nationalism on the basis of 
immediate economic demands. Agitation on economic lines, according to him 
"*" Namboodripad, History of Indian Freedom Struggle, p. 329, cf, Harkishan Singh Surjcct et al 
(eds.). History of the Communist Movement in India, The Formative Years I'y 20-1933. pp 
96-98; later he suggested that the solution was the "total abolition of separate communal 
organisation" and placing the agitation among the masses more on a nationalist and more 
upon economic struggle than upon religious fanaticism". S.M. Ganguly, Leftisn. in India, pp 
61-62 
' Jyoti Basu and others (eds.), Documents of the Communist Movement of India. Vol 1. pp 332-
333 
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would provide the safest guarantee against communal tensions. One c f the mam 
planJks in the nationaUst platform, he further suggested should be the protection for 
national and communal mmonties. 
The C.P.I, adopted several resolutions against communalism at its Kanpur 
Conference in 1925. It resolved that 'no one who is a member of any communal 
t 1 S4 
organization in India shall be admitted as members of the Communist Party In 
the resolution on aims and objects it was mentioned clearly that the party shall 
consist of Communists who would pledge themselves to work for he paily's 
objectives and that no one who was a member of a communal organization would 
be admitted as a member of this party.'^^ 
The Communists were trying to win over the Muslim masses through 
different programmes. Their aim was to influence and if possible to ri^cruit class 
conscious and politically aware Muslims in their ranks. They published 
newspapers in different languages in order to reach different religious 
communities including Muslims. In Punjab, the Communists brought out Kirti in 
Gurmukhi as well as in Urdu so as to be able to reach both Sikhs and Muslims '***' 
'^ '^  Ibid., 
'*"* Adhikan (ed.), Documents, Vol. I, p. 666.; Irfan Habib, "The Left and the National 
Movement", p. 10 
'*' Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. II, p. 668. 
** Khizr Humayun Ansari, The Emergence of Socialist Thought among North hdian Muslim 
(1917-47), Lahore, 1990, pp. 74-75. It is evident that during 1925 Hindu and Muslim 
religious organisations developed rapidly. Most prominent Hindu and Musli n nationalist 
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After the Kanpur conference, CPI's first open call to the Indian people was 
through its Manifesto on the 'Hindu-Muslim Problem'. Dated May 15, 1926, this 
manifesto, published jointly by Muzaffar Ahmad and J.P. Bagerhatta, placed an 
entirely new solution to the communal problem in India. The Manifesto pointed 
out: 'Have the Hindu and Mussalman masses nothing in common in India? Are 
both of them not suffering equally under the ruthless exploitation of ihe foreign 
bureaucracy? Are they not economically ruined by the foreign and Indian 
capitalists and landlords? The union can only be realized when they are told of 
their common grievances, so that they should be conscious of their common 
miserable plight. It may be difficult for bourgeois political philosophy to find a 
common ground to stand upon. The masses- the common workers and peasants-
are, however, as a matter of fact already united by virtue of their common 
economic interests, only the consciousness of this union is interfered with by large 
doses of conflicting reUgious dogmas administered by interested parties. Religious 
propaganda is an indigenous method of exploitation by the able doctors of 
leaders declared it to be their object especially to defend the interests of their co-religionists 
In April 1926 Sir Abdur Rahim, a liberal Muslim leader in Bengal, formed a Be ngal Muslim 
Partv. In May 1926 the Khilafat Committee, enlarged its objects to embrace all the interests. 
temporal as well as spiritual of Mohammedans. In June the chief Hindu organisation, the 
Hindu Mahasabha countered by deciding where necessary for Hindu interests, t) run its o\\ n 
candidates at the election. Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. Ill A, pp. 222-23 
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divinity. This they have to do in order to preserve feudal rights of he upper 
classes, without whose support they cannot live and prosper'. 
The preaching behind every religion is that of obedience and faith and it 
created a tradition and lived by it. To-day the power of tradition is destioyed. 
Religion begets servility. You are taught to obey God, His apostles, obey parents, 
obey masters, obey your landlord, obey your king, and obey even those blessed 
souls, the rich people. A country where people have only learnt to obey could 
never demand its freedom and where liberty cannot be hoped for, power becomes 
the grand object of human desire and the passion for it is the most ardent and 
unscrupulous... [We] want to impress upon our countrymen with all the 
earnestness we are capable of to begin with a new phase of the movement with an 
economic programme reflecting the immediate demands of the workers and 
peasants- the proletariat of the country- and commence a struggle subordinating all 
religious and communal questions to the great politico-economic one.. . The 
Communist Party of India, which stands for the economic emancipation of the 
people, to create a society having no bloodsuckers and wage slaves- a classless 
Government of Bengal, I.B. File No. 35/1926 (SI. No. 2/26), cited in Roy Chaudhur\ (ed ). 
Seed-Time of Communism, pp. 166-73, Cf. Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds.). History of 
the Communist Movement in India, The Formative Years 1920-1933, pp. 96-97 
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society, is ready to join hands with you in your struggle against tht ruthless 
1 88 
exploitation of the present capitalist plutocracy. 
The Manifesto emerged out the understanding contained in the Constitution 
of the CPI. Thus, as E.M.S. Namboodripad says: 'Right from the inception of the 
Communist Party as a movement, a new approach towards the Hindu-Muslim 
strife, as in the case of many other problems, appeared on the Indian pohtical 
scene. As distinct from the bourgeois-petty bourgeois approach, this new. 
communist approach linked the socio-cultural problem Hindu-Muslim rift to the 
political problem of anti-imperialist struggle and to the economic and political 
1 SO 
problem of the fight between the exploited and exploiter'. 
The Indian National movement suffered because it was based upon shaky 
foundations. The unity achieved in the wake of non-cooperation and Kliilafat was 
an artificial one, being built on the unreliable foundation of religious 
sentimentalism. But a political movement, involving unity of the Hindu-Muslim 
masses, must be based on only upon their basic, common economi: demands 
which alone could bring about a solid and durable national unity.''^ '^  
Government of Bengal, IB. File No. 35/1926 (SI. No. 2/26), cited in Roy Chaadhun (ed ). 
Seed-Time of Communism, pp. 166-73, Cf, Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al.(eds). History of 
the Communist Movement in India, The Formative Years 1920-1933. pp. 96-98 
'"' Namboodripad, History of Indian Freedom Struggle, p. 331, of, Harkishan Singl Surjeet et al 
(eds.). History of the Communist Movement in India: The Formative Years h'20-l933. pp 
96-98 
'^ ^ Ibid, p. 164; for different angle on Khilafat issue see, Moin Shakir, Khilafat to Partition: A 
Survey of Major Political Trends among Indian Muslims during 1919-1947. Ne\v Delhi. 1970 
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It ended with an appeal to the workers, the peasantry and the lower middle class 
elements to free themselves from religious and communal bias and work for 
economic emancipation. The battle for national freedom was to be fought by the 
masses and it must be their mterests.'^' 
In December, 1926 a Manifesto by the CPI addressed to the Indiar National 
Congress on the occasion of its annual session at Gauhati, was published from 
London. The Manifesto took a disconcerting note of the national movt ment and 
the nationalist parties which were divorced from the masses. Both tht National 
Congress and the Swaraj Party were deficient in this respect. The Manifesto found 
the national movement in a state of decomposition. The leadership of ihe Swaraj 
Party was predominantly bourgeois, and there was a contradiction bt tween the 
leadership and its rank and file. Its programme and policy were always (hctated by 
the capitalist and landowning classes. It maintained: "The Swaraj Party will not be 
able to become a Party of the people unless it breaks away completel y from the 
bourgeoisie seeking compromise with imperialism."'^^ 
Like the Manifesto of July, 1926, this Manifesto also addressed tself to the 
communal problem. It reiterated the earlier stand that the non-coopt-ration and 
Khilafat agitations quickened religious fanaticism at the expense of political 
"^ ' Ibid. 
"" A Manifesto to the All-India National Congress, Gauhati, 1926 by the CPI. Muzaffar Ahmad. 
Myself and CPI, pp. 492-510; L.P. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, pp. 164-65 
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consciousness. The decomposition of the national movement gave impetus to 
communal conflict. 
While the upper classes of both fought for rights and privileges, the masses 
of both the communities had their economic exploitation. Thus, there was no need 
to be discouraged by communal conflicts. It maintained that a party of the people 
would find solution to this problem by helping them to be the conscious of their 
economic interests, and by giving them a courageous lead against theii common 
enemy. It admitted that this could not be done overnight but there was no other 
remedy of communahsm. 
When communal riot broke out in Calcutta in 1926, the Communists re-
stated their non-sectarian position and explained the conflict as essentially a 
product of the class division within Indian society. A manifesto drafted most 
probably by M.N.Roy and Evelyn Roy, was circulated in Calcutta. It argued that 
communal strife was an expression of the competition between Muslim and Hmdu 
privileged groups, of which the office holding intelligentsia was the spokesmen 
and slum dwellers in the cities, were the instruments.''^ '* It further adaed that "m 
A Manifesto to the All-India National Congress, Gauhati, 1926 by the CPI, cf. L. ^. Sinha. The 
Left-Wing in India, pp. 165-66 
''^ Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. IIIA, p. 78; Khizr Humayun Ansan, The 1 mergence of 
Socialist Thought among North Indian Muslim, pp. 74-75; for a different understanding on 
the communal riots in Bengal see, Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal 1910-1947. New 
Delhi, 1991. Suranjan Das writes that both in terms of social geography and political 
developments Bengal occupied a crucial place in the evolution of communal politics m the 
sub-continent. By the turn of the twentieth century Bengal had one o ' the largest 
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spite of the fact that Hindu-Muslim unity was one of the planks of the nationahst 
programme, the bourgeois leaders have totally failed to solve th; vexing 
problem.'^ ^ In countryside, too, communalism was seen as serving the vested 
interests of Muslim and Hindu landlords. These communal divisions enabled the 
British rulers to play on the mutual fears and suspicions of the two communities, 
and thus successfully pursue their policy of 'divide and rule'. The solution to the 
problem, according to this manifesto, lay in class struggle.'^ 
The Communists denounced communal antagonism in their periodicals 
Langal and Ganavani. As a result, their popularity suffered temporarily but they 
continued to make fervent pleas for social harmony between the two 
communities. So strong was their opposition to communal sentiments that the 
slightest concessions to communal feelings by a member of the paity invited 
immediate expulsion. ^ ^^  
In 1927, the Workers' and Peasants' Party (WPP) of Bombay issued a 
'Mohurrum Manifesto' appealing against a possible communal clash between 
concentrations of Muslims in India. Although economically more backward in c smparison to 
their other co-religionists, the Bengal Muslims were among the first to be organised 
politically to voice their right as Muslims; Bengal had one of the worst records of Hmdu-
Muslim conflict; and it was the only state where the Muslim League managed to form 
relatively stable ministries in the two crucial decades preceding the end of th( British Raj: 
also see, Ishwari Prasad, Hindu-Muslim Problems, Allahabad, 1974 
'"^  Ibid., p. 75 
''* Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. IIIB, pp 82-85 
'•^ ^ Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. IIIA, p. 25 
"'' Adhikari (ed.), Documents, Vol. IIIA, p. 136 
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Hindus and Muslims. It was declared that the party was duty bound to c all up on 
Indian masses to maintain peaceful and fraternal relations among themselves 
during the forthcoming Mohurrum festival. The working masses of both he Hindu 
and Muslim communities had nothing to gain by communal mobilization, which 
would only lead to the advantage of the exploiting masses. It was shameful and 
tragic that the Hindu and Muslim masses who were all exploited peoole would 
fight amongst themselves. It added that they must realize that the two communities 
together constitute a homogenous body and their suffering were common which 
resulted from serfdom and their social and political exploitation.''^^ 
The 'Mohurrum Manifesto' declared "the WPP, the political vanguard of 
all exploited, considers its duty to advise the Indian masses not to participate in 
religious struggle and communal movement which the religious minded ambitious 
bourgeois politicians of Indian dream of and aspire to kindle on a countrywide 
scale. The communal movement will only create a disastrous division i i the ranks 
of masses".^°° The WPP firmly demanded the abolition of communalisni.'^' 
The contents of a Central Committee meeting of C.P.I held in 1927 are 
equally revealing. It carry following items having a bearing on their policy with 
regard to communalism: (1) position of members of a Communist Part} who were 
members of a communal organization or were carrying on communal work to be 




considered, and (ii) statement on Hasrat Mohani's claim as being a Communist 
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and communal leader at the same time. 
S.A.Dange presided over the meeting on 29* and 30"' 1927. The Central 
Committee took firm action against members who were associated with any 
communal organization.^°^ This problem of 'simultaneity'^ ^"* and dual membership 
was characterized a 'splintered consciousness'.^°^ Since Hasrat Mohani was asked 
to quite the Muslim League. But he preferred to resign from the Communist Party. 
Similarly, S.D.Hasan who was working for a communal paper in Punjab was 
"dropped" from the party. K.N.Joglekar who was a member of the Brahmin Sabha 
was asked to resign from that position for the same reason.^ *"' This was n fact the 
"•'Ibid, p. 136 
"°^  Sukhbir Chaudhary, Growth of Nationalism in India (1919-1929), p. 376. A number of 
Congressmen were members of Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League "communalist under 
his nationalist cloak". 
•^ '^  Habib Manzer, 'Hasrat Mohani, Indian National Movement and Communist movement till his 
Disenfranchisement'- An Evaluation', in A.K.Sinha, (ed.) Reading in History. Dolhi. 20(i3. p 
348 
'''^  Shashi Joshi, 'Nehru and Emergence of the Left Block, 1927-29, in Bipan Chandra, (ed.) The 
Indian Left: A Critical Appraisal, Delhi, 1983, p. 85 
""^  Adhikari (ed.). Documents, vol. IIIB, p. 136; Shashi Joshi, Struggle for Hegem my in India. 
1920-47, The Colonial State, the Left and the National Movement, Vol. I. 1 ^20-34. Neu 
Delhi, 1922, p. 170; Muzaffar Ahmad, CPI and Years of Formation, p. 21. Hasrat Mohani 
had to leave our Party inl927, when we did not approve of his joining the Mislim League 
Our standpoint was fundamentally different from that of the Congress, and we icnow that the 
top leaders of the Congress participated in the Muslim League conference in Ca cutta e\ en as 
late as January- 1928.; Harkishan Singh Surjeet et al (eds.). History of th- C omnninist 
Movement in India: The Formative Years 1920-1933. p. 108. In Madras meeting December 
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first occasion when a political party adopted such a resolute stanc against 
communahsm. On the other hand, it was only in 1938 that Congress banned its 
members from joining communal organisations. 
Subsequently, on 29* January 1928, the Workers and Peasants, Party of 
Bombay, then a platform of Communists, passed a resolution calling upon the 
whole nation not to be misled by motivated communal propaganda, an to realize 
that the interest of all the oppressed and exploited people did not clash. They 
appealed to people to sink, minor differences in the great task of obtaining 
freedom for all.^ °* Again around the same time (middle of January 1928) the 
Bombay Presidency Youth Conference, which had invited a Sizeable, numbers of 
1927, Hasrat Mohani and S.D. Hasan were expelled from the Party for their association with 
communal outfits. 
'"^ Shashi Joshi and Bhagwan Josh (ed.). Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920-19 i7: (\ilnire. 
Community and Power, Vol. Ill (1941-1947), New Delhi, 1994, p. 308. It was only m 1938 
that the Congress barred its doors to members of the communal organisations. Be th in Punjab 
and Bengal, many a Congress leader had no difficulty in championing the Hindu cause" in 
respect of jobs, constitutional discussions and communal riots. While a Muslim joined the 
Muslim communal organisations, only the very rabid Hindu communalist wculd join the 
Hindu Mahasabha or RSS in the 1930s; the ordinary Hindu patriot tended to remain m the 
Congress. Cf Bipan Chandra, Commiinalism in Modern India, New Delhi, 1984. p. 191; The 
Working Committee proceedings (Wardha-11-16 December 1938) resolved that for the 
purpose of Article V (c) the following organisations are declared as communal crganisations; 
Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League. Article V(c) reads: "No person who is a member of 
any elected Congress Committee of a communal organisation, the object or programme of 
which involves political activities which in the opinion of WCC, anti-national a id in conflict 
with INC. Indian Annual Register, Vol. 2, 1938, p. 300 
-"* Adhikari (ed.). Documents, Vol. IIIC, p. 184. 
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important communist or radical leaders in its meeting, passed a resolition on 
Hindu-Muslim unity and the abolition of communal electorates. 
In the same year on 27 October 1928, Jawaharlal Nehru in the meeting of 
First All India Socialist Youth Congress pointed out if the attention of the masses 
was directed to the economic facts which mattered, they would automatically turn 
away from communalism. Further, he stressed his belief that the various 
communities in India could remove this communal spirit by socialistic ideas. 
Being fed up with the congress reformist politics and getting sick of growing 
communal strife in the post-non-cooperation phase during the twenties the 
revolutionary group, Punjab Naujawan Sabha, was formed by the workers of 
Amritsar in which all the different communities represented. Their primary 
objective was to shift the attention from 'communal programme' to economic 
issues concerning general masses. Their perception was that "ommunal 
programme" was the root cause of all communal clashes. Therefore, it should be 
shunned from pubhc sphere.^'' 
The criticism of Nehru Committee report on the principles of the Swaraj 
Constitution by the WPP Bengal and AITUC Sub-Committees had an identical 
approach on the communal problem. Both the documents (of WPP and AITUC^ ) 
dealt in detail with the communal question and observed that a solution was 
" Joshi, Struggle for Hegemony, Vol. I, p. IJ 
Sukhbir Chaudhary, Growth of Nationalism in India (1919-1929), p. 407 
Adhikari (ed), Documents, Vol. IIIC, pp 291-292 
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possible through a joint struggle of the working class and other toilinj; people 
against imperialism, feudalism or any other forms of exploitation. Al Parties 
Conference was held in Delhi on 12 February 1928 in which major participants 
were AITUC, WPP and CPI (Bombay) who represented the working clas^. A Sub-
committee was formed to delve into the problem of communal questior and the 
creation of province based on linguistic boundaries. Its repost was to serve as the 
basis of the provisional draft fi^om a left perspective of the principles cf Swaraj 
Constitution.^'^ 
The WPP of Bengal criticized Nehru report for giving excessive attention 
to the communal question. Their perception was that masses had no communal 
feelings and that such an unwanted discussion would only lead to creating 
communal consciousness among them.^'^ Following the necessities to curb the 
communaUsm on December 21-24, 1928 at Calcutta Conference the AH India 
Workers' and Peasants' Party adopted a provision in its constitution making it. 
mandatory for "candidate" as well as full fledged members to avoid joining any 
communal organization as well as not to participating in any communal 
campaign.^''* 
' " Ibid, pp. 22-24. 
'"Ibid, pp 218-219 
"'"* Basu, (ed,). Documents of the Communist Movement in India, Vol. 4, p. 371; Harkishan Singh 
Surjeet et al (eds.). History of the Communist Movement in India: The Formative Years 192(1-
1933. p. 132 
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However, with the rise of an active left leaning youth cadre innde the 
congress, a large number of persons with a working class background were drawn 
into the movement. The communal tensions among workers were partly, a result 
of the recruitment pattern in the mills where the employer and the government had 
a tendency to play one section of the workers against another on nanow 
communal grounds.^'^ This became exphcitly clear during the 1929 communal riot 
of Bombay. But the Communist trade union leaders are known 10 have 
participated actively in pacifying that riot.^'^ In the same context Gandhiji (July 
1931) had suggested that the communal problem may be solved only by 
substituting it by a feeling for the nation in which the role of mincrities is 
recognized. This the advocacy for solution of the Communal problem, however, 
suffered a major set back when prominent ideologues of Communist Paty were 
convicted in the Meerut Conspiracy Case (1929-33) to long terms of 
imprisonment.^'^ 
The Progressive Writers Association (PWA) was then having a 
considerable influence among Urdu speaking groups came out in latt thirties 
opposition against Muslim League. They asserted that the League was not a broad-
based political organization but represented rural aristocrats and urban nawabs. 




Mahatma Gandhi, Communal Unity, Ahmadabad, 1949, pp. 157-59. 
Irfan Habib, op.cit., p. 11; P.K. Shukla, 'Imperialism War to Peoples War-Communist 
Strategy", 1939-42, P///C, pp. 555-63 
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The League according to them was foraied for safe guarding the narrow economic 
interest of these exploiting classes by fomenting communal prejudices. In this 
way, the revolutionary zeal of the masses was being deliberately divened into 
infer- communal strife. The imperial policies 'divide and rule' were served very 
effectively by communal strife. According to PWA the task of the Muslim Left 
wing intellectuals among Muslims was to oppose the League. They wen- of the 
opinion that freedom could only be won on the basis of inter communal 
harmony.^^^ The PWA also tried to resolve the long standing Hindi-Urdu language 
controversy, which had acquired communal overtones. The difference in script 
was artificial and the direct result of the divide and rule policy of the i olonial 
rulers. To resolve this problem they suggested that Roman script should replace 
both the scripts. 
Jawaharlal Nehru had visualized the danger of communalism and its i'ascist 
implications for Indian society and future polity. He therefore initiated a program 
of Muslim Mass Contact to prevent the gullible from falling into the trap of 
Communal ideology. K.M.Ashraf, a Communist was entrusted by the A ICC to 
direct the Congress's Muslim Mass Contact Campaign to 'wean away Muslims 
Ansari, The Emergence of Socialist Thought among North Indian Muslim, pp. 222-23 
^«Ibid 
Mushiml Hasan, 'The Muslim Mass Contact Campaign: An analysis of strateg> of political 
mobilization", in Mushiml Hasan (ed.), India's Partition: Process. Strategy andMoh.Hzatum. 
pp 133-159; R.C.Dutta, Towards Social Democracy: A New Orientation of the ( ongrcss 
1928-36', Symposium on ' History of the Indian National Congress 1885-1947 , Nehru 
Memorial Museum Library, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 51-52 
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from the fold of Muslim League'.^^^ It was launched in 1937 with a radical 
political and economic plan.^ ^^ Nehru in his election speech at Ambak on 16 
January 1937 lambasted those who talked in terms of Hindu rights and Muslim 
interests as "job hunters who were guided by self interest".^ ^"^ Jawaharla! Nehru 
said, "We talk of approaching the Muslim masses. That is no new program for us 
although the stress may be new. It must be remembered that the Congress has 
always had large numbers of Muslims in its fold and the most eminent (Nitional) 
leader of ours have been and are Muslims." 
The programme of the Muslim Mass Contact threatened the coramunal 
lobby amongst Muslims.^^^ Nehru could feel the left ward swing of the nasses. 
which resulted on the one hand in thousands of Muslims joining Congress and on 
the other hand forced the League to adopt a radical anti-imperialist program This 
had created a favorable situation for attracting of Muslim masses that were still 
under communal influence into active political struggle by organizing tie joint 
struggles for the immediate demands of the Hindu and Muslim masses. They were 
"'" Ansari, The Emergence of Socialist Thought among North Indian Muslim, pp. 222-23 
Mushirul Hasan, "The Muslim Mass Contact Campaign. An analysis of strategy of joliticai 
mobilization', in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), India's Partition: Process. Strategy and Mohilizaiion. 
Delhi, 1994, pp 133-159. 
-"•* S.A.I. Tirmizi (ed.). The Paradox of Partition. 1937-47. Vol.1, New Delhi, 1998. (Nehru 
Election Speech at Ambala) 
" ' K.K. Aziz, Muslims under Congress Rule. 1937-39. A Documentary Record, n.d.. \oi.I. pp 
110-114 
"'^ National Front, 19 June 1938, Vol. I, No. 18, p. 6 
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of the view that 'communal unity' at the base would provide much broader vase to 
227 
work upon. 
The conference of the Congress Socialist Party held at Lahore in April 1938 
identified the Communal disturbances as the handiwork of reactionar es and 
deliberated upon preventing such occurrences in future by upholding the religious, 
linguistic and cultural rights of the minorities in accordance with the p omises 
made in the Congress manifesto prior to the elections. The Congress wanted 
identification of political and economic interests of all the different communities 
and thus drew them into the fold of the party providing it a broader social base. It 
suggested the creation of a Volunteer Corps for the maintenance of communal 
peace. It was hoped that there would be a mass movement invohing all 
communities in the nation's anti-imperialist struggle. 
The Muslin League condemned the Muslim Mass Contact campa gn and 
dubbed the Congress as a Hindu organization. It demanded withdrawal of 'Bande 
Mataram' as national anthem, statutory share for Muslims in government s;ivices, 
withdrawal of opposition to Communal Award in local bodies and recognition of 
the Congress and League as exclusively Hindu and Muslim organ zations 
respectively. Thus, League wished to take away Muslims from the Congress 
^"Ibid. 
"'Ibid, 1 May 1938, No. 11 
""^  For such utterances pertaining to the Congress Ministry (1937-1939) of Bihar sco Papiva 
Ghosh, Community and Nation: Essays on Identity and Politics in Eastern India. Dellii. 200X. 
pp. 34-77 
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fold.^ "*" The League was apparently feeling threatened. It tried in vain for e •cample, 
to disrupt the strike of Kanpur workers. It tended to become a bargaining ever of 
mobilizing all sections of Muslims of the city. As a result, the ranks of League 
were increasingly filled by left wing young leaders. It was, however, anxious to 
check the growing influence of Communists and socialists among Muslims 
On a country- wide scale, however, the League started gaining ground 
among the Muslim intelligentsia, as well as the urban poor. It was belit ved by 
them that the League was championing their sectional demands. Even Congress 
was prepared to concede all the reasonable communal demands made by the 
League, provided the League joined hands with the Congress for overthrowing 
imperialism.^ ^^ Subhas Chandra Bose wrote that it's was necessary to stiess the 
economic issues common to all which cut across communal divisions and 
barriers.^ ^^ 
"^ " Ibid, 12 June 1938, No. 17: According to United Press message of June 7, the League has 
made eleven demands. CPI organ National Front writes that 'the leaders of tht League 
representing the upper classes of Muslims do want the pact... They want successfulK to 
blackmail Congress. But already the broadening base of the League is coming intc conflict 
with its reactionary top. All efforts of reactionaries to use the League to disrupt the glorious 
strike struggle of the Cawnpore workers failed... The leaders of the League wam unity 
unit\' for struggle not against imperialism but against the rising tide of kisan and v\orking 
class movements, unity against Communists and Socialists, unity to share the mmis ries and 
jobs. They expect entering into such unity'. 
^^ ' Ibid. 
232 
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Ibid, 18 September 1938, No. 31 
Ibid, 23 October 1938, No. 36 
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In 1937, a General Jute Workers Strike was called by trade unions. Soon 
the strike spread to Barrkappore and Hoogly areas. The leadership of the 
"Communists in this strike was firmly established. They organized meetings witli 
workers every where. However, Suhrawardy, the labour minister in Fazl-ul-Haq s 
government tried to exclude the labour organizations from mill areas by the use of 
section 144 of the Criminal Penal Code. This was sought to be justified by argumg 
that Muslim workers were not happy with the Hindu leadership, which naturally, 
whipped up communal feelings leading to attempts at organizing the workers on 
communal lines. In the Meghna North Mill, Muslim workers were attacked by the 
Hindu workers of the nearby Anglo-Indian Mill.^ '^* 
On 16 November 1938, a clash broke out between Hindus and Muslims as 
Ramzan coincided with Durga Pujaa in September- October. The AnamI Bazar 
Patrika blamed a few persons belonging to the local Communist organization for 
the communal trouble at Titagarh. Reference was made to the formation by the 
"Red" group of Hindu Sangha. Throughout October, Nani Gopal Mukherji. a local 
CPI leader, convened meetings of the Titagarh branch of the Bengal Chatkal 
Majdur Union (BCMU) in conjunction with the Hindu Sangha. Mukherji 
involvement with the Hindu communalists did not have the sanction of the official 
Communist leadership. The CPI leaders were unhappy over his divisive tactics.^^' 
-^'^ Nirban Basu, The Working Class Movement, Calcutta, 1994, pp. 82-83. 
"'' Ibid, pp. 139-40, 
15] 
The BLP-CPI leaders were of the opinion that a general strike would help remove 
the communal differences by focusing attention on economic issues. 
Communal disturbances broke out in Bengal over the question of 
'victimization of some jute workers who had participated in a demonstration 
against the jute ordinance. Two workers had been killed and 40 injured in these 
disturbances. Subhas Chandra Bose had observed, "The strike breakets have 
fomented communal strife in order to put and end to the strike." 
In the annual session of Hindu Sabha at Nagpur, the leading communal 
ideologue V.D.Savarkar pleaded in his address for a 'Hindu National Front' and 
appealed to communal minded persons to boycott congress by stopping al kinds 
of monetary helps to it in running its affairs.^ ^^  
The Second Conference of Progressive Writers Associations lield in 
January 1939 suggested a constructive plan with regard to the communal problem 
They declared, "It is we who want that literature should have the closest touch 
with the masses...we want to keep literature clear of communalism and racial 
discrimination. "^ ^^  
The Communalists and bureaucrats had ignited the communal troable at 
Jabalpur in May 1939 because of their apprehensions on account of increasing 
influence of the left. On the that occasion the CPI sponsored National Front 
236 Ibid. 
~^'' National Front, 27 November 1938, No. 41 
-'* Ibid, 1 January 1939, No. 47 
-^' Ibid, 8 January, 1939, p. 211 
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suggested that to ease communal tension is to hold private meetings in all 
mohallas by calling all parties; peace committees ought to be formed, pickets and 
volunteers from both the communities ought to be recruited to guard the mohallas. 
The Muslim Mass Contact Committee has not done anything so far. The attention 
must be focused on economic struggle that they have to wage. 
In June 1939, again the communal riots occurred in the industrial cit> of 
Sholapur. It was believed by the Communists to be result of divisive policies and 
activities of Arya Samajists. They reported to have used very offensive slogan like 
'Hindustan Hindooka, Nahin Kisi Ke Bapp Ka'. It goes to the credit Gimi <amgar 
union led by Communists that the swift and decisive intervention it saved the city 
from a riot on the occasion.^ "*' 
A.K.Gosh, writing in National Front, in January 1939, suggested a definite 
line of action for combating communalism; "that congress must accept the 
reasonable demands of Muslims, special effort must be made to win over 
Muslims, Congress must purge its Hindu outlook and prohibit the semi-ri^ligious 
ceremonies at Congress functions. Bande Mataram must be given up and should 
not be used in Congress meetings. The insistence on the Vidyamandir Scheme 
ahnost created a crisis in Central Province. It is necessary to discard all doubts of 
-* Ibid, 7 May 1939. 
'^' Ibid, 4 June 1939. 
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Muslims. Nothing could be done which shows that congress wants to impose 
Hindu culture on them use of religious terminologies be given up. 
After the Muslim League adoption of 'Pakistan Resolution', yvdhikari 
admitted that 'in 1938 we did not understand the real nature of the communal 
problem which was becoming clear in the process of national, political and 
economic development. We were groping tovvards it. It became crystal clear to us 
when (in March 1940) the Muslim League adopted the Pakistan Resolution. In 
1938 we were yet wrapped up in the theory, like the rest of the nationalists, that 
India was one nation and that the Muslims were just a religious cultural minority 
and that Congress-League united front could be forged by conceding "protection 
of cultural and religious rights and demands". We stood on the same basis as the 
Congress leadership.^ '*^ 
Thus, the ideological struggle between mainstream Congress party and the 
Communists on the one hand and the communal parties of all hue on the other 
continued. But the Muslim Mass Contact movement of the Congress did 
•^^^ Ibid, 1 January 1939; similarly, B.T. Ranadive had tried to trace Muslim communalism to the 
'fact', that this Hindu-Mushm separateness had been intensified by the current 
misinterpretations of the history...because "the masses" have fears of majorit>' conimunitv 
"Years of isolation from the Muslim masses have invested the Congress with a peculiar 
Hindu atmosphere". He warned the Congressmen to get "rid of these shortcomings'. B T 
Ranadive, 'The Communal Problem', National Front, 12 March 1939. 
""*' G Adhikari, (ed.), Pakistan and National Unity- The Communist Solution. Bombay. 1943. pp 
29-30, Cf Utpal Ghosh, The Communist Party of India and India's Freedom Struggle 193^-
7947, Calcutta 1996, p. 49 
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contribute to creating awareness among the political class, the urgency of focusing 




Imperialist War to People's War 1939-1945 
Communism in India had a difficult birth, and faced an uncongenial 
environment worsened in its first decades by a vigilant foreign police. The 
Communist Party of India (CPI) had begun making some progress, but the Meerut 
conspiracy case trial (1929-33) left it outlawed, with most of its leader behinds the 
bars. Despite the harsh attitude of the colonial government towards the Communists, 
the CPI still took some measures to progress into Indian National Congress, and 
Congress Socialist Party (CSP) and unify the trade unions. The government Home 
Political Files began very apprehensively to mention Communist activities in the 
various provinces.' 
This chapter aims at reviewing the activities of the CPI and the response of the 
Government of India during Second World War. The focus will be from 1939 to 1945 
which covers the begiiming of the war and the period when a German iavasion of 
For detail information regarding the communist activities in entire period of 1930s see Home 
Political files which is full of communistic information and apprehension; When the war broke out 
in Europe in September 1939, the leftists formed a 'war cabinet' consisting of Rahul Sankritayan. 
Sahajanand and Kishori Prasanna Sinha and the latter two went on advising Kisat. workers to 
concentrate on anti-war issue. (Saradindu Mukherji, Peasants' Politics and the British Governmeni 
1930-40: A Study on Eastern Bihar, Delhi, 1993, p. 140); by the middle of 1940 the mtmber of the 
members of Communist Party grew to 55. Many others also came near party who w jre workmg 
among workers, peasants and students. It was under these people influence that in 194( in Dalmi>a 
Nagar workers strike and in Patna, Chapra, Darbhanga, Bhagalpur, and Monghyr i nd at other 
places students strike were being organized against the war (Indradeep Smgh, Bihar Mein 
Communist Party ka Vikas, Communist Party Prakashan, PC.Joshi Archive, JNU Libraiy p 5) 
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Soviet Union CPI's characterization of war had changed from that of an 'imperialist 
war' to 'people's war'. What other changes took place in the party line during the 
course of war when they considered it a people's war is also to be investigated. An 
important question to be answered in this aspect is if the anti-imperialist plan of the 
communist movement continued during this time or they were blindly supporting the 
British war effort? 
Condition for the work of the CPI became extremely complex vv^ hen World 
War II broke out in 1939, especially from 1939-1941 until shift in the CFls position 
over the war after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. As we know. 
World War II passed through essentially two phases:^ First, when it was bemg fought 
between the imperialist powers (the fascist axis on the one hand and the Britain and 
France, on the other). This was between 3 September 1939 and 21 June 1941 and 
Second, when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union (on 22 June 1941), with the resources 
of practically the whole of the Europe at his command. In Communist view the 
character of the war now changed from an 'imperialist war' to 'people's wu ' . 
As a resuU of Nazi Germany's attack on Poland on September 1 1^39, Britam 
and France declared war on Germany on September 3. The British (lovemment 
declared India to be a belligerent party to the war without even informalK consulting 
Indian leaders. In reaction, the Congress Provincial ministries resigned and the 
Congress withheld its support to war activities. The war took Communist Party of 
The C.P.I, viewed the war as neatly divisible into two phases: Imperialist War phase (September 
1939-June 1941) and People's War phase (June 1941-1945) 
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India completely by surprise; only a week earlier its organ, National From, declared 
that there was going to be another Munich.'* The CPI condemned the war altogether 
and following the line taken by the International Communist leadership declared this 
war as an 'Imperialist War''*. The opinion within the rank of Indian National 
Movement was divided: on the one side was the antipathy to the British masters of 
India, on the other, hostility to the Nazis as upholders of everything offensive to 
human dignity. 
During this phase the CPI considered it as imperialist war because of two 
factors viz. (1) the two contestants in the war "two imperialist rivals, the Anglo-
French imperialists on the one side and the Hitler fascists on the other" were 
responsible for it; and (2) the "actual living war aims of the two sides... ^vere selfish 
imperialist aims." In this phase the task before the people according to CPI was 
"Revolutionary utilization of war crisis for the achievement of National Freedom and 
therefore the people should be brought out into "active struggle". On the question of 
' Victor G. Kieman, ' The Communist Party of India and the Second World War", in Piakash Karat 
(ed.). Across Times and Continents, New Delhi, 2003, p.212 
The Communist International issued in October a manifesto on the inter-imperialist character of the 
war (William Z. Foster, History of the Three International II, New Delhi, 1958. pp. 157-58) G 
Dimitrov, its Secretary-General, issued a long address 'The War and the Working Class" b> the end 
of 1939 (reprinted in G. Adhikari (ed), From People Front to People's War, second ed . Bomba\. 
1944, pp. 328-46, setting out a detailed defence of the Intemationars position. 
^ P Bandhu and TG Jacob(ed.), War and National Liberation: CPI Documents. 19J9-1945. New 
Delhi, 1988, p.iii; Communist International treated this war as inter-imperialist war havmg bemg 
preceded by Munich Conspiracy (1938), {Cf. Irfan Habib, "The Left and the National Movement". 
Social Scientist, Vol. 27, Nos.5-6, May-June 1998, p.20) 
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immediate struggle the Communist Party was with Bose for launching mass 
struggles.*' 
Within a few days of declaration of war, CPI decided to call for a general 
strike on October 2^ This was anti-war protest strike in which more than 90,000 
workers participated, making it the first anti-war strike in the world labou movement. 
The resolutions adopted at the meeting of the strikers proclaimed: "ihis meetmg 
declares its solidarity with the international working class and the people oi'the world, 
who were being dragged into the most destructive war by the imperialist powers. It 
regards the present war as a challenge to the international solidarity of the working 
class and declares that it is the task of the workers and people of different countries to 
defeat this imperialist conspiracy against humanity."^ Thus a process started which 
continued intermittently all through 1940s. The CPI issued a manifesto en 26 Januaiy 
1940, in which it declared: 
"Struggling against the economic distress caused by war, struggling against the 
suppression of political liberties the masses are already moving on the path of action. 
Aided and led by the Congress, these struggle will millions of our coimtrymen mto 
'^ Rakesh Gupta, Bihar Peasantry and the Kisan Sabha. 1936-1947, New Delhi, 1982. p 112 
Jyoti Basu(ed.), Documents of the Communist Movement in India, Vol. IV (1939-1943). 
Calcutta,, 1997, p. 102 
^ B T Ranadive, ' The Role Played by the Communists in the Freedom Struggle". Social Scicniisi. 
Vol.12, No.9, September, 1984, p.23; L.P. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, Mi aiffarpur. 196.x 
p.495; R P Dutta, India Today, Bombay, 1949, p. 305. According to official reports. 110 strikes 
took place in the last quarter of 1939, involving about 170,000 workers. (Cf Pankaj Kumar. 
Communist Movement in India, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 177-78) 
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organised assault on the very citadel of imperialism... with thi;^  perspective 
Independence Day must be celebrated this year as a day of demonstraticn of national 
unity and strength, a day for the decisive struggle for the smashing cf Imperialist 
Rule, for the victorious convening of the Constituent Assembly, for laying the 
foundation of the People's Democratic Republic".^ 
By the time the open session of the Congress was held at Ramgarh in March 
1940, the CPI had come to the following conclusions: 
1. That the crisis created by the outbreak of the Second World War could be fully 
utilized for the achievement of independence because of two easons: (a) 
British imperialism was at its weakest; and (b) the Indian nasses were 
prepared for an outright struggle against imperialism. 
2. That the congress could, if it gave a call for such a struggle, mobili/ e the entire 
nation. However, the Gandhian leadership that represented the interest of the 
bourgeoisie was more interested in bargaining with imperialism than in 
attaining independence because it was afraid more of masses than inrperialism, 
3. That because of the class character of the Congress, even the task of the 
bourgeois democratic revolution had to be, and could be, completed only by 
the proletariat and its party, the CPI. This would be possibly only if the CPI 
was able to establish its hegemony over the national movement. Its basic 
'Independence Day Manifesto of the CPI, 26 January' 1940', C H Philips Ed.. The Evohii on of India 
and Pakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents, London, 1962, p. 365 
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objective was to isolate the Congress leadership from the Congn-ssmen who, 
then, would come under the leadership of CPl. 
4. That in order to isolate the Congress leadership from the Congressmen, the 
masses had to be mobilized both around an understanding of the imperialist 
nature of the war and around economic demands such as increase in wages and 
war allowances."^ 
The Communists were the first to start resistance against the war burden 
imposed on the people.'^ They started their resistance with the strike of 175,000 
textile workers for deamess allowance in Bombay in March 1940. The Bombay strike 
lasted for 40 days despite wholesale arrests of the strike leaders and terrorization of 
workers. The Bombay Trade Union Congress led by Communists gave a call for one-
day solidarity strike and 350,000 workers in different industries joined the strike on 
March 10, 1940.'^ The British Government launched a ruthless attack against the 
Trade Union and peasant leaders in India, and arrested and detained vvithout trial 
hundreds of them under the Defence of India Rules (Act). Of the 70C (who were 
arrested or extemed) were detained in jail without any charges in January 1941, about 
'" D.N. Gupta, Communism and Nationalism in Colonial India, 1939-45, New Delhi. 2( OS. pp. 93-94 
" Ibid, the Home Political Files and other CID and Intelligence reports are full of tho Communists 
activities during 1939-1940. 
' B.T. Ranadive, 'Role Played by the Communists in the Freedom Struggle. Social Scientist. Vol 
12, No. 9, September, 1984, p. 24 
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480 persons were Communists.'^ The Communist Party was virtually driven 
underground; a few functionaries were, however, able to evade poice. By a 
Communique issued on 14* March 1940, the Government of India declaied its policy 
of keeping under detention those persons who were engaged in Communist activities. 
The General Council of the All India Trade Union (AITUC) on 28"' March 
condemned this policy of the imperial government.'^ The war situation saw a large-
scale spurt in militant peasant struggles as well, with the Communists playing a 
leading role in some of them. They organized "hunger marches" and other militant 
activities of the rural poor in several parts of Madras province, Andhra, Malabar, 
Bengal, etc., where traders and zamindars were forced to provide grain to the hungry 
either free or at "fair price". It is clear that Communist influence strongly affected the 
Kerala branch of Socialist Party by 1940. In that year the Communists tried to 
Cf., Sunil Kumar Sen, Working Class Movements in India 1885-1975, Delhi, 1994. p 65; the main 
targets of the British were the Communists. Using the law on the Defence of India Rules, the 
authorities arrested nearly the entire CPI leadership, including A.K.Gopalan, S.A.D;inge. Muzaffar 
Ahmad, S.V.Ghate, S.S.Mirajkar, E.M.S.Namboodripad, Sajjad Zaheer, and others D N. Gupta. 
Communism and Nationalism in Colonial India, 1939-1945, p. 95. In March 1940, the Government 
of India, after seeking the advice of the provincial governments, issued orders for tfic arrest of 19 
prominent Communists, who formed the Central Communist Directorate, under Rule 26 (1) (b) of 
the Defence of India Rule and sub-section (2) of the Defence of India Act 1939, in trder to cripple 
the Communist activities in India. Despite its best efforts, the government failed to ai)prehend ail of 
them, and 10 of them went underground. (For detail see. Letter from the Secretan,, (jovemment of 
India, Home Department, to Provincial Governments, 23 February 1940. Home (Pell). I. File No. 
71 40. 
'•* Sunil Kumar Sen, Working Class Movements in India 1885-1975, p. 65) 
" Prem Sagar Gupta, A Short History ofAITUC(1920-1947), New Delhi, 1980, p.325 
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precipitate Indian independence by paralyzing the British wartime administration. The 
national bourgeoisie within the Congress was now seen not as allies but as "cowards" 
to be isolated,"'^ and the urban proletariat was expected to lead the struggle. The most 
well known among the peasant struggles of the early war years took place in Kayyur 
and adjacent areas of Malabar. Four policemen and two Kisan activists died in 
separate clashes on and immediately after 15 September 1940, observed as the Anti-
Repression Day. Responding to these events, the national Congress leadership 
expelled the Kerala socialists from the party. All of them thereupor joined the 
Communist Party. Those Communists who escaped imprisonment went underground, 
1 7 
and the "proletarian struggle" petered out in early 1941 . 
On r* April 1940, in a Chatkal Majdoor Bulletin, the CPI issued a leaflet 
addressing to the jute mill workers of Bengal put forward some demands like war 
bonus of 25 per cent and permanency of jobs to the workers etc. Further it declared 
that 'there is only one path of conflict before the working class now. That path is the 
path of conflict, of heroic struggle against an imperialist war, a struggle in which there 
is no chance of either safety or settlement...''^ The Party also issued a leaflet to 
students and asked them to join anti-war struggle against the imperialist power 
'** P. C. Joshi, "Unmasked Parties and Politics," March 1940, quoted by Gene D. (Kerstrect and 
Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 1959, p. 181 
'^  Kathleen Gough, 'Peasant Resistance and Revolt in South India', Pacific Affairs, \ol . 41, No 4. 
Winter, 1968-1969, pp. 526-544; (For Bihar see Vinita Damodaran, Broken Pronises: Popular 
Protest. Indian Nationalism and the Congress Party in Bihar J 935-J 946, New Delhi, 1992). 
'*' Home Pohtical, File No. 37/60/1940. 
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defying all obstacles thrown by the Ordinances in the path of meetings, processions. 
They were asked to form Anti-War Committees from among ihe selected 
revolutionary students in schools and colleges. 'Then and then only will we be able to 
draw the masses, ready for a movement into a real struggle... The responsibility of 
the students' community is very great here'.'^ In an official survey of 1941 (January), 
it was mentioned that the CPl was functioning in Bombay and part cf the illegal 
communist apparatus was not dislocated or disorganized by police measures. 
Communist leaders from the Bombay, Bengal Punjab, Madras and several 
'underground' leaders of U.P. had been arrested, and yet there were a sizeable number 
of publication of leaflet published by the Party which were translated into different 
regional languages like Urdu, Hindi, Marathi, Telegu, Tamil, Bengali etc. The 
Communists' publication's resources was not enough to meet the expenses mcuned 
on publications, and officials suspected some foreign aid and support tiaving been 
obtamed for the purpose. The Central Committee had appealed for a collection of 
Rupees 10,000 on the eve of 'May Day'^^. The Women's fraction of the Bengal 
Home Political, File No. 37/27/1940. Communists influence among the students is visible m 
different kinds of report. 
^" Home Political, File No. 7/1/1941; the pamphlets was published from Bomba\ mentioned in the 
report are: "Communist", "Marx on India", "A Contrast of Two Worlds- 20 Years Under 
Imperialism and Socialism", and reproduction of R.P.Dutt's book India Today. "A Soldier Hero" 
about the life of Garhwali soldier mutineers by Thakur Chandra Singh in the naric of Ramesh 
Chandra Sinha, "Fight Against War", "Second Imperialist War and Our Task", and 'Lenin s 
Advice to Students". 
''Ibid 
"'Ibid., communist survey of May 1941 
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Branch of the CPI called women to join anti war campaign against the British 
Government. The examples of the women and their role in revolution in Soviet Russia 
and China were cited for the purpose. It was emphasised in the pamphlets that 
'Women may help the Communist Party in various ways. By giving help to the 
Communist Party girl students of schools and colleges, domestic girls and educated 
young women may still more strengthen the movement for freedom.' The pamphlet 
further assigned what help women may render. 
1. 'They may collect funds for the party from every house, school, college and 
hostel. 
2. They may sell the sell the secret organ of party. 
3. They may make arrangements for keeping in safety men engaged in secret 
work. 
4. They may distribute everywhere the secret pamphlets and maniftjstos against 
the war and in favour of the struggle for freedom. 
5. They may help in the matter of preserving pamphlets, books and documents 
of the party. 
6. They may carry on propaganda against the war by holding secret meetings. 
7. They may help in the formation of women workers' organisation by paying 
visits to workers' bustees and may start schools, study circles, and 
associations for removal of illiteracy in order to educate their children ."^  
23 i The Communist Party's Call to Women', Published by the Women's fraction of the Bengal Branch 
of the Communist Party of India,-Branch of the Communist International Home Pol.lical. File No 
165 
From 1940 to 1941 almost 500 Communists were arrested and convicted for 
carrying on anti war political propaganda. The Bombay Communists attempted to 
organize a strike of Victoria drivers in late April (1941), but it failed owing to the 
communal riots. Similarly their efforts to stage a one day strike on May Day , was 
foiled by the imposition of bans on all meetings. Still 'May Day' was celebrated by 
Communists and socialists^" By May 1941 more than 20,000 freedom fignters, mostly 
leftists, had been put behind prison bars under the Defence of India Rules and other 
repressive laws. A Detention camps were set up, as in Deoli (Rajasthan) and Hugly 
(Bengal) for confinement of political prisoners from various states. The war period 
witnessed a series of glorious anti-imperialist actions of students led by the All-India 
Students' Federation—against war and against imperialist repression University 
campuses all over the country were stirred as never before. The Central Government 
issued a Press Note (March 1941) drawing public attention to the subvers ve nature of 
the Communists anti-war propaganda and organized attempts to sabotage India's war 
effort. Bengal Intelligence Branch reported that the Communist Party aimed at stirrmg 
37/61/1940. Renu Chakravarty, Communists in Indian Women's Movement writes ttiat in October 
1942, soon after the legalization of the Communist Party, the Bengal Provincial Woncns Front of 
the Communist P<uty was formed. Fighting against tremendous odds in the form of social barriers 
and anti-communist propaganda, communist women campaigned on the issues of food scarcit\. 
protection from Japanese bombings and the defence of the country. Earlier in Stptember 1942 
communist women started famine relief work among the working class and rural poor women m 
Calcutta, Pabna, Rangpur, Barisal and Dinajpur. 
'"* Home Political. File No. 7/1/194l;Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement in Pun/at 11921-1947). 
Delhi, 1979, p. 161; he mentioned that the rally was poorly attended by the Communists ignoring 
the fact about the communal riot as mentioned in the Government Home Political file 
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up industrial and peasant discontent; it planned to organize "protest" strikes and cause 
unrest among industrial and railway labour on "war allowance'" and other 
grievances.^^ The Intelligence Bureau reported that 
"The aims of the Communists in India are two fold: to overthrow the British 
Government established by law, and to destroy the present economic organization of 
society. The ultimate method of achieving these objects is that of violence, and the 
law is not adequate to deal with that. The first stages, at which we have endeavoured 
to stop Communists attack, are the stages of the propaganda to deal with propaganda. 
The Communists themselves divide their activities into legal and illegal. They devise 
legitimate means for the purpose of promoting a situation which will encourage the 
development of the communist spirit...they also mobilize workers for no-rent against 
landlords to deprive Government of its revenue." 
During this period (1940-41) the CID launched various conspiracy cases 
against the Communists which are as follows: 
1. Orissa Communist Conspiracy Case, Cuttuck, 1940 
2. Coimbatore Communist Conspiracy Case, 1941 
3. Trinevelli Communist Conspiracy Case, 1941 
4. Madras Communist Conspiracy Case, 1941.^^ 
•• Home Political/1941, Cf., Subodh Roy(ed.), Communism in India Unpublished Documents 1935-
79^/5, Calcutta, 1972,p.231 
''' Home Political, File No. 7/8/1941 
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As noted the Government suspected that CPI was involved in secret activities 
and foreign Communists were supporting Indian Communist Movement. Intelligence 
Bureau report of the period showed that there was evidence of ("Pis secret 
correspondence with their British advisors founded as a result of the search of the 
home Michael Carritt in England.^^ Despite Government efforts the ( l^ommunist 
activities was going outside and inside jail also. The Communists were })aying much 
attention to the reorganization of the Party as the intelligence bureau in its 
Communists survey of May (1941) noted. The CPI headquarters' at Bombay laid 
down the policy to be observed by the Communists in both prison and outside and 
further described the "brutal and inhuman treatment" meted out to security prisoners 
in the detention camps at Deoli and Nasik and in other Indian jails. 
By June, however, there was an apparent decline in Communist activities. 
and there were reports of dissension among Communists in the Deoli ( amp on the 
question of treatment as Class I and Class II prisoners. The Central Committee 
published only the "Communist" (Number 4) for June 1941, but some local branches 
had been continuing to issue their pamphlets, in Bombay, Ahmadabad, Punjab, Kerala 
and Delhi. In Kerala several party Letters in Malayalam were secretly distributed. 
These letters condemned "police repression". In the Punjab the 'Lai Jhanda" was 
' ' Home Political, File No. 7/39/1941,He was an I.C.S. officer in Bengal and after his resignation he 
settled in London and became a leading member of the Communist Part> of Great 
Britain(CPGB)being in, charge of the Indian section. Michael Carritt wrote his memoirs entitled A 
Mole in the Crown, Hove, 1985. He had assisted Ben Bradley who had been an excused in thc 
famous Meerut Conspiracy Case. 
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distributed in the Jallundhur district and anti war posters had been discovered at Dera 
Ghazi Khan^^ 
On June 22, 1941 Nazi Germany attacked Soviet Russia and for the 
Communists it necessarily brought a change in complexion of the war. The Comintern 
declared that this was not an extension of war but transformation of wa;: The attack 
on Red Russia was not like an attack on any other country. It was an attack on the 
Socialist Fatherland of the workers of all lands, it was an attack on the anti-imperialist 
friend of the oppressed peoples of the East; it was an attack on new civilization; it was 
an attack on one-sixth of the earth, which alone was only free and prosperous, which 
embodied the best dreams and all the hopes of the best of mankind, and behind which 
stood not only the organized world-wide Communist movement but all freedom-
loving and progressive peoples.^^ Therefore, this war was called as 'People's War' ' 
by the Comintern. 
The German attack found bulk of the Communist leaders imprisoned in Deoli 
Detention Camp, where they kept company with the Socialists, who as so had been 
actively opposing the war effort in pursuance of their demand for immediate national 
independence. The shift in the character of the war caused deep confusion among 
the members of the Progressive Writers Association (PWA). In July 194! progressive 
writers, who were also members of the CPl supported the 'united ami imperialist 
-^ Home Political, File No. 7/1/1941 
^'P Bandhu and TG Jacob(ed.), War and National Liberation: CPI Documents 1939-1)45. p.3.^ 
^^  For detail, see, Sumit Sarkar, Modern India J 885-1947, New Delhi, Reprint 2001. pp 4II -13 
'^ M R Masani, 'Communism in India', Pacific Affair, Vol.24, No. 1, March 1951. p.2-
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front'/^ The CPI took some time to appraise the changed character of the war Most 
of its leaders in jail found it difficult to turn from the long established position of 
hostility to British Imperialism, and treat it as an ally in a world w de alliance. 
Therefore, its anti-imperialist activities had been going in various prcvmces The 
continuing anti-war effort had been reaffirmed as correct by a pamphlet dated July 
1941 issued by the Polit-Bureau of the CPI. This pamphlet (secretly circulated 
throughout the various party strongholds) declared: 
"Our attitude towards the British Government and its imperialist war remains what 
it was. We must continue and intensify our struggle against both. We can render really 
effective aid to the Soviet only as a free people".^'' 
In August 1941 as well there was no change in communist's anti-war attitude. 
The party adopted two fold 'party line'. The war on the Eastern front >vhich Soviet 
Russia was fighting must be supported; and the war between Britain and (lermany in 
Europe was an 'imperiaHst war' and must be resisted and obstructed. Communists 
Khizr Humayun Ansari, The Emergence of Socialist Thought Among the North Indian Muslim 
(J9J 7-1947), Lahore, 1990, p. 18 
" Shashi Joshi and Bhagwan Josh, ed. Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920-1947. Vcl. Ill 1941-47. 
New Delhi, 1994, p. 328. The change in the character of the imperialist war into peoples war 
started a debate among the political line of the Communist ranks in India. For about six months two 
opposing lines in the part>', one advocated by P.C. Joshi who was outside and otht r b\ the jailed 
comrades in the Deoli camp, continued to contend with each other. (The part\ stalwarts jailed at 
Deoli included S.A. Dange, Muzaflfar Ahmad, S.S. Mirajkar, B.T. Ranadive and Aja> Ghosh) 
Ultimately the entire leadership accepted the 'Deoli Thesis' which declared that national struggle 
is only a part of the International struggle and not vice-versa'. 
^^Home Political, File No. 7/1/1941 
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sought to organize "Solidarity Campaign" through Soviet Aid Committees and 
creation of funds for popular agitation-voiced through civil liberties unions, Kisan 
Committees, and Student organizations for the release of Communist prisoners 
without fear of consequence. Later they crystallized their position as folic ws: "Britain 
is fighting an 'Imperialist War' and the Soviet Union a 'Just War'.. .CPl's activities m 
provinces like Punjab, U.P, Madras, Calcutta and Bombay etc., were itill on.^' In 
November the Central Committee from Bombay issued a 'Party Letter' in 
commemoration of 'November Day'. This stated: 
"Our main slogan this November is: victory of the Soviet Union is bound up with 
the victory of all oppressed peoples over their exploiters. We must help to make 
Soviet victory possible, not by helping Imperialist rulers in their war effort, but by 
fighting harder for our own freedom" 
The Communist leaders (held in Deoli Jail Camp) prepared their Jail 
Document' in December, in which they argued forcefully for a change of policy to 
one of 'people's war'. This involved offering their assistance to the British war effort 
without linking it to the demand for immediate independence.^^ It A'as only in 
Ibid, Survey of the Communist Activity in India, August 1941; In September survty the situation 
was more or less same despite Soviet characterization of the war as peoples war 
Ibid, Summary of Communist Activity in India, November-December 1941 
The defeat of 'fascism' became an important constituent of the political agenda of the national and 
provincial leaders of the CPl. They saw the demand of Indian independence and tie need to help 
the Allied war effort as being mutually exclusive issues. The leadership did not a^k its cadres to 
give up their fight for independence but advised them to postpone the struggle till the "forces of 
fascism' were defeated. The Polit-Bureau members consistently reiterated that, ". 1 idia s freedom 
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January-February of 1942 that the Communists in Kerala fully grasped the tactics of 
unconditional support to the War Efforts.'*^ P.C.Joshi, (the then General Secretary), 
also maintained that India would secure freedom in the course of supporting the war. '' 
This statement was based on two arguments- first, that the leadership and example of 
the Soviet Union was in itself a guarantee of world wide liberation from the pre-war 
order, and secondly, that the creation of national unity to support war efforts would 
force the British to concedes India's freedom. 
The 'Prison Document' or 'Jail Document' justifying the people's war wrote: 
"Nazism is the main enemy of the international proletariat and the peoples of the 
world and the war against it is a people's war...Soviet peoples are fightmg not for 
"national preservation" but for the existence as a socialist state ..."Therefore, "the 
war against Nazism waged by the USSR with the help of British was people's war to 
defend socialism and safeguard the future revolutionary movements.'"^^ urther, they 
reiterated that 'the party must take the initiative to unite all the progressive forces in 
the country to demand and fight for minimum demands such as: 
1. Unconditional release of all political prisoners and detenus 
lies through successful resistance against fascist invader...Let us rouse and mobilize the people to 
force the nations leaders to defend the country and win its freedom in the common stoigglc \\ith the 
United Nations'. 
T M Thomas Isaac, 'The National Movement and The Communist Party in Ivcrala". Social 
Scientist, August-September 1986, Vol. 14, No. 8, 9, p. 72 
P C Joshi, Communist Reply to the Congress Working Committee Charges, Bomba>. 1945. p 45 
* Home Political, File No. 44/32/1942 
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2. Removal of ban on all Communists who have been interned cr otherwise 
restricted. 
3. Withdrawal of warrant against all underground Communists. 
4. Withdrawal of ban on the National Front, The New Age, and all other organs of 
the Communists in provincial languages. 
5. Immediate grant of press declarations for new newspapers, j(»umals, and 
periodicals 
This charter of demand should be the basis of a mass struggle and its 
acceptance by the British government of unfolding India voluntary v ar effort to 
secure victory in the war against Hitler's fascism'.'" The All India Student Federation 
(AISF)/^ amidst scenes of tempestuous enthusiasm, had passed the resolution on the 
people's war by 534 votes to 9 at its Patna sessions (December, 1941).Tlie Executive 
of the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) also (at its Nagpur session in February, 1942) 
'^ Ibid. 
•*• All India Students' Federation (AISF) was organized in 1936 to provide a unified voice for the 
student movement. From the beginning, the AISF was strongly nationalist and radical in its political 
views, Myron Weiner, 77?^  Politics of Scarcity, Chicago, 1962, p. 163; Communists, socialists, and 
Gandhians worked harmoniously within the AISF and provincial affiliates were organized in all 
parts of India, The annual AISF conferences, held at the same time as the sessions of the Indian 
National Congress, attracted upwards of 3,000 delegates and the top Congress leaders addressed the 
students, (Philip G. Altbach, 'The Transformation of the Indian Student Movement', Asian Survey. 
Vol. 6, No. 8. Aug., 1966, p. 450). 
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had adopted the policy of the people's war, and it was reported that the imprisoned 
leaders of the movement wholeheartedly agreed with the resolution. 
Despite Communists' support to war effort the colonial administration continued 
strict vigilance over their activities. Writing to Secretary of State L.S. /.mery on 26 
February 1942, the viceroy Lord Linlithgow complained that there was "little 
practical support" to the war effort from the Communists.'*'* There v ere raid on 
several places and Communists' post was often withheld. A large number of books 
were seized by the intelligence police during the period January-September 1942. ' 
But eventually, an order was issued for the release of sixteen communist prisoners in 
April. In the Punjab several communist and Akali leaders were released. The order 
stated that 'the persons who have been detained as member of the CPl are supportmg 
the war effort so their alleged detention no longer exists and they may safely be 
released'.'"' A letter explaining the government' attitude towards the pa?ty declared: 
^^ Bandhu and TG Jacob(ed.), War and National Liberation CPI Documents 1939-194:. p.66 
•" Transfer of Power. 1942-47, Vol. I, pp. 252 ff, quoted from Hiren Mukherjee, Under Commimism 's 
Crimson Colour: Reflections on Marxism, Indiaandthe fforW&ewe, New Delhi. 1982. p 119 
'^^ Home Political, File No. 41/5/42 (Internal), Between January 1942- January 1943; Sec Appendix 
for the book lists) 
•**• Home Political, File No. 44/32/1942, Those who were released were Harsh Deo Malviya. Ajo> 
Kumar Ghosh, Sajjad Zaheer, Sunil Kumar Mukherji (I regret to have failed in obtaining a cop\ of 
his autobiography Party Jivan ki Yaaden), S A Dange, R D Bhardwaj, S V Ghate. S S 
Batliwallah, B T Ranadive, S. S. Mirajkar, Paramhans Ram Udar Das alias Rahul Saukritavan, Shcr 
Jang Chowdhury, A. S. K. Ayyangar; In Punjab Teja Singh Sutantar, Achhar Singh Chinna. Iqbal 
Singh Hundal, Bhagat Singh Bilga, Sohan Singh Josh Ferozuddin Mansur, Karam Singh Ma and 
Fazl Elahi Qurban were released (who were member of the Communist Party and Kirti circles) h\ 
the Punjab Government. And then the CPI issued a proclamation; "we must defend our countr\ 
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"At the present juncture, the Government of India consider it to be of primary 
importance to allow freedom of action to the adherents of any party in India who are 
prepared to help the prosecution of the war and make use of any elements m the 
population whose activities will form an effective makeweight to the deieatist tactics 
of the Indian National Congress and thus help discredit that party. They are fully 
17 
aware that there are risks in the policy which it is proposed to adopt..." In various 
parts of India units of the Friends of Soviet Union (FSU) were set up. On 21 July. 
1941 the first All-India Day of solidarity with the Soviet Union was observed. 
Meetings and demonstrations, evenings of friendship were held in Benga , the United 
Province, Bombay, Bihar, Malabar and at many other places. The leaders of the 
Congress also expressed their solidarity with the people of the USSR and gave vent to 
their unreserved hatred against Fascism."^ ^ 
Though there were reports from different provinces of renewed communist 
activities. The decision to support the war resulted in the gradual release of all the 
communist leaders from detention (24* July 1942), and to lifting the ban on the 
Communist Party itself and its organ the National Front and the New Age, enabling it 
against Japanese imperialism to the bitter end," They urged '"for the formation :>i a National 
Government, release of political prisoners, and creation of a democratic Peoples Arm\ b\ 
mobilization of nation's manpower and the utilization of all the industries and resources of the 
countrv', see, Punjab Fortnightly report for the Ilnd half of April 1942 received from the Central 
Intelligence Officer, Lahore, {Cf., Subodh Roy (ed.). Communism in India 1935-1945. p 338) 
•^^ Cf., Biswamoy Pati (ed.). Turbulent Times. India 1940-44, Mumbai, 1998. p. 144 
L.V. Mitrokhin, Friends of the Soviet Union, Delhi, 1977, p. 31, Cf., Shashi Bairathi C 
and Nationalism in India, Delhi, 1987, pp. 185-186 
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4' to function as a legal party for the first time nearly after a decade. Before the 
legalization of the communist party, Japanese attack had alarmed the British. They 
had sent a Cripps Mission but that was rejected by the Congress as well as Muslim 
League. The CPI in its letter number seven welcomed the British Constitutional 
proposal "as a suitable basis for a settlement; inadequate though they are ', and urged 
the Congress and Muslim League to form a national government for mobilizing the 
country for defence.^° 
In May 1942 Police reports mentioned that there was an argument with 
N.G. Ranga of Madras over key positions in the AIKS secretariat. It further suggested 
'*'' M R Masani, The Communist Party of India: A Short History, London. 1954, p. 80 \n December 
1941, Japan and America entered into war. Singapore surrendered to Japanese in lebruan 1942 
On 9'*" March, Rangoon was seized. The Allied forces were in full retreat on all fronts. And in JuK 
1942 the Indian atmosphere was choking with unrest and frustration, anger and a des re for change 
With the failure of the Cripps Mission, all hopes of compromise with the British had broken down; 
(Shashi Bairathi, Communism and Nationalism in India, p.185; Bhagwan Josh, op.cit p. 165) 
'" Subodh Roy (ed.). Communism in India Unpublished Documents, 1935-1945, Calcutta. 1976, 
p.361: towards the end of April (1942), the war came closer to India. The Japaicse airplanes 
bombed Chittagong and were talks of an air attack on Calcutta. The AICC meeting at Allahabad. 
held towards the end of April, decided to adopt a neutral attitude towards the Japai esc The CPI. 
pledged by now to do everything in its power to rouse the masses to resist the Fascist invade, was 
highly critical of the Allahabad decision of the AICC. A top CPI leader (Adhikari). wrote to 
Jawaharlal Nehru, "Anti-British demagogy plus neutrality means defeatism and more defeatism 
among the masses. It is not the soil on which we can grow the harvest of the patriot!: defenders of 
our motherland. It is the soil on which the enemy- the new imperialist enslaver will grow his ugK 
crop. That is why we appeal you to see that the resolution is not taken advantage of 5\ pro-Fascist 
elements and implemented in the spirit of your press review". (Adhikari to Nehru. 3 May 1942. 
Jawaharlal Nehru ed., A Bunch of Old Letters, p. 488, Cf Gautam Chattopadhya\. Bengal Electoral 
Politics and Freedom Struggle 1862-1947. New Delhi, 1984, pp. 179-80) 
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that some of his youthful communist adherents favoured civil defence organization as 
a means of obtaining arms to commit dacoities, and of screening underground 
operation. Before their release from Hazaribagh jail in the 17*'' April, thiee students" 
security prisoners were involved in a "rowdy" demonstration refusing to leave 
without their jail kit and to accept Government orders restricting their mo v^ ements (Jai 
Prakash Narain and the Socialists kept aloof from this fracas). Two of them were later 
prominent at a Patna meeting which condemned Government, but urgec students to 
spend their vacation creating an anti-fascist atmosphere in the villages. ' he released 
Monghyr Communists planned to 'activise' the district Kisan Sabha and student 
organization.^' 
On 8* August 1942 the Congress launched 'Quit India' movement and most 
of its leaders were imprisoned. CPl following the policy enunciated by the Commtem 
opposed the Quit India Movement and criticized the CSP and Forward Bloc for 
organizing sabotage. They planned to persuade the Congress and Muslim League that 
their interests lay in unity.^^ As Sumit Sarkar has pointed out, it was a wise step to 
embark and avoid confrontation at a moment when India was full of Allied troops and 
when the British would have had a unique chance of justifying the most brutal of 
" Second fortnight Review of situation in Bihar, CID-Patna, Home Political File. No. 226/1942; As 
such the Communists were able to form the Bihar state unit of the CPI onK in Octobor 1939. when 
their United Front agreement with the CSP collapsed. (See Indian Communist Fatty Documents 
1930-56 (CPI Documents) (Bombay: Democratic Research Service, 1957. p. 44) 
'- Bipan Chandra (ed.). The Indian Left: Critical Appraisals, New Delhi, 1983. pp. 243 44 
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repressive measures.^^ The District Communist Party of Jhansi issued statement on 
\7^^ August: "The Communist Party wants to remind the people that by resortmg to 
violent methods against government in the name of Congress and Gandhi they are 
neither enhancing the prestige of the Congress nor helping Gandhi t) fulfill the 
mission of his life...The Communist Party severely condemns the repression and 
urges Britain to recognize the independence of India and set up a national government 
immediately with a view to fighting the Japanese aggression successfully ..the 
communist party, concludes the statement, appeals to the people to carry on the 
agitation against the arrest of Congress leaders by all peaceful means "^  A large 
number of party cadres were arrested in eastern India. In Orissa, for nstance. all 
'leading communist, Kisan, student, labour workers' were rounded up and detained 
within a week after the trouble started, the Communist press was muzzled and no 
pamphlets explaining the party's stance were allowed to be published until the 20 
"^  Sumit Sarkar, "Communists and 1942", Social Scientist, Vol. 12, No. 9, September 1984. p 52: 
The Communist Party characterized this war as People's war because of the changed regrouping 
and changed prospect before the world. It did not mean subjugation to the British, n view of the 
part\', as alleged by the Congress. It worked out a strategy of a national unity to \ in a National 
Government...as far as its aims of National Government was concerned, and suggested a united 
fi-ont, Rakesh Gupta, op.cit., p. 113; Similarly, the AIKS did not subscribe to the August Struggle' 
programme of the Congress. In its political campaign it demand like the Commi nist Part, the 
release of Congress leaders arrested immediately after the announcement of the August Struggle. 
and campaigned for unity of the Congress, (M.A. Rasul, A History of the All India Kisan Sahha. 
Calcutta, 1974, p. 85) 
Reuter Telegram, For Press Advice No. 9, Jhansi, August 17, Home PolituaL File No 
36/61/1942(Intemal) 
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September 1942." A letter from Madras asked, in September 1942, whether the 
Government of India wanted to continue the policy of treating the Commanists action 
with the distrust. The letter agreed with a collector's view that the Comrnmists were 
'10 percent anti-Nazi and 90 percent anti-Government'.^^ In this period ol mass anger. 
the voice of the Communists fell on the deaf ears and they were isolated from the 
people as never before.^^ Communists on the other hand, argued that the path to 
Indian freedom lie not through struggling against Indian defence but by strengthening 
it. By destroying defence they would not achieve freedom but Fascism instead. Unity 
is the only way out for the Indian people. 
While criticizing the August movement, the manifesto issued by CPl also 
denounced the repressive measures against Congress leadership. It held that the 
solution to the crisis did not lie in continuing repression to crush the Congress as 
"imperialists, loyalists and Royists suggesf. They severely cr ticized the 
People's War, 20 September 1942: Cf. Biswamoy Pati (ed.). Turbulent Times Indu 1940-44. pp 
148-149; the Communist Party in Orissa was started in 1938. Biswamoy Pati. C f Movements. 
Compromises and Retreats: Orissa, 1936-1939', Social Scientist. Vol. 20, No. 5/6. (May - Jun . 
1992), p. 64 
•^ Home Political File, No. 7/15/42(1), Cf. Biswamoy Pati (ed.). Turbulent Times Inaia 1940-44. p 
149 
" For detail debate over the CPI and 1942 as well as criticism of the part\ for not supporting this 
movement, (See, Sumit Sarkar, "Communists and 1942", Social Scientist. Vol. 12. No <-). 
September, 1984; Biswamoy Pati (ed.). Turbulent Times, India 1940-44: Baiidhu and TG 
Jacob(ed.), War and National Liberation CPI Documents 1939-1945) 
^^ People's War, 4 October, 1942 
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government's policy of repression and held the British responsible for the same.' At 
this time Harry PoUitt urged that it was the task of the British Labour Movement to 
play a leading role in resolving the Indian deadlock. The only path accordmg to Pollitt 
was 'to grant India her independence which would enable her to form an Indian 
National Government here and now representing all national forces and ])arties. Such 
a Government would then be in a position to mobilize all the great power and 
resources of the Indian people to fully cooperate with Britain and the Urited Nations 
in armed resistance to the Fascist aggressors.'^° P.C.Joshi repeatedly mentioned that 
'the path to Indian freedom lies not through struggling against Indian defence but by 
strengthening it. To destroy defence is not to get freedom but fascism instead. Unity is 
the only way out for the Indian people. Unity is the people's strategy to :omplete the 
encirclement of a handful of the imperialist rulers. Unity at the top will be the 
culmination. It can not be the beginning of the movement for national movement .'' 
On 17 January 1943, the local Communists at Dacca organized a successful 
conference. They advocated National Defence and formation jf National 
Government. In this conference programme was chalked out. 'It was decided to raise 
Rs. 3,500 for the two lacs fund. The other items were as follows: enroll 115 new Party 
members, organise a Volunteer Corps of 300 consisting of Party members and 
militants, raise Janayudha subscribers from 700 to 1000 by the end of January 1943. 
Shashi Bairathi, Communism and Nationalism in India, p. 190 
"" People's War, 17 January 1943, Support for Labour-Communist Unity". Pollitt s New Years 
message- End Indian Stalemate (11 January 1943) 
*' People's War, 4 October 1942 
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every Party comrade to take A.R.P. training by the next month and every cell leader to 
get special Party training.' 
Prior to this, Chittagong District Communist conference (held on the 29" 
and 30**' December 1942), was attended by 396 party members, n-ilitants and 
sympathizers and in the open session nearly 4000 men, women, workers, peasants, 
students and intelligentsia were present. In this conference nearly Rs 5000 were 
collected. Some members of the Muslim League also participated in tht meeting. It 
succeeded in rousing the people for Unity-National Resistance-Freedom/' In 
February the party gave a call for the release of Gandhiji to end national crisis and 
appealed to every patriotic son and daughter to stop sabotage. '^*' 
With the blatant and brutal attack of Japanese fascists came the devastating 
famine of 1943 which took the toll of 35 lakhs of men, women and children. Writers 
and intellectuals could no longer keep themselves aloof from the national stream."^ 
Consequently Bengal suffered from food crisis both because of famine as well as 
black marketeers. The Communist Party had launched anti-hoarding drive, to raise the 
*^  Ibid, 17 January 1943. (Dacca District Communist Conference) 
' ' Ibid. 
'^ Ibid. 21 February 1943, Resolution of Central Committee of the CPl m session at Bombav. 14-22 
Februarv', 1943, p 1 
'^'^ Sarojmohan Mitra, 'Progressive Cultural Movement in Bengal', Social Scientist, >'ol 8. No 5/6. 
[Marxism and Aesthetics], Dec, 1979 - Jan., 1980), p.l 18 
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war production, etc. The party sought the cooperation of the Congress and Muslim 
League to form a National Government to end the political deadlock. 
P. C. Joshi wrote that 'the government arrested our agitator, oetained our 
organizers without trial, raided our offices and denied us permission to hold meetings. 
We suffered the lack of civil liberties with the rest of national movemen except that 
our party was formally legal.' Despite Government continuous repression he noted 
that 'our membership have doubled, we lost 29 old members, but gaineti 4,448 new 
ones. Party membership today is 9,219. The sale oi People's War has increased by 
124% and it comes out in five languages.' 
The description provided by the intelligence department showed that despite 
Government's strict vigilance, the dissemination of Soviet propaganda v as going on 
in communist strong-holds. Soviet Literatures and cinemas were used as a means for 
propaganda. Russian films were translated either into English (or into some other 
Indian languages) by an Indian communist at the exhibition. The Indian Communists 
"^  Ibid, 4 July, 1943, Vol. 2(1), p. 1; They put emphasis on the unity to achieve independence. 
People's War, 1 August, B T Ranadive, "Communist Fight for Unity". (For food scarcit> in Bihar 
see Vinita Damodaran, Broken Promises: Popular Protest, Indian Nationalism ami the (\in^ress 
Party in Bihar 1935-1946, pp. 245-83 and Vinita Damodaran, 'Bihar in the 1940s: Communities. 
riots and the state'. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 18:2,153-176) 
" P. C. Joshi, The Way out of the Cnsis", People's War, 7 March 1943: -Over 65.000 copies of the 
Part}' organs are produced in 11 languages... Party Central Head quarter alone has jrought out 26 
pamphlets in 42,500 copies and 92.5% of which is already sold out. It organised 24.610 \oluntccrs 
m the Red Guards of P.V.B; 1, 97,629 workers m 240 Trade unions; 2, 81,109 kisans in their own 
sabhas; 25,822 women in Mahila Sanghams or Atma Raksha Samities; 6.400 kids in 190 Basu 
Sanghams." 
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were sending literature to China for which the Intelligence Bureau advised, "hundred 
per cent censorship.. .anything objectionable would be stopped by the censor."" 
The Government of India pointed out that 'the communist openly declare their 
'pro-war' and 'anti-fascist' attitude. They do little however to practice.' what they 
preach. It admitted that the arrest of Gandhi and the working committee have 
persistently demanded their release. The Government of India admits the propaganda 
of the party since its legalization has given the cause for anxiety and they refer in 
particular to the party's organ the People's War. The tone of this paper v as such that 
action had to be taken against it under the Indian Press Act by the Bombay 
Government. The Government of India is inclined to discount the prj- Congress 
activities of the Communists, in particular their support of the Congress, on the 
ground that this was necessary in order that party might increase its influence. But 
according to the latest policy of the party, adopted in June 1943, their object is the 
liberation of the country from imperialist enslavement. This can mean nothing but the 
overthrow of the present Government. The policy adopted in this province (Bihar) 
towards Communists has been in the past one of strict neutrality in the sense that 
^'^ Home Political (I) Secret File, No. 7/10/1943-poll (I); Summary by Chief Censo in India, this 
report labeled CPI as "official propaganda agents" of the Soviet Union. It menticnod that MB 
Billimoria was instrumental in providing and arranging newsreels for exhibition which was 
produced by Films Pont, Moscow on behalf of CPI. The Russian films were translated cither into 
English or some Indian languages by an Indian communist at the exhibition iiillimona also 
contacted Messrs Sayvzintorgkino for hiring newsreels at cheaper rate for rupees o ic per reel per 
month. This further reports that the Socialist Literature Publication Co., Agra offered to bu\ \ arious 
speeches by Stalin and to sell communist literature in Urdu if the Russian firm was interested 
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since the ban was removed, members of the Communist Party have not been 
condemned as such but have been deah with strictly on their merits.' 
The communist Party had been condenming the arrest of Gandhi and Congress 
leaders and demanded their release. These demands had been supported by a 
campaign for reconciliation between the Congress and Muslim League with the 
professed object of forming National Government. The attack on 'Goverrnient which 
accompanied this propaganda in the Communist Press had undoubtedly at times been 
embarrassing.' ' The Party had, as a whole , exercised a restraining; effects on 
students, and its influence over the student community, though not great, has ,such as 
it is, been used in the direction of preventing student strikes and disorderly 
demonstration.' The party also made every effort to extend its influence with labour, 
kisan and the food situation, army and services. The People's War in particular had 
frequently overstepped permissible bounds in its attacks on the colonial (jovemment. 
The party's pro-war propaganda had almost invariably interlarded witn attacks on 
bureaucratic inefficiency, the effect of which might had detracted from the value of its 
condemnation of sabotage and fifth columnists. At the time of its legalization, a 
Japanese invasion of India seemed imminent. Subsequent improvement in the war 
situation provided a breathing space in which the parties concentrated on internal 
organization and expansion; finally, increasing confidence in its own strength had 
"^^  Government of Bihar to Government of India (from Y. A. Godboie Chief Secretary to GOI to The 
Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, 21" October 1943). Honii Political. File 
No. 7/23/1943, Cf PS Gupta, Towards Freedom Documents on the Movements for 1 idependence in 
India 1943-1944, ICHR, Delhi, 1997, pp 1648-49 
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produced a tendency for the party to resume its pro-war and anti-Congress 
propaganda. It was clear that during (the) period under review, the Communists' 
principal preoccupation had been to increase the strength of their party. It was 
difficult to think about Communists to adopt a wholly loyalis attitude; as 
Communists and Nationalists they 'were fundamentally opposed to "Imperialist 
domination" 7*^  
After the conclusion of Bezwada session of AIKS on March 16' . 1944. 
Adhikari, one of the three members of the Polit Bureau of CPl, addressed in a private 
meeting of some 50 Communists from all provinces. He said: "theii success had 
greatly encouraged them and could now go ahead with the real task of bringing about 
of revolution of the proletariat. The kisans and mazdoors were ready for such a 
revolution and therefore, their work in the trade unions and Kisan Sabha should be 
intensified. The call for the revolution would be given when the Russian victory in the 
present war become an absolute certainty, the Nazis are completely anaihilated and 
British and American imperialism is crippled to the extent of being unable to suppress 
the revolution. They had to take into account the 20 lac of Indian army personnel and 
to inculcate communist ideas to them so that when the bugle of re>olution was 
sounded, the Indian Army rank and file should join the comrade.^' 
"^ Government of India, Home Department to all Provincial Governments. LPSJ 8 5(Vy: ff 31-34. 
New Delhi, 20 September, 1943. 
" Home Political, File No. 7/5/1944 (I) & K.W, Communist Policy 
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The Punjab C.I.D. reported that the communist headquarters ai Bombay had 
circulated a model speech to all provincial committees of the Party on the eve of 
Independence Day regarding famine in Bengal^^ In March 1944, tht; Communists 
were actively involved in famine relief work. In Bengal they organi2ed a People "s 
Relief Committee. It claimed to have distributed lakh of rupees on relief through food 
committees, gruel kitchen, and medical units. It had distributed cloth and grain 
collected from other provinces. Besides this the Party claimed its membership to be 
25,000 throughout India, an increase of 9000 since May 1943, Bengal and Madras 
were the leading provinces with about 7000 members each. Bombay stood next after 
them with a claim of some 3000 members whereas in Punjab the communist 
following in industrial area was negligible and there was intense rivalrx between the 
Communist and their Kirti allies and the hostile Akali leaders. The Conmiunist Party 
journal, the People's War circulation, was at its peak in January 1943 when 34.000 
copies on the average were sold every week of the English, Marathi, & Gujrati 
• Punjab C.I.D. No. 341-42-A.D.S.B. dated 20* January 1944, 'Policy towards Comiiunists . Home 
Political, File No. 7/5/1944 (I) & K.W: "Independence Day this year comes at a t me when utter 
extinction faces Bengal, the land which gave us our Renaissance and where was born our national 
movement. Famine started there over 6 months ago... Bureaucracy saying it is over br the last two 
months. Truth is just opposite. Malaria, smallpox, dropsy, typhoid, a host of epiden ics have comc 
in the wake of starvation... The entire socio-economic and family life of Bengal has cracked up all 
around... How can independence come to the rest of us in India if we allow Benga , the cradle of 
our very national movement, to die in this manner in front of us? Bureaucracies realize this It 
cannot fight with corruption because it is linked with hoarders... The so called Wavell plan of 
trying to solve the famine by purely administrative measures, by passing the political issue is their 
last card." 
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editions combined. This went down to 26,000 in August and rose again just to 31,000 
in December. The Party had established a new record by selling 8000 copies of 
P.C.Joshi's pamphlet "Who Lives if Bengal Dies".^ ^ In Orissa Communists" 
interference in the business of procuring food was on the increase. Thtir newspaper 
the Muktiyudha continued to publish exaggerated and unfounded reports of the 
starvation. They hold meetings to proclaim the failure of the bureaucrac> to solve the 
problem and alleged that the officials and police were alliance with the boarders and 
the merchants. The Communists in Puri district are reported that they weie preaching 
the doctrine of village self-sufficiency for the purpose of preventing the movement of 
paddy from one village to another. The Cuttack District Communist speakers 
demanded the opening of more relief centres, the release of political prisontrs, and the 
maintenance of the Parlakimedi ministry in organizations. One of the organizers was 
arrested under Rule 129 (1) of the Defence of India Rules because he was believed to 
have instigated people to violence. '^' The leaders of the Punjab Communist Party had 
been warned that unless they restrain anti-ministry and anti-Government propaganda 
Communist Survey Number 1, ST' March 1944, Home Department Political, and K.W. to 
7/5/1944-PoiI: In United Provinces "Organising Committee" claimed about 1000 mem Krs: The 
Bihar Party informed PC. Joshi that it has 963 members; Assam, Central Provinces and Orissa not 
more than few hundred each; in Sindh and NWFP, the Communists were a mere handful. The Part\ 
Convention in May 1943 launched a membership drive and the target for end of Dccembei was Rs 
500,000 fund, 56,000 member, 1,33,000 students and 5,60,000 trade unionists was fixed. 
^^  Extract from Orissa Fortnightly for the 2"^ half of June 1944, Communist Survey. Home Poll K W 
to 7/5/1944(1) 
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within the limits of reasonable criticism, 'action will be taken against them under the 
Defence of India Rules. 
The Party started agitation for the release of some 60 Bengal terrorists, who were 
alleged to have abjured the old cult of terrorism and categorically sworn allegiance to 
the principles and programme of the Communist Party of India. Mearwhile on 6" 
May 1944, 9 leading Communists of Delhi were convicted and sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment ranging from one to six months for rioting at a Royist meeting m 
November 1943.^ ^ 
The Government report mentions that the main objective of the communist was 
to overthrow the British rule through violent insurrection on the Russian model. The 
eventual establishment of a communist state in India was schedaled after 
independence from British rule. 'Despite their professed desire to hasten the 
overthrow of Fascism, the Communists have never abandoned their traditional 
strategy of introducing their followers into the armed forces with object of preparing 
the ground for an outbreak of mutiny when the time for revolution is ripe.' It further 
mentioned that a careful watch was kept for the existence of Communist Cell'. A 
group of 5 communist was discovered in R.A.F. signal school in Hyderabad state in 
early in 1944, one was attempting to spread sedition. ''^  




' Communist Survey No. 2, 30 June 1944, K. W. to 7/5/1944(1) 
Policy towards the Communist Partj' of India' (Communism and Armed Forces in India) Home 
Political File No. 7/11/45-PolI (I) & K.W. 
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In 1945 there was a widespread support for lifting the ban on The } 'eople' War in 
U.P. Krishna Chandra Sharma, leader of the Meerut Congress advocated for the 
lifting of ban/^ Similarly, Abbas Hussain Ghaznavi, a Muslim Leaguer in Ranchi said 
that 'The People's War has been doing real and sincere service to the country towards 
the cause of political unity. Unity of the political parties to end the deadlock has been 
its guiding motto. By placing ban on it in U.P. there will be setback for he cause of 
unity. The U.P. Government should reconsider the matter and remove the ban. The 
ban on the paper is to be taken as a ban on the freedom of press.' The Meerut 
District Committee of the CPI in its special meeting strongly condemned this 
undemocratic and vindictive attitude of the U.P. Government banning the sale and 
circulation of 'People's War and its language editions in this province and airesting 
mass communist leaders at Cawnpore and elsewhere. This committee felt that it was a 
direct attack on civil and democratic liberties of the Indian people and press which no 
representative government could deem to do. This committee demanded removal of 
*^ Home Political. File No. 7/11/45-Poll (1). He says Tt is difficult to understand he UP 
Government's order with regard to People's War's circulation in U.P. the fault in publishing a 
historical incident dating as far back as 1930. The story and its implications do not come within 
purview of the Government's ever-ready phrase 'prejudicial to the efficient prosecution of war': 
Even m June-July 1944, the Provincial Committee of CPI at Bombay and Delhi requested that 
'Special permission may be granted to the People's Publishing House, Bombay, to consul ic 2 '4 
tons of paper other than newsprint. The five journals of the Communist Party ma\ be allow el to be 
printed on paper other than newsprint... permission to use the quantity of paper each month etiual to 
the quantity they have been using upto now. {Home Poll. 7/JJ/44-Poll (J))) 
''Ibid 
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ban on the papers from U.P. Govemment.^ ° On 9 June 1945 Amalner Gimi Kamgar 
Union condemned the ban imposed by the Government on People's V^ar (English). 
Lokyudh (Hindi) and Koumijang {Qaumi Jang, Urdu}. It further clarified that it was 
not only attack on the freedom of press, but it was an attack on genuine fighters for 
the cause of United Nations and urged for the withdrawal of ban. ' Similarly Jila 
Kisan Sabha (Itawa), Lala Pindi Das a Congress leader, Sardar Hayat Khan, leader of 
Muslim League (Punjab) Assembly Party, Raja Ghazanfar Ali, Deputy Leader Punjab 
Muslim League Assembly Party and others severely criticized U.P. Govsmment ban 
on People's War and demanded its removal. In the same year (6 &9 August, 1945) 
the Second World War ended after America dropped atomic bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Thus they had resorted to after defeating fascist powers in Europe. As a 
matter of time, it became obvious that Communists must shift from the strategy of 
people's war back to the strategy of anti-imperialist struggle. In Decemb(?r 1945 the 
CPI central committee described "the post-war period in India" as "the period of 
unprecedented opportunity to make the final bid for power.^ ^ 
'' Ibid. 9 June, 1945 
" Ibid. 11 June, 1945. several others leader like Syed Jafar Imam, ML.A., member of tho Provincial 
Muslim League, Jagjivan Ram, Congress leader of Bihar and President of All India Depressed 
Class League, Rajendra Prasad, member of Congress Working Committee and others vehementK 
criticized UP. Government imposition of ban on the People's War and its Urdu and Hiidi edition 
They all were of the opinion that these three weeklies had exposed the hoarders, pre fiteers and 
black-marketers 
*' P Bandhu and TG Jacob (ed.), War and National Liberation: CPI Documents. 1939-19 Si. p 1.S9 
P. Sundararayya says of this meeting that "in fact it revised its [the Central Committees reformist 
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The relations between CPl and British during 1939-1945, were not very 
amicable. It can be seen clearly into two phases. First, was between 3 September 1939 
and 21 June 1941 when it was considered as imperialist war by the Comn^^unist Party 
of India. In this phase the task before the people according to CPl was "Revolutionary 
utilization of war crisis for the achievement of National Freedom and second, when 
Hitler attacked the Soviet Union (on 22 June 1941), the CPl adopted the pro-war 
policy. The policy towards CPl was thus a failure at all levels of administration on the 
one hand. The Home Department would have believed that communist cooperation 
could be used to mobilize the war effort in India to destroy t^e legitimacy of the 
Congress instead they supported and continuously demanded the release of Gandhiji 
and other political prisoners. It is important to remember that they regularly mobilized 
people by promising a 'final assault' against the government and its lackeys after the 
war was over. It is evident that the Kerala Communists never lost any opportunity to 
harness local militancy in Malabar. The Communists did not support the Quit India 
resolution, due to existing international situation when there was a war between 
Fascist on the one side and Soviet Russia and allied powers on the other side. But in 
the course of repression against the Congress member, quite a large number of the 
Communist workers were also arrested by the local authorities. The Home 
Departments' secret reports also show that the Communists were trying to reorganize 
policies pursued during the war period. Telengana People's Struggle and its Lesions. Calcutta. 
1972, p. 39; Tridib Chaudhuri in his work The Swing Back A Critical Survey of the oevious Zigzags 
of CPl Political Line 1947-50, Calcutta, 1950, p. 7, has written that "the CPl in 1947 broke a\va> 
with people's war tactics and followed Soviet policy of opposition to Anglo-American Imperialism 
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and strengthen their party. Communism fundamentally opposed the theory of 
imperialism, so the whole hearted loyalty from the Communists 'was remote 
possibility'. In U.P. the entry oi People's War was banned by the provincial 
government. Finally it may be said that the relations between the two were 
mutually hostile to each other. Although there were no political strikes during 
people's war period (as the workers were involved in the production of war 
material, Kisans were busy in no-rent movement at one or another place) during 
war period CPl benefited in terms of organizational expansion and consolidation 
and could lay claim to be the third most influential party in post-war Indian 
politics 
Chapter V 
Communist Party, Muslim League and the Question of Pakistan 
V.l. The Communist Party and the Muslim League, 1937-1947 
The decade 1937-1947 was crucial as well as trying period in the history of 
India's freedom struggle. The role of the Communist Party during the period has 
largely been ignored or partially touched in the historiography of India's struggle 
for independence. In this section an attempt is made to trace the moves of the 
Communist Party of India during these years, to influence the Muslim League, in 
order to persuade them to demand a larger independent, undivided nation based on 
secular values rather than obtaining, narrow, parochial partitioned country 
Growing popularity of the CPI in early thirties made the go\emment 
apprehensive. It was banned in 1934. The rank and file of the CPI joined Indian 
National Congress with the purpose of radicalizing it. 
This was the time when provincial elections were declared and different 
parties had adopted divergent courses. The CPI considered the declaiation of 
provincial elections illegal. They called the Act of 1935 a 'Slave Constitution'. 
Still they decided in favour of participating in the elections. At the same dme CPI 
was opposed to the "acceptance of office" under the constitution. They raised the 
demand for a 'constituent assembly'. Later, there was change in CPFs stance with 
regard to acceptance of office. It was based on the understanding that a 
'bourgeoisie democratic revolution' should precede socialism. When the Congress 
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decided to accept office, Ben Bradley advised CPI to form a united font by 
supporting it from outside. 
On the eve of elections (1937), like the Congress, the Muslim League had 
also adopted a resolution, spelling out their programme concerning the countiy's 
progress and the interests of the people. The hallmark of this resolution was the 
concern shown for Islam and the Urdu language as also its scripts with waich the 
Muslim minority identified itself An atmosphere was thus created in w lich the 
Congress and the League appeared to be coming together for the collective benefit 
of the country.^ Both parties had contested the election in United Provinces on the 
basis of a general agreement to put up common candidates. The results were on 
expected lines."* However this phase of conciliation proved to be tempo ary and 
short-lived. Soon after the convincing success of the INC in the electicn, a rift 
started appearing. Subsequently, the Muslim League shifted to a separatist stance 
as reflected in the famous document 'Final Bid for Power' (1947) where it was 
noted that the goal of League was "the establishment in India of a federation of 
Utpal Ghosh, The Communist Party of India and India's Freedom Struggle 193" to 1947. 
Calcutta 1996.p.57 
' Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Towards a Common Destiny A National Manifesto, trans b\ Ali 
Ashraf, New Delhi, 1994, p. 276 
^ T G Jacob (ed.). National Question in India, CPI Documents 1942-1947^ Delhi, 1988. p 275 
•^  Cf. Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman. Jinnah. the Muslim League and the demandfi r Pakistan 
(henceforth The Sole Spokesman), Cambridge, rep. 1994, p 31. The Congress could v m 134 out 
of 140 general seats while the League won 1 urban Muslim seats and 20 m rural. 
^ Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Towards a Common Destiny, p 276 
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free democratic state in which the right and interest of Muslims and other 
minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded". 
The All India Muslim League Council on 20* March 1937 passed a 
resolution strongly condemning the Congress for foisting 'Bande Mataranr' as the 
National Anthem upon the country showing callous disregard for the feelings of 
Muslim. The resolution further stressed that the song was not only anti-Islamic 
and idolatrous in its inspiration, but also subversive of the growth of genuine 
nationalism in India. ^  
The fissures appearing in the relationship between FNC and AIML became 
further evident from Jawaharlal Nehru's speech at Madras where he reportedly 
asserted that there were only two parties in India: the Congress and th(i British 
Government. Reacting to this assertion Jinnah said there was a third party, the 
Muslim League. Nehru contradicted it saying that the League was confined to the 
upper classes only. Its members did not go to villages on the contary; the 
members of the Congress were in touch with Muslim Masses. In short there began 
a quarrel on no-issues.^ 
In U.P., the Congress leaders refused to form a coalition with the League on 
the pretext of having a "homogenous cabinet". They offered to League members 
^ T G Jacob (ed.). National Question in India. CPI Documents J942-1947, p 275 
G. AUana (ed), Pakistan Movement: Historical Documents, Lahore, 1988, p. 175 
Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Towards a Common Destiny, p 276 
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births in the ministry provided they dissolved their Party in the Assembly.'^  All 
these happenings, naturally, led to simmering disputes between the Congress and 
the Muslim League. 
It was in this situation of growing differences between Muslim League and 
Indian National Congress that poet Allama Iqbal wrote to Jinnah on 20' March 
1937: "while we (Indian Muslims) are ready to cooperate with other progressive 
parties in the country, we must not ignore the fact that the whole future oi Islam as 
a moral political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organisation of 
Indian Muslims. I, therefore, suggest that an effective reply should be given to All 
India National Convention. You (Jinnah) should immediately hold an \11 India 
Muslim Convention in Delhi to which you should invite members of the new 
Provincial Assemblies as well as other prominent Muslim leaders. To this 
convention you must restate as clearly and as a distinct political unit in the 
country. It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India 
that economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim 
point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian 
Muslims. At any rate it is not less important than the economic problen... This 
would further make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle, 
can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural entity"."^ 
^ T G Jacob (ed). National Question in India, CPI Documents 1942-1947, p 275 
" G. AUana (ed.), Pakistan Movement: Historical Documents, pp. 140-41. 
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A.K. Ghosh, (who joined Communist party in 1931 and became it> general 
secretary in 1951) articulating in National Front, suggested that even though some 
of the demands of the Muslims such as a larger share in the Govemraent and 
Municipal services, schools for imparting education in Urdu medium and Muslim 
culture in localities where the Muslim constitute a small minority, etc. may appear 
unreasonable, the Congress must prepare itself to concede them. The Muslim 
grievances of attempted restriction on cow slaughter, music before mosque etc. 
wherever they exist, should be immediately remedied. He further emphasized that 
it was necessary to purge the Congress completely of its Hindu outlock and it 
should prohibit all semi-religious ceremonies at the Congress functions. Bande 
Mataram should not be used in the Congress meetings. The insistencii on the 
Vidyamandir scheme had created a crisis in the Central Province. It was also 
necessary, according to him, to discard other doubts among the Muslims regarding 
the scheme.'' 
The installation of the Congress Provincial Ministries in eight out of eleven 
provinces and the exclusion of the League, led to sharp reaction among a section 
of Muslims against the idea of a "Congress majority". They were induced to strive 
for making the League more powerful.'^ 
" A.K.Ghosh, 'Communal Unity', National Front, 1 January 1939, Vol. 1, No. 42, p 5 
' ' R Coupland, Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part II, Indian Politico 1943. p 
112; Soon after the election debacle the League through its 'economic, social and edicational" 
programme in 1937 tried to bring the organisation into touch with the masses. This im luded the 
encouragement of cottage industries, use of'swadeshi' articles, organisation of volun ecr corps 
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It is in this context that Iqbal, in a letter to Jinnah dated 21 June 1937 urged 
that the Muslims of North and West India and Bengal should have the privilege of 
1 'i 
self-determination. 
The INC had already launched the Muslim Mass Contact Programme in 
January 1937 and placed it under the charge of K.M. Ashraf, a well known 
Communist. He was entrusted with the express task of directing this programme to 
'wean away Muslims from the fold of MusHm League'. In 193^-38 the 
Communists were active in the mass contact campaign of the Congress, which 
immediately provoked bitter opposition from the Muslim League.' 
for social service, ameliorating the conditions of factory workers, abolition of usur\. reduction 
of rural and urban indebtedness, rural uplift, the introduction of compulsory pnmar> education 
and re-organisation of secondary and university education. C H Philips and Wain U right. The 
Partition of India: Policies and Perspective 1935-47, Aberden, 1970, p. 259 
'^  Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p 42 
'•* Khizr Humayun Ansari, The Socialist Thought Among the North Indian Muslim (lil 7-/9-/"'). 
Lahore, 1990, p 222; The Congress had a big majority in U.P. (134 out of 228). enjoved the 
support of the Deoband ulama group which dominated the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and was 
being backed in northern India also by Ahrar Part>' formed few year back by ex-Khilafatists in 
the Punjab. An Ahrar Conference in May 1937 denounced Jinnah as an "cut-of-datc 
politician... making a fetish of constitutionalism', and the League as 'a coterie of a fev knights. 
Khan Bahadurs, and Nawabs'. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, first published, Delhi. 
1983, rep. 2001, pp. 353-54. For detail about Muslim Mass Contact see, Mushirul H.isan. The 
Muslim Mass Contact Campaign: An Attempt at Political Mobilization', South Asia:. 'oiirnal of 
South Asian Studies, 7:1, 1984, pp. 58 -76 
'^  Irfan Habib, 'The Left and the National Movement', Social Scientist, Vol 27, No.5 6. Ma\-
June, 1998, p. 24; Throughout the twenty-seven months of Congress rule in provinces, tlic 
League kept up an intense propaganda barrage, climaxed by the Pirpur Report (Report of tlie 
inquir\' Committee appointed by the Council of the All India Muslim League to inquire into 
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The Congress was trying to consolidate its electoral success by winning 
support of the Muslims.'*^ This made Jinnah and the Muslim ^eaguers 
apprehensive of losing their political support. In the 26"' session of the Muslim 
League at Patna in 1938 (Dec 26-28), Jinnah ventilated his anger against the 
Congress by dubbing it as a Hindu party which "wanted to enslave the IVuslims". 
This indicated that the objective of the League at this juncture was opposing the 
Congress on all coimts/^ The reaction of the Congress is epitomized in Nehnrs 
characterization of League as anti-nationalist and narrow-minded. Accc>rding to 
Nehru (1938), League was a directionless party and stood for chaos and social 
anarchy.'^ Some elements in the Congress felt that congress had perhaps under 
estimated League's capacity for survival, as well as the extent of fear that was 
created among Muslims which it could play up. The Congress therefore, called off 
the Muslim Mass Contact Movement and Jinnah was approached through Subhash 
Chandra Bose for arriving at a fresh understanding between the league and the 
Muslim grievances in Congress provinces, late-1938), the Shareef Report on Bihar (March 
1939), enumerated the various atrocities committed by the Congress Party regime on the 
Muslims of Bihar and Fazlul Huq's Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule (December 1939) 
spoke of denigration of Islam, interference with their religious beliefs, and religious practices 
such as prohibition ofazan and of the sacrifices of cows, desecration of mosques b\ throwing 
pigs which are abominable to Muslims, etc. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947. p 355; Y 
Krishnan, 'The unfinished agenda of partition', Asian Affairs, 1998, Vol. 29. No. 3. p 279 
Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p 45 
'^  Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Towards a Common Destiny, p 279 
'* Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, New Delhi, 1980, p 605 
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Congress. But Jiirnah refused to parley with the Congress.'^  Much of the League 
propaganda at this stage was directed against the Congress tri-colour, th( singing 
of Bande Mataram, the Vidyamandir scheme in C.P. and Wardha Scheme of 
education. All these examples were paraded as the proof of 'Congress atrocities' 
Not only this, the League reduced its membership fee to 2 annas instead of 
congress 4 annas, in place of Congress tri-colour flag they started hoistmg the 
green "Islamic" flag and a committee for social programme was appointed 
Around this time the Communist Party was also engaged in anal> zmg the 
"communal problem". This effort is reflected in the report on their "Resolution on 
Pakistan and National Unity" , passed at Mantravarpallam (1938). This was the 
initial effort. The Communist Party could foresee that the Congress-League unity 
was the key to national unity and therefore, urged negotiation between tv o. They 
could see the transformation that had already occurred in the attitud<.* of the 
Muslim masses.^ ^ The other political parties including Congress Socialist Party 
utterly failed to perceive this change in the situation. They still saw the problem m 
the old way. The C.S.P. for example declared: "the Muslim masses will come over 
Subhash Chandra Bose's note to Jinnah, 14 May 1938, AIML/File No. 122, Cf Aytsha Jalal. 
The Sole Spokesman, p 44 
'" Ayesha Jalal, p 43 
'^ K M Ashraf, An Overview of Indian Muslim Politics, 1920-47, Trans. By Jaweed Ashraf. New 
Delhi, 2001, pp 102-04 
" G Adhikari (ed.), Pakistan and National Unity- The Communist Solution, Bomba>. 1913. p 17 
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to us and the League leadership will get isolated". '^* The Communists on he other 
hand were of the opinion that though a section of Muslim intelligentsia htid jomed 
hands with Congress, but in the post election scenario, when Congress refused to 
form coalition ministries, these intellectual along with Muslim masses felt ditched. 
The League leadership was also trying to exploit the anti-imperialist upsurge of 
Muslim masses. The Communists realized that the waxing of the Muslirr League 
was tantamount to swelling of the problem of "communalism" in India. Congress 
on the other hand felt that the reactionary League leadership was only exploiting 
the 'backwardness' of the Muslims.^^ Therefore, they had resorted to Muslim 
Mass Contact Programme' which was perceived by the League as a move by the 
Congress to destroy their political support. Apparently the situation wa^  turning 
very pessimistic but the Communists perception was different. In their perception 
"growth of Muslim League was not the growth of communalism but thi; rise of 
anti-imperialist nationalist consciousness among the Muslim masses."^^ The CPl 
hoped "to weld this into a firm anti-imperialist unity".^^ Therefore, ihey put 
forward the slogan of Congress-League Unity.^ "^  The idea behind this slogan was 











imperialism, these should not be allowed to dissipate their energies in mn. By 
uniting these two major political forces, it was visualized; a united front :ould be 
formed to pursue democratic demands for carrying forward Indian struggle for 
freedom."^^ 
It is interesting to see that on 8* April 1939 at the Delhi session of the 
AIML, a resolution moved by S Naimul Haq seeking certain civil liberties and the 
criticism of the controversial Wardha Scheme of Basic Education was discussed 
and withdrawn.^' However, the same League changed its opinion within a few 
months. They raised a serious objection in July 1939 to the Wardha scheme of 
education. It was condemned as a calculated step to destroy Muslim culture 
gradually and secure Hindu cultural supremacy. Clause 5 of the Resolution was 
particularly addressed to the linguistic schism. The League felt that in the name of 
Hindustani a highly Sanskritised Hindi was being spread to suppress Urdu. 
Similarly the text books prescribed and provisionally sanctioned by some 
provincial governments were also condemned as highly objectionable Irom the 
Muslim point of view.^ "* There was a lurking fear of hegemonic stmctaiing of 
Indian society and culture by exclusiveness of Hindu religion, its gods and 
'° Ibid., p 29 
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goddesses and ignoring of the contribution of Muslim thereto.'*^ In this context, the 
suggestion by the Progressive Writers Association deserves attention, hi their 
meeting of January 1939, they suggested that the solution of communal problem, 
especially the problems of school syllabus and Hindi-Urdu controversy could be 
achieved by "eschewing communalism, sectarianism and reaction ever the 
introduction of syllabus of education introduced by the piovincial 
governments..."^^ They declared "It is we who want literature should have the 
closest touch with the masses. We want is for us to make the language and the 
script easy enough for masses to learn. We want to keep literature clear of 
communalism and racial antagonism so it is our duty to evolve a common 
language and a common script." 
Besides socio-political grievances, there were economic grievances as well. 
B T Ranadive (bom in December 1904) drew the attention towards economic 
grievances of the Muslims. Admittedly, the CPl treated communal as closely 
linked with economic grievances of the Muslim masses which were exploited by 
the opportunist League's leaders as well as imperialists. It appears that the CPIs 
stand was on the whole pro-Congress and anti-League.^^ 
On the communal question the CPl's stand during this period was more or 
less closer to that of the Congress. It supported Congress initiatives but did not 
'' Ibid. 
36 4 India's Cultural United Front', National Front, 8 January 1939, Vol.1, No 47, pp 6-7. 
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regard it as a final solution. Adhikari sought the root of communalism in the 
capitalist-imperialist exploitation and "mainly in the competition for jobs and 
favours in the struggle for the distribution of the little political power which is to 
be obtained through compromise with imperialism".^^ He suggested that the 
menace of communalism could be eliminated only through mass struggle against 
the imperialists. He glorified League progressive role in twenties and denounced 
its subsequent pro-imperialist stand.'*'' The CPI favoured the mass campaign 
against federation for repeal of repressive laws and direct election to the Central 
Assembly. They expressed an appreciation that some of the Congressmen like 
Bhulabhai Desai and Satyamurthi were for the acceptance of the federal sc heme m 
a modified form.'*' CPI noted that when every circumstance 'was favourable for a 
final struggle' these acceptances of federal scheme would mean repudiation of the 
goal of national independence. Like Bose, the National Front contested ihe logic 
of members of Constituent Assembly elected under the Act of 1935, time being 
representative of the people. They demanded that the AlCC must declare m 
unequivocal terms that the Constituent Assembly could not be convened under the 
aegis of imperialism. It was felt by R D Bhardwaj, Bankim Mukherji, Somnath 
Lahiri, N Dutta, Majumdar, S G Sardesai, V. V. Chitale et al., authors of Draft 
^'Ibid, 
*' Ibid., pp69-70 
'^ Ibid., p 62 
203 
Resolution that "time was ripe for passing on to the offensive".'*^ The parcy called 
for an intensive campaign throughout the country against federal scheme, and 
Workers and Peasants organization. 
In 1939 the Congress Provincial Ministries resigned in protest against Great 
Britain's making India a party to their war against Nazi Germany without 
consulting the Indians. The CPI on the other hand, following the line taken by the 
International Communist leadership declared this war as an 'imperialist wcir . 
Both the Congress and the League looked at the war as a good opportunity 
for bargaining with the British. Gandhi and Nehru, at first offered their 
unconditional cooperation to British war efforts. The CWC declared theii resolve 
not to spark off or lead any mass movement against the British rule in order to 
extract concessions. The AICC endorsed this view on October 10, 1939 and 
demanded that India be declared an independent nation.''^ Prior to this the Muslim 
League had passed a resolution on 18 September promising support in the war 
effort on the condition that no constitutional advance in India be made without 
consulting the League as the sole representative of the Muslims in India.*^ 
Obviously, the League leadership too had started a parallel 'bargaining gaine' with 
•'^Ibid. 
^Mbid. 
** P Banddhu and T G Jacob, (eds.). War and National Liberation CPI Documents 193'>-t5. New 
Delhi, 1988, piii 
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imperialism. They offered cooperation in war, pledged non-embarrassment and 
hoped for separate settlement on its own.'*^ However from the League's point of 
view suspension of the federal scheme was not enough. They askec for its 
complete abandonment and impressed upon the government the need of revising 
and reviewing the entire constitutional problem de novo. 
Commenting upon the war, the National Front observed that both Hindu 
and Muslim masses would receive severe treatment at the hands of the British. 
There was a strong feeling amongst a large section of the Muslims to achit ve unity 
between the two communities for forming a common front against imperialism in 
the struggle for independence.'*^ 
In 1940, the Congress at Ramgarh session demanded complete 
independence and a Constituent Assembly based on adult suffrage. Wht^reas the 
League in 1940 passed a historic 'Pakistan Resolution' demanding complete 
freedom for Muslim majority zone, to be carved out and constituted into 
independent states. ^ ° League's adoption of the Pakistan Resolution in Maich 1940, 
made it clear that all chances of rapproachment between the Congress and League 
had lost their relevance. It has rightly been observed that this resolution was a 
^^ Ibid., p XX 
•^^ Cf. C H Philips and Wain Wright, The Partition of India: Policies and Perspective 1935-47. p. 
262 
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clear demand for secession based on exploitation of the fear of Muslim masses 
about Hindu domination.^' The only way to avoid such an ugly turn in Indian 
history was to unite the Hindu and Muslim masses by raising issues of agiarian 
nature in which the Muslim masses were generally interested. 
Confronted with the challenge of the demand for the division o ' British 
India into two separate states, the CPl had to examine afresh the nature and 
complexity of the communal problem of the Indian subcontinent.^^ The C^l began 
to see that the so called communal problem especially Hindu-Muslim in India was 
really a reflection of the growth of linguistic and other regional nationalities/' 
According to them the only way out in the situation was to recognize the right of 
self-determination to the point of secession of the Muslim nationalities "f s in fact 
of all nationalities which have India as their motherland".^^ Nevertheless by 
advocating this formulation of the right of self-determination, the Communists 
were not advocating secession as such. This was an acknowledgemerit of the 
availability of opportunity for remaining together. First, people should try to reach 
an understanding for remaining together by avoiding fratricidal conflicts of so as 
to be able to fight unitedly against British imperialism. The CPl believed that it 
B T Ranadive, 'The Role of Communist in the Freedom Struggle in India", Sociai Saenlisi. 
Vol. 12, No. 9, September 1984, pp 26-27 
^ I^bid. 
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was essentially a national problem not a communal or religious one and therefore 
should be treated as a just demand. They emphasized "self-determination not out 
of any opportunistic impulse for winning over Muslims. But it was aimed at 
achieving Congress-League unity for united resistance to imperialism. According 
to CPI it was only way of weaning them, (Muslims) away from separatist and 
disruptive slogans. This becomes evident from a contemporary document." It 
addresses the Muslim League in following words: "Our (Communists) ardent 
appeal to the Muslim League is: your right of self-determination will remain on 
paper if you do not intervene in national crisis. Both Hindu and Muslim A'ill pass 
from British domination to Jap (Japan) slavery if you let the situation drift. The 
harder you work for the release of the Congress leaders, the more unequivocal 
your support to the national demand, the more ardently you work for C ongress-
League unity, the easier it will be to get the Congress to accept willingly the right 
of self-determination".^^ The sincerity of the Communists is also proved by the 
declaration of its young followers the All India Student Federation confc^rence in 
December 1940. Commenting on the Pakistan resolution, they demanded that 
India should be "a voluntary federation of regional states based on mutual 
confidence". ^ ^ 
57 
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By 1941, the Pakistan demand took a concrete shape. Jinnah had made it 
clear that the Muslim League would not accept any constitution of ill India 
character with one government at the centre but would like "to establish a 
completely independent state in the North-West and Eastern Zones of India, with 
C O 
full control of finance, defence and foreign affairs". 
A marked shift in the Communist Party of India towards war ippeared 
when on 22 June 1941 Hitler invaded the USSR, the character of the war 
according to CPI transferred from an imperialist one ^^ to people's war because 
now there was an attack on a socialist country which was the father land of the 
workers of the world. This stand caused deep confiision among the memb(;rs of the 
PWA. In July 1941 Progressive Writers who were the members of the CPI held 
fast and supported the 'united anti-imperialist front'.^*^ The majority of the 
Communist leaders detained at Deoli Detention Centre felt that it had become their 
'moral and political' duty to support Allied war effort because the Soviet Union 
had come under attack. The threat of Communist disruption to the war elfort thus 
being removed, the British government gradually released leading Coramunists 
and CPI was legalized on 24'*' July 1942.^ ^ 
Perceiving the war situation, the British Government sent a Cripps proposal 
to reconcile Indian at this juncture of war crisis. Joshi said that the Congress stand 
Utpal Ghosh, The Communist Party of India and India's Freedom Struggle, pp 101 - 02 
P Banddhu and T G Jacob, (eds.), War and National Liberation CPI Documents 193',-45. p 31 
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was "Give us National Government and we will defend the country" League, 
"Give us Self-Determination and we will defend the country with or without 
Congress". Imperialist used further promises to calm the League or C ongress. 
Neither of two forges the united front to face Cripps, blow up the imperialist game 
and jointly rouse the people for national defence. 'Neither trusted the ether and 
both lost'^^. But it was rejected by both the Congress and the Muslim League. 
Though the government had accepted Jinnah's^^ demand in the sense that the 
provinces were given the option to join or not to join the union. The Communist 
Party in their letter number seven welcomed the British constitutional proposals 
"as a suitable basis for a settlement; inadequate though they are", and urged the 
Congress and the League, to form a national government to mobilize tht countiy 
for defence.^ 
The things had come to such a passe that C. Rajagopalachari's proposal that 
the freedom of India could not be achieved without a settlement with the Muslim 
League. It was out rightly rejected by Congress as well as League. In sheer disgust 
he tendered his resignation.^^ The Muslim League opposed the proposal of 
Rajagopalchari better known as "Rajaji Formula", for a plebiscite of the whole 
~ Indian Annual Register, \o\. 1, 1943, p. 305 
^^ Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Towards a Common Destiny, p 284 
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population in Muslim majority regions on the issue of separation.' The CPl too 
criticized the Rajaji's proposals and exposed the weakness of its position on 
Pakistan. According to them it was in the nature of top settlement which did not 
show to the bulk of the Congress rank and file how justice to the Muslim masses 
was combined with the preservation and strengthening of Indian unity and 
integrity.^^ P C Joshi had out rightly rejected Rajaji Formula. He said, "1 accepts 
the right to Pakistan but not Pakistan itself. It provides the mechanism to vote for 
it if they want to get it. But the right to vote is not the right to self-determination." 
The Muslim League, in its resolution at Bombay, deplored the decision of 
AlCC on August 8, 1942 to launch an "open rebellion" by resorting to niass civil 
disobedience movement in pursuance of their objective of establishing Congress 
Hindu domination in India. This movement according to League was not only 
directed against the British Government into handing over power to Hindu 
Oligarchy, but also to force Mussalmans to submit and surrender to the Congress 
terms and direction. ^ ^ Jinnah utilized this period when the principal leaders of the 
Congress were behind prison bars, to the fullest advantage in building up the 
League as a powerful party. An extensive propaganda was carried out in avour of 
Shri Prakash, 'CPl and the Pakistan Movement', p 250 
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Pakistan. Muslim separation became the creed and ideology of the progressive, the 
70 
intellectuals, the business community, the middle class and masses. 
The CPI was following the policy of united front as enunciated by the 
Comintern. It opposed the Quit India Movement and criticized the <"SP and 
Forward Bloc for organizing sabotage. They planned to persuade both the 
Congress and League that their interest lay in unity.^' As Sumit Sarkar has pointed 
out that it was not a wise step to embark on an out confrontation at a moment 
when India was full of allied troops and when the British would have had a unique 
chance of justifying the most brutal of repressive measures.^^ The appeal issued by 
the CPI on the occasion of the League session at Delhi (1943) clearly reflected this 
policy. The CPI referred to the League as a sister organization in the struggle for 
freedom and self-determination. It also criticized the League negligence of 
government attack on the Congress as a national danger. But Jinnah holds 
contrary view of the appeal issued by the CPI.^ '* 
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Muzaffar Ahmad wrote to CPI in 1943 about replacing 'Advisors' ^ule. 1 o 
him the best way was to move the masses for forming real coalition ministries 
with or without Congress participation but with Congress support, pledged to work 
for crisis for Congress-League Unity and for National Government for National 
Defence... The bureaucracy wanted to drive a wedge between the non-('ongress 
parties and the Congress. The best solution was to launch a broad-based popular 
movement for forming coalition ministries in all provinces, composed of all non 
Congress parties and provided for the later inclusion of the Congress also. And the 
ministries ought to pledge themselves before the people to work for the release of 
Congress leaders and lifting ban on the Congress, to solve food problem in close 
collaboration with People's Food Committee, to support the demand for National 
Government based on Congress-League unity. The CPI, he argued, had no 
hesitation in declaring that it would support such coalition ministries in all 
provinces. It urged the League leader that their asking for the release of Congress 
and urgently need; between you and the satisfaction of your just demand for self-determination 
The viceroy had already said 'No' to this just demand of yours. The viceroy demands surrender 
of the Congress. To tolerate this demand is to help the bureaucracy to crush the biggost brother 
party of yours in the country through which alone you can realise your fight of self-
determination". PS Gupta (ed.). Towards Freedom Documents on the Movements for 
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Jinnah referred to the appeal issued by the Communist Party to the Muslim League "The 
Communist Party', he said, 'seems to be the most active party these days, but the st itcment in 
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leaders would smoothen the path of winning self determination. The Communist 
literature of the period is full of similar commentaries on Congress-League unity 
and grant of self-determination despite the opposition from Congress. The CPI 
issued an appeal to the Muslim League at the time of Karachi session in December 
1943. It stated that since League ministries had been formed in Assam Bengal. 
Punjab, Frontier Province and Sind and it commanded allegiance ol Muslim 
masses, the party wanted the League to work for the welfare of the peoi)le. They 
demanded that the League must introduce rationing, equal quantity of food for 
each. According to them unity and self determination was the panacea of all evils. 
The key to the freedom of entire Islamic world, the CPI pleaded for national unity. 
Congress League unity to secure the release of Congress leaders and end the 
deadlock. '^ 
The CPI had high hopes from Gandhi-Jinnah talks. They thought some kind 
of settlement would come forth. But unfortunately, Jinnah stuck to his demand for 
the separation of six provinces, namely Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, Bengal. 
and Assam. He described Gandhiji's offer as 'a shadow and a husk mutilated and 
moth-eaten Pakistan', ultunately the talk broke down.^ ^ 
' P.S. Gupta (ed.). Towards Freedom Documents on the Movement for Independence in India 
1943-44, pp 1606-1608 
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R.P.Dutt noted that there was a remarkable growth in the size anil strength 
of the League during 1937-45.Its membership in 1927 was 1330 increased to 
hundred of thousands in 1938 and 2 million by 1944. In Central and Provincial 
Assembly it won 460 out of 533 seats. So it established as a major political 
organization among the Muslims in India. Above all the League's growth reflected 
the failure of the Congress to make any serious consistent effort to reach out and 
appeal to the Muslim masses. 
Similarly, we find that Muslim press like Ajmal (Bombay) on 16 April 
1944 also echoed in the similar tone of CPI that "the stable unity between the 
Congress and the League spells the death blow for British imperitdism". It 
appealed for the bigger and broader unity of Congressmen and Leagut;rs in the 
79 
country. 
The Simla Conference (25 June, 1945) broke down as Jinnah demanded 
League's absolute right to choose the Muslim members in the proposed cabinet 
and as he wanted to secure some sort of communal veto in Executive. 1 he CPI 
opposed the League demand, and appealed to both the Congress and the League 
leadership not to wait for fresh British initiative but must come together 
themselves on the basis of Congress-League policy. Elsewhere, Joshi alleged that 
for the failure of attempts to come for a compromise on the communal question 
was due to the pursuance of the 19**^  century liberal ideas by both the League and 
78 
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the Congress leaders and their faith in British.^° The Simla conference seriously 
SI 
undermined Jinnah claim to be the sole spokesman of all Muslims. 
The CPl rejected the League demand of six provinces because the demand 
appeared to be 'unjust'. Communist Party promised extension of its support if the 
League gave up the demand of partition and agreed to 'fight shoulder to shoulder 
for common independence in alliance with freedom loving brothers'. The CPI 
was advocating its vision of free India comprising 17 nationalities ano a vague 
idea of some sort of federation. Whereas Jinnah and League reiterated their 
demand that the first step must be to accept Pakistan in principle since th; Muslim 
electorate had given their verdict in favour of it. The Congress still wanted 
independence first and settlement of the communal problem after\^ard. In 
January 1946 P.C.Joshi declared "we and all the progressive persons in India 
wanted the Congress to become the people's National United Front and lead us in 
India's struggle for independence".^'* 
During the Cabinet Mission's negotiation (March-June, 1946), the (PI 
objected to the presence of British troops and demanded their withdrawal within 
six months. In a memorandum to the Cabinet Mission by the CPI, it was 
Utpal Ghosh, The Communist Party of India and India's Freedom Struggle, pp 206 207 
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proposed that the best course would be an agreement between the Conj-jess and 
the League for parity in the Government and the adequate representation to 
minorities. It was the right of the Indian people to have their own constitution and 
the full sovereignty vested in them. The Communist Party was firmly convinced 
that the best interest of the Indian masses would be served by their nimaining 
together in one common union, in a common brotherhood to defend the freedom 
and solve the problem of poverty which required the basis of the application of the 
principle of self determination. 
The Communists called the proposed scheme of the Constituent /assembly 
as 'undemocratic' because it was not elected on the basis of adult suffrage.*^^  They 
however, opposed the League's demand for a single Constituent Assembly and a 
separate state. It could not be conceded without reference to the will of the entire 
peoples of the linguistically and culturally homogenous areas like Assam, Bengal, 
the Pathanland and Central Punjab etc., all of whom had the righi of self 
determination.^^ To solve the Hindu-Muslim problem Somnath Lahiri proposed 
setting up of a Boundary Commission which would demarcate the existing 
provinces and states in such a way that each state was culturally homogenous and 
"India is regrouped in national units."^^ 
^^ P.C.Joshi, 'Memorandum of the CPI to the British Cabinet Mission", in T G Jacob (ed ). 
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We find shift in Communists attitude toward Pakistan in 1946. R.P.Dutt in 
Labour Monthly wrote: 'Muslim League is not a national movement cf certain 
nationalities. It is a communal organization just as Hindu Sabha. Pakistan 
movement is a movement of the League for the constitution of the Muslim state 
with the determining factor as religion and not nationality".''*' The PWA began to 
support once again the emergence of a united Indian nation at independence; the 
League became more hostile and contested literary and political issues ^vhenever 
the opportunity arose.^' 
It was emphasized by Joshi that the Communist Party was the cnly non-
Muslim organization that had voluntarily accepted and popularized demand of the 
MusUms to be sovereign in their own homeland. They had done this dt spite the 
suspicion of the League leadership about Communists and slanders against them 
in the League's press.^^ 
On April 26, 1947 Jinnah told Mountbatten that he would be delighted 'if 
Bengal could remain united even if this meant it would have to stay out of 
Pakistan. After all, what is the use of Bengal without Calcutta; they \\ ill better 
remain united.^^ Contesting this, Nehru on 27 May formally announced that 
Congress would agree to Bengal remaining united only if it remains in Union.'^ ^ 
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Earlier on 8 March 1947 the CWC passed the historic resolution demanding the 
partition of the Punjab. 
The Communal riots that preceded and accompanied the partition (;ould not 
demarcate the Congress and Muslim League better. Despite the undoubted growth 
of communal sentiments in the Congress, which the CPl constantly pointed out. 
Gandhi's valiant fight to protect both Hindus and Muslims from Communal 
slaughter had no counterpart on the League side. The communist had no large 
mass influence of similar kind, but their fight against communalism diirmg this 
period forms an important chapter in their contribution to the National Movement. 
The CPI resolution on 'Mountbatten Award and After' addrt ssed the 
British Government utter weakness which forced it to make transfer of power to 
the Congress and League Governments on Dominion Status basis by August IS.*^ ^ 
This was not all, but the CPI also passed a resolution against communalism It read 
as follows: 'The Congress must save the immediate communal situation from 
worsening and shape it right direction by taking a firm and fraternal stand on the 
following issues: (i) Boundaries Commission, (ii) Muslim Minority Fights- in 
which full protection to the religious and cultural rights of the Muslims are to be 
safeguarded. The Mountbatten plan (June 1947) was accepted by the ('ongress. 
'' Ibid., p 247 
' 'Political Resolution of the Central Committee of CPI m June 1947\ T G Jacob (ed I. National 
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the League and other Sikh leaders which became the cornerstone cf Indian 
Independence Act. This was ratified by the British Parliament on August 5, 1947. 
V.2. The Question of Pakistan and the Communist Party of India 
With the outbreak of World War II, the freedom movement of India enters 
into its fmal phase. The demand was raised: Recognise independence here and 
now; let the Indian people decide their constitution through a Constituent 
Assembly based on adult suffrage. The Congress leaders raised this demand 
because they realised that imperialism had now entered its fmal crisis and the 
Indian freedom movement could now make the bid for power. After the outbreak 
of the war, the League leadership too begins to play a parallel bargaining game 
with imperialism.^* Hence, the last decade of the freedom struggle was the most 
crucial phase of India's independence from colonial yoke. The British withdrawal 
from the Indian subcontinent led to the creation of two sovereign states, India and 
Pakistan. The justification for the Great Divide has always been the so-called 
'two-nation theory', which holds that 'Hindus' and 'Muslims' in the subcontinent 
comprise distinct, homogenous collectivities, harbouring in their separate spheres 
the elements of nationality. Behind the chronology of events that culminated in the 
formation of the state of Pakistan in 1947 lay a historical process that has been the 
'*" P C Joshi, 'For the Final Bid for Power: The Communist Plan Explained" (1946). in Jvoti Basu 
(ed.) Documents of the Communist Movement in India, Vol. V (J 944-48), Calcutta. 1997 
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object of a wide-ranging and disputed discourse. This chapter examines the 
attitude of the Communist Party of India (CPI) towards the question of Pakistan."'' 
The official poUcy of the CPI until 1940 was based on the presupposition 
that India was a single nation. This view was later changed to one that recognized 
the existence of a number of nationalities, some Hindu and some Muslim ; the 
exact number of nationalities varied from time to time (for example as new 
nationalities came into existence). 
The resignation of the Congress ministries was celebrated by tht Muslim 
League as a 'Day of Deliverance' or Yaum-e Nijaat (October 1939). Both the 
Indian National Congress and the Muslim League tried to exploit the war 
situation. The Congress at Ramgarh session (1940) demanded complete 
independence and Constituent Assembly based on adult suffrage. Whereas the 
'^ Ch. Muhammad AH, The Emergence of Pakistan (1967): Pakistan as the land whtre Muslim 
aspirations could be fulfilled. P. Hardy, Muslims of British India, Cambridge, 1972: Pakistan 
demand a remit of Muslims' underprivileged position In India. Francis Robinson, 'separatism 
among Indian Muslims. The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims. 1860-1923. ('ambridgc. 
1974: Indian Muslims' separatist tendencies due to the possibility of losing thei relativeK 
privileged position under Hindu-dominated independent India. Tafiq Ali, Can Pakistan 
Survive? (1982), provides an eclectic explanation: Pakistan formed owing to an "ideological 
confection" and because Muslim capital could not compete with Hindu capital. F^r a recent 
work, see A. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman. Jinnah. The Muslim League and the ifemand for 
Pakistan, Cambridge, rep. 1994, which typifies the methodology prevalent in the studies on the 
formation of Pakistan in spite of different conclusions from the above studies; A} esha Jalal. 
Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850. vJcw Delhi. 
2001 
'* G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, Communism in India, Bombay, 1960, p. 492 
"" Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, New Delhi, Reprint 2001, p.358 
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Muslim League in March 1940 passed Lahore Resolution, which became ihe basis 
for the 'Pakistan' demand."^^ It demanded complete freedom for Muslim majority 
zone, to be carved out and constituted into 'independent states'. Since the 
Communists had declared it as an 'imperialist war' therefore, they stood for 'the 
freedom for all India and not freedom of one section or worse still of the (x)ngress 
caucus and slavery of Musalmans and other minorities". 
The League's adoption of the Pakistan resolution made it clear that all 
chances of rapprochement between the Congress and the Muslim League had lost 
their relevance. It has rightly been observed that this resolution was a clear 
demand for secession based on exploitation of the apprehensions of Muslim 
masses about assumed domination.'°^ The only way out was unifying the Hindu-
'°" Irfan Habib, "The Left and the National Movement", Social Scientist, vol. 27. No. 5-6. May-
June, 1998, p. 24; For a different view on the issue, see, Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman. 
Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, rep. 1994; But \\c find 
that different political organisations condemned the 'Pakistan' demand of the Musli n League 
Resolution of Hindu Mahasabha (19 May 1940, Bombay) strongly condemn the Pakistan 
Scheme' as adopted by the Muslim League aiming to break India into a number )f Muslim 
States and Hindu States as fundamentally anti-Hindu and therefore anti-nation il and its 
resolution at Madura (29 December 1940) condemns the attitude of the British Government is 
not making a clear announcement of its opposition to the scheme of Pakistan and... Pakistan is 
the only solution to communal problem in India. S.R. Bakshi (ed.), The Making of India and 
Pakistan, Select Documents, Vol. Ill, Delhi, 1997, pp. 5 and 45 
"" Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Towards a Common Destiny A National Manifesto, tnns b\ All 
Ashraf, New Delhi, 1994, p. 280 
"^ N.N.Mitra (ed.). The Indian Annual Register (lAR), 1940, Vol. 1, p. 309 
' B T Ranadive, 'The Role of Communist in the Freedom Struggle m India", Socio Scientist. 
Vol. 12, No. 9, September 1984, pp 26-27; B.R. Nanda writes that 'the 'Pakistan Resolution". 
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Muslim masses through the slogan of an agrarian revolution in which th.; masses 
especially the Muslims were vitally interested. It was feh that neither the Congress 
nor the Muslim League leadership would be interested in such an enterprise '^ **' 
Nehru's immediate reaction to the 'Pakistan' Resolution was thai 'all the 
old problems.. .pale into insignificance before the latest stand taken by tht Muslim 
League leaders at Lahore. The Whole problem has taken a new completion and 
there is no question of settlement or negotiations now." 
The CPI regarded the Congress-League unity as the key to national unity, 
yet right up to the fnst half of 1942, it laid the main emphasis in exposing the 
reactionary character of the Pakistan programme. In a pamphlet entitled The 
Imperialist Alternative', Adhikari maintained that the problem was not unity vs. 
partition but it was the problem of achieving Hindu-Muslim unity. For this proper 
solution needed. He fiirther wrote that 'Cripps proposals' was a conspiracy 
between Churchill and Cripps for a new communal award.'"^ The Government had 
accepted Jinnah's demand in the sense that the provinces were given the option to 
join or not to jom the union.'°^ In February 1942, P.C. Joshi (then Party Secretaiy) 
as it came to be known, gave a new twist to the communal problem. All the solutions hitherto 
thought of- separate electorates, composite cabinets, reservation of posts- suddenly became out 
of date'. B. R. Nanda, Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman, New Delhi, 1995. p. V?<9 
'°^ Ibid. 
'"' B. R. Nanda, Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman, p. 139 
G. Adhikari, 'The Imperialist Alternative', in Jyoti Basu (ed.). Documents of the ('ommmisi 
Movement in India, Vol. V, Calcutta, 1997, pp. 4-6; MR, 1943, Vol. I, p. 305 
'* Manglori, p. 284 
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said: "Jinnah's dreamland of Pakistan (separate Muslim state) leads no where 
except to stalemate and sitting tight." 
Confronted with the challenge of the demand for the division of British 
India into two separate nations, the CPI had to examine afresh the nature and the 
complexity of the communal problem.*" G. Adhikhari explained the Muslim 
League's demand of Pakistan in the following words: 'In 1938, were yet wrapped 
in the theory like the rest of the nationalists, that India was one nation and that the 
Muslims were just a religious cultural minority and that the Congres>-League 
United Front could be forged by conceding 'protection of cultural and religious 
rights and demands'. We stood on the same basis as the Congress leadership, and 
were guilty of the charge of denying the peoples of the Muslim nationalities their 
just right to autonomy in free India. Since 1940, the party began to see tliat the so 
called communal problem in India was really a problem of growing nationalities 
and that it could be solved on the basis of the recognition of the right of self 
determination, to the point of political secession of the Muslim nationalities as in 
fact of all nationalities which have India as their common mother land. In those 
days many comrades were shocked by the formulation that India was not one 
"° Cf. L.P. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, Muzaffarpur, 1965, pp. 559-60. 
' " G Adhikari (ed.), Pakistan and National Unity- The Communist Sobition, Bombay. 943. p 29; 
the main division between the Congress and the League was over the question of Pa'cistan The 
Congress stands for the unity of India. The League demands Pakistan or a sovereit;n Moslem 
State in North-West and North-East India. R.P. Dutt, 'A New Chapter m Divide and Rule". 
Jyoti Basu (ed.), Documents of the Communist Movement in India, Vol. V. p. 247 
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nation and its development was in the direction of a multinational unity... the 
demand for Pakistan if we look at its progressive essence is in reality the demand 
for self determination and separation of the areas of Muslim nationalities of the 
Punjab, Pathan, Sindh, Baluchistan and the Eastern Provinces'."^ The Communist 
Party of India's assessment of the situation was the so called communal problem 
was a reflection of the growth of linguistic and other regional nationalities. 
Before 1940, the Communists were active in Muslim Mass Contact 
Campaign (MCCP) of the Congress, as the Muslim League was not considered a 
suitable party in which Communists should work. From then the Muslin League 
started their anti-Congress, anti-mass movement programme. This effcrt of the 
League paid heavy dividend for there occurred a substantial increase in the 
membership of the Party. Clearly, once the Muslim League had grown in strength 
there had to be negotiations with it. The Communists propose that the Congress 
and the Muslim League leadership should come together, and certain concessions 
be given to the League, as a party."'* 
A new policy was formulated by the CPl on the national composition of 
India, which was to go through a number of mutations over subsequent years, 
"^ G.Adhikari, Pakistan and National Unity, August 1942, pp. 29-30 
"Mbid. 
Irfan Habib, 'The Left and the National Movement", p. 24: For further details .'ec. Sumit 
Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, First published, Delhi, 1983, rep. 2001 
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culminating in the declaration of the right of nationalities to secede from the 
Indian Union.'^^ 
In the midst of situation, Adhikari invoked the Marxist Leninist positions 
on national self-determination''^ (better known as Adhikari thesis) in September 
1942, it says that 'every section of the Indian people which has a contiguous 
territory as its homeland, common historical tradition, languages, culture, 
psychological make-up and common economic life would be recognised as a 
distinct nationality with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free 
Indian union or federation and will have right to secede from it if it may so desire. 
This means that the territories which are the homelands of such nationalities and 
which today are split by the artificial boundaries of the present British provinces 
and of the so call "Indian States" would be re-united and restored to them in free 
India. Thus free India of tomorrow would be a federation or union of autonomous 
states of the various nationalities such as the Pathans, Western Punjabis 
(dominantly Muslim), Sikhs, Sindhis, Hindustanis, Rajasthanis, Gujratis, liengalis. 
"^ G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, Communism in India (1959)., p. 493 
"The right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its 
destiny, that no one has the right forcibly to interfere in the life of the nation, to lestrov its 
schools and institutions, to violate its habits and customs, to repress its language, or curtail its 
rights.' 'Thus, the right of self-determination is an essential element in the solut on of the 
national question.' According to Stalin 's well known definition: 'A nation is a listoncalK 
constituted stable community of people formed on the basis of common language territor>. 
economic life and psychological make up manifested in a common culture'. J. Stalin ('ollccied 
Works, Vol. 11, Moscow, 1953, pp. 300-81 
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Assamese, Biharis, Oriyas, Andhras, Tamils, Kamatakis, Maharashtnans, 
Malayalees, etc'."^ 
This theoretical position ('the Adhikari thesis'), which was confirmed in 
comparatively cautious language by the political resolution of the Communist 
Party of India's first Congress in May 1943 (Bombay)"^ had immediate |)ractical 
implications. S.A. Dange said that Congress-League unity was of paramount 
importance and the party would strain its most for the consummation of such 
unity.''^ Communists were now to work in the Muslim League, as they had done 
in the Congress. Nevertheless, by advocating secession as such the Communists 
emphasised self-determination not out of any opportunistic impulse for winning 
over Muslims. But it was aimed at achieving Congress-League unity for united 
resistance to imperialism. It was the only way of weaning them (Muslim) away 
from the separatist and disruptive influences. 
' " See, Adhikari, Pakistan and National Unity- The Communist Solution, pp. 14-15; T G Jacob 
(ed.), National Question in India, CPl Documents 1942-1947, Delhi, 1988,. 1988. pp.29-.^2 
'But the recognition of the right of separation in this form need not necessarih lead to actual 
separation. On the other hand, by dispelling the mutual suspicions, it brings aboi t unit\ of 
action today's and lays the basis for greater unity in the free India of tomorrow. Nat onal unit\ 
forged on the basis of such a declaration and strengthened in the course of joint struggle in the 
defence of our motherland is bound to convince the peoples of all Indian nationalities of the 
urgent need to stick together and to form a free Indian union or federation in v hich each 
National State would be a free and equal member with right to secede.' 
"^ JAR, Vol. I, 1943, p. 308; same text in T G Jacob (ed.), National Question in India, f 98 
' " S.R.Bakshi, (ed.). The Making of India and Pakistan: Select Document. Vol. 111. p. 4^2 
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This becomes evident from the contemporary document. The party 
addresses the MusHm League in following words: "our (Communists ardent 
appeal to the League is: your right of self determination will remain on paper if 
you do not intervene in the national crisis. Both Hindus and Muslims vill pass 
from British domination to Jap (Japan) slavery... work for Congress-League unity 
and release of the Congress leaders, the easier it will be get the Congress to accept 
willingly the right of self determination".^^° 
Reacting to it. Congress in its April (1944) resolution of the working 
committee said, "Nevertheless, the committee also declares that it cannot think m 
terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in the Indian union 
against their declared and estabhshed will."'^' Such a unity was strongly 
advocated by C. Rajagopalachari's proposal (1944) that the freedom of India could 
not be achieved without a settlement with the Muslim League and conceded to 
them their demand for Pakistan as a political expediency. But it was summarily 
'^ " 'Appeal of the Communist Party of India on the eve of the Karachi session of All India 
Muslim League', People War, 19 December 1943; Also, Utpal Ghosh, The Communal Party of 
India and India's Freedom Struggle 1937-1947, Calcutta, 1996, pp. 197-206. 
'"' B.T. Ranadive, p. 27 
'~ Adhikari, Pakistan and National Unity- The Communist Solution, p. 9; C. Rajagopalachari 
however, realised the necessity for Hindu-Muslim reconciliation as a pre-requis te for the 
attainment of independence. On April 23 1943, Rajagopalachari addressed a small gathering of 
old Congress supporters in the Madras legislature and got a resolution passed for submission to 
the All India Congress Committee, recommending the acceptance of partition in principle On 
May 2, he mooted his proposal on Pakistan in the AICC at Allahabad, which stated it has 
become necessar>' to choose the lesser evil and acknowledge the Muslim Leagued clami for 
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rejected by both the Congress and the League. In sheer disgust Rajaji tendered his 
resignation/^^ The CPI too criticised the Rajaji's proposal on the basis of its 
concession to poUtical secession by licensing the "two nations" theory of 
Jinnah.'^'* P.C. Joshi's rejection of Rajaji formulae was its acceptance of Pakistan 
as a separate nation. Right to vote should not have been interpreted as right for 
self-determination.'^^ P. C. Joshi wrote that 'Our Party is the only organization 
that has actually worked for Congress-League Unity. We alone have tried to 
explain the view-point of one to the other during the last two and a half years. We 
have popularized the Muslim demand for Pakistan among Congress men. and the 
Congress demand for National Government and the need for the release of 
Congress leaders among the Leaguers... Anti Unity, pro-sabotage and pio-Hindu 
elements among the Congressmen have tried to stop us getting a hearing by 
spreading the slander that we were government agents and in private paymg the 
compliment (not meant to be such) that we were able to work out the case for 
Pakistan better than even the Leaguers'.' 126 
separation..." D.N. Bannerji, Partition or Federation, Calcutta, 1945, pp. 127-28 Cf S\ed 
Razi ^d&ii, Muslim Struggle for Freedom in British India, Delhi, 1993, p. 354 
'•^  C H Philips and Wain Wright (eds.). The Partition of India: Policies and Perspective 1935-47. 
Aberden, 1970, p 267 
'••* Adhikari, Pakistan and National Unity- The Communist Solution, p. 9 
'-' P.C. Joshi, 'They must not Fail', p. 30, cf. Shri Prakash, 'CPI and Pakistan Mov.^ment". in 
Bipan Chandra (ed.). The Indian Left: Critical Appraisal, New Delhi, 1983, p. 251. 
''•^  Joshi P C, 'They Must Meet Again', Bombay, January 1945 
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The CPI's position on the questions of self-determination, Pakistan, and the 
national question differed from that of both the Congress and the Muslim League, 
as we see. The Congress, with some exceptions such Rajagopalchari, held that a 
single, pre-existing Indian nation (begrudgingly admitted as being composed of 
various linguistic groups) and nationalism had been rediscovered. For th^ MusUm 
League, another nation had been added to the Hindus-the League's well known 
"two-nation" theory. 
In contrast, the CPI talked about Muslim nationalities'^ ^: that the Muslims 
were a group of nations and not a single nation; and that, whilst Muslims could not 
' ' ' Mohit Sen in his autobiography. A Traveller and the Road, The Journey of in Indian 
Communist. New Delhi, 2003, pp. 27-28, writes that 'A serious error committed by the CPI 
leadership was its virtual support to the Pakistan demand of the Muslim League CPI never 
accepted the two nation theory but in 1943 it advanced the concept of Muslim nationalities, i e . 
geographical areas where linguistic and Muslim majorities combined North-West Frontier 
Province, Punjab, Baluchistan, Sindh and Bengal. The "Muslim nationalities" theorists also 
pointed out that in these areas the landlords were mainly overwhelmingly Muslim It was 
further pointed out by them that the Muslim middle class had lagged behind thni Hindu 
counterparts in accepting western education and, therefore, had lost out in the compi;tition for 
jobs and business in the latter decades of the nineteenth and early decades of twentietii centurv 
By the founding of the AMU by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was such as an attempt to rencdx this 
situation. Taking all these factors into account, the Pakistan was assessed as the distorted 
version of the urge for freedom of Muslim nationalities. 
According to the some analogy, the CPI leadership also stressed that free India should be a united 
India and all nationalities should be persuaded t o remain together to fight unitedly for India s 
freedom. 
Religion and geographical or regional concentration as the basis of a nation or nationalit\ was 
also reason that led the CPI to accept the Sikhs as a nation and plead the case for a Sikh 
homeland in those districts of the Punjab where they were in a majority. 
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be regarded as a nation on the basis of their common religion alone, there were 
other factors, such as contiguous territory, a common culture, a common political 
aspiration, etc, which would enable some Muslim groups to form federated 
Muslim homelands. 
Muslim League's case was based on the premise that the unitary :entre for 
India was a British creation and India consisted of many nationalities and creeds 
that had to be brought together through a compact that recognized its diverse 
character. This was endorsed by the Communist Party. P C Joshi, a stalwart of the 
Communist Party, wrote: 
"We were the first to see and admit a change in its character when the 
League accepted complete independence as its aim and began to rally tht Muslim 
masses behind its banner. We held a series of discussions within our party and 
came to the conclusion in 1941-1942 that it had become an anti-imperialist 
organization expressing the freedom urge of the Muslim people that its demand for 
Pakistan was a demand for self determination and that for the freedom of ndia, an 
immediate joint front between the Congress and the League must be forgt d as the 
first step to break imperialist deadlock. A belief continues to be held that League 
is a communal organization and what Mr. Jinnah is Pro-British. But what is the 
reality? Mr. Jinnah is to the freedom loving League masses what Gandhiji is to the 
Congress masses. They revere their Qaid-e-Azam as much as the Congrt ss does 
the Mahatma. They regard the League as their patriotic organization as wt regard 
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the Congress. This is so because Mr. Jinnah has done to the League what Gandhi 
did to the Congress in 1919-1920 i.e., made it a mass organization". 
The Communist Party, the Congress and League had to sied their 
prejudices against each other on the eve of Simla Conference.'^ ^ The Conference 
(25* June 1945) broke down due to Jinnah's insistence on right to choose Muslim 
members in the proposed cabinet. The CPI opposed the demand of the Le ague and 
appealed the Congress and League leadership to take initiative and come together 
themselves on the basis of Congress-League policy. Joshi remarked that the 
compromise on the communal question failed due to the pursuance of the 
nineteenth century liberal ideas by leaders'^ ^ of both the contesting parties. 
Finally, in the election manifesto of 1945-46 the CPI proposed that, since India 
was a multinational state, all nationalities had the right to secede and shoald form 
their own sovereign states.'^' 
Next on the question of constitution making body. Congress wanted one 
whereas Muslim League demanded for two constitution bodies. The CPI in its 
election manifesto (January 1946) advocated that power be transftned to 
seventeen different sovereign national constituent assemblies rather than India and 
128 P C Joshi, Congress and the Communists, Bombay, 1942, p 5 
' ' ' 'Congress-League Agreement. Immediate Need', Peoples War, June 24, 1945. p. 5 
130 Utpal Ghosh, The Communist Party of India and India's Freedom Struggle, pp. 206 207. 23; 
People's Age. January' 20-27, 1946, No. 8 
'^' G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 232 
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Pakistan."'^^ The Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPI held in Febmaty 
1946 described the key significance of the 'Self-Determinatior'. Self-
determination of nationalities means the bringing together of the common people 
of the same nationality, Hindus and Muslims, to fight against imperialist feudal 
regime, against Princely autocracy and landlordism. It also means the bringing 
together of the common people of all nationalities in the common straggle for 
independence from British imperialism for that is the precondition for winning 
self-determination. The CPI fights to build Hindu-Muslim unity by bringing the 
Hindus and Muslims workers and peasants together in their common organisation 
to fight for their living conditions and by fighting for self-determination. Similarly 
the party will popularize the consistent application of self-determinatic^n to the 
states under the slogans, "End of Princely Autocracy".''^^ The Communists opined 
that the British imperialists wanted to utilize the conflict between two political 
organisations and aimed at dividing India into a 'Pakistan', a 'Hindustan and a 
'Princistan'. The Communists were very clear that such a step would not lead to 
the freedom of either Pakistan or India.'^ '^  
'^ - People's Age, January 20-27, 1946, No. 8, p. 8. 
Jyoti Basu (ed.). Documents of the Communist Movement in India, Vol. V, Calcutta, l*->97. pp. 
114-15 
Adhikari, 'Sikh Homeland', National Question in India, pp. 127-28; It is interesting to see that 
at All India Akali Conference (14 October 1944 Lahore), President Sandhu Pritam Singh said. 
"The Sikhs are opposed to the establishment of Pakistan and they can not tolerate India s 
vivisection. But if India is to be divided and cut into pieces, the Sikhs must have a hon eland on 
the basis of the land now in their possession and their political importance.' Master T;ja Singh 
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Furthermore, the CPI rejected the demand of the League, for six provinces 
because the demand appeared to be 'unjust'. The Communist Party promised 
extension of its support only if the League dropped the demand of partition and 
agreed to fight unitedly.'^^ This is evident from the party documents that the party 
characterized the post war period as a period of final united struggle tor Indian 
freedom. The central slogan of the party was the demand of the immediate transfer 
of power to the Indian people through an All India Constituent Assembly. This 
includes the right of self determination of the people of Indian states.' ^ In this 
period of the role of the Communists was emphasized by advocating for the 
United National Front of "Congress-League-Communist Unity" instead of Just 
"Congress-League Unity". 
There was variable response to the policy of support for a separate 
Pakistan: opposition came from both within the CPI and from outside. In 1940 
K.M. Ashraf, a prominent Muslim member of the CPI, condemned the Muslim 
League's version of Pakistan though he did not reject self-determination More 
vigorous support for Pakistan came from another prominent Muslim mtmber of 
the CPI, Sajjad Zaheer, who saw in self-determination and Pakistan a just, 
said that 'both Gandhi and Jinnah wanted to impose Hindu and Mushm majorities on the Siklis 
by dividing India.' S.R. Bakshi (ed.). The Making of India and Pakistan: Select 1) mmenis. 
Vol. Ill, pp. 683-84 
'^' PC. Joshi, For the Final Bid for Power', Bombay, 1946, p. 97, 
"^ 'Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPI" passed at its meeting, Decembei 1945. \n 
Jyoti Basu (ed.). Documents of the Communist Movement in India, Vol. V, pp. 78-79. 
' " T G Jacob (ed.), National Question in India,, p. 178 
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progressive and national demand. Criticism of the new policy also came from the 
British Communist Party and the Soviet Union (in the person of D. Dyakov). D N. 
Pritt'^^ Ben Bradley'^ ^ and R P Dutt condemned both the Muslim League and the 
Pakistan idea. The League was a creation of the British, it was suggestec, and the 
Congress was the sole representative of the Indian people in their nej;otiations 
with the British for independence. The opposition to Pakistan was based on the 
assumption that religion could not designate a nationality and that support for 
Pakistan would mean a fracture in the anti-imperialist struggle. 
The Communist Party rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan'"**^  (March-June 
1946) for : (a) it did not make immediate declaration of independence (b) it denied 
a democratic Constituent Assembly based on universal suffrage's (c) ii did not 
provide provision for democracy in states (d) it partitioned India into four zones 
"^ G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 232. 
'^^Ibid.. 
' On May 16, the Cabinet Mission announced its draft plan for solution of the Indian problem. 
and on the same day, it was placed before the House of Commons by Attlee. Its relevant 
portions ran thus: "The setting up of a separate sovereign state of Pakistan on the lints claimed 
by the Muslim League would not solve the communal minority problem. Nor can we sec an\ 
justification for including within a sovereign Pakistan, those district of Punjab and of Bengal 
and Assam, in which the population is predominantly Muslim. Everv' argument that can be used 
in favour of Pakistan, can equally, in our view, be used in favour of the exclusion o1 the non-
Muslim areas, from Pakistan. The point would particularly affect the position of thi Sikhs 
We are, therefore, unable to advice the British Government that the power that j t present 
resides in the British hands, would be handed over to two entirely separate sovereign states 
Gautam Chattopadhyay, Bengal Electoral Politics and Freedom Struggle JS62-J94^. New 
Delhi, 1984, pp. 205-206 
234 
!4I (e) Central government was left with very weak and limited powers. In a 
memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, it was proposed that the best couise would 
be an agreement between the Congress and the League for parity in the 
government and adequate representation to minorities for safeguarding their 
interests. The CPI was firmly convinced that the interest of the Indiai masses 
would be best served by their remaining together in one Common Union and in a 
common brotherhood to defend the freedom and solve the problem of poveity. 
In an article entitled 'A New Chapter in Divide and Rule' R.P. Dutt wrote 
that 'the tactics of Cabinet Mission were entirely concentrated on the division 
between the Congress and the League in such a way as to erect on these divisions 
inseparable obstacles to effective Indian independence...unfortunately the 
Congress and the League played in their hands. It had served the (imperialist) 
purpose of displaying to the world the apparently irreconcilable divisions of the 
Congress and the League, and thus paving the British award as the supposed 
inevitable only solution. The Cabinet Mission's plan for India is not an Indian plan 
'•*' Cf. L.P. Sinha, The Left-Wing in India, p. 548. 
''*' See, 'Communist Party Memorandum of the Cabinet Mission', lAR, 15 April 1946. Vol I. pp 
220-21; the reaction of the Congress and the Muslim League to the Cabinet Missions Plans were 
mixed. The Congress welcomed it because it rejected the Pakistan proposal and recommended 
scheme based on the concept of a united India. On the one hand, the Congress was highK critical 
of the system of groupings and the delay in the transfer of power. On the other hand, the Muslim 
League resented the criticism of Pakistan, but welcomed the Groupmg Schema. Gautam 
Chattopadhyay, Bengal Electoral Politics and Freedom Struggle 1862-1947. pp. 206-207 
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for India. It is a British plan for India imposed by British power, and its terms are 
deeply resented by large sections of Indian opinion'. 
By 1944, important leaders like Zaheer had started arguing that the 
'demand for Pakistan is the logical expression of the development of political 
consciousness among the Muslims of India. It has grown together with the 
development of the national movement as a whole'.''*'' Reacting agamst such 
assertions, we find a shift in the Communist attitude towards Pakistan in 1946, 
R.P.Dutt in the Labour Monthly wrote: Muslim League is not a national 
movement of certain nationalities. It is a communal organization just is Hindu 
Sabha. Pakistan movement is a movement of the League for the constitution of the 
Muslim state with the determining factor as religion and not nationality. 
According to R P Dutt, "The Pakistan movement.. . is a movement of the 
Moslem League for the constitution of a Moslem State, with the determining 
factor as religion, not nationality. It is doubtful if it is correct to speak of 'Moslem 
nationalities' any more than it would be to speak of Spain, Italy, France and 
Austria as 'Catholic nationalities." The measure of religion is not identical with the 
measure of nationality. "^ ''^  
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'•^ ^ Jyoti Basu (ed.). Documents of the Communist Movement in India, Vol. V, pp. 249-5 1 
'"^  Sajjad Zaheer, 'Muslim League and Freedom', People's War, 19 March 1944, p. 3 
Utpal Ghosh, The Communist Party of India and India's Freedom Struggle, p. 207 
'India and Pakistan^ Labour Monthly XXVI, March (1946), p. 89; for detail on the 
nationalities question, See, Irfan Habib, "Emergence of Nationalities", Social Sciential Vol. 4. 
No. 1, The National Question in India Special Number. August, 1975, pp. 14-20 
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When the Mountbatten plan (June 1947) was announced, tht Part>'s 
Central Committee offered to "fully cooperate with the national leadership [of 
Indian Union] in the proud task of building the Indian Republic on democratic 
foundations". The programme that it put before the "national leadership" 
demanded that there be: No discrimination to rehgious and cultural rights of 
Muslims. No discrimination against Muslims in services or in any other sphere of 
life. Open repudiation elements which preach that Muslims are ahen inside the 
Indian Union. ^ '*^  
The plan was the culmination of a double-faced imperial policy, which 
obstructed the realization of real independence. The 'divide and rule' formula 
finally led to an act of partition of the country into two separate states. 
Accordingly Moscow denounced the Mountbatten plan of the partition of the 
subcontinent into two sovereign independent, the union of India and Pakistan as a 
"British maneuvers designed to perpetuate British hegemony and control over the 
area".''*'' 
Finally when the country was declared independent on 15* August 1947 
and dividing sub-continent into two sovereign independent states i.e. India and 
Pakistan, the CPI declared it as sham and not a real independence and the party 
'•*^  'Mountbatten Award and After', in Jyoti Basu (ed.), Documents of the Communist Movement 




Ibid., pp. 354-365 
Raghunath Ram, Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan, New Delhi, 1983, p.7 
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issued, 'Onward to Task Ahead' on 15 August 1947 in which it was stated that the 
CPI would "doggedly defend all the just way to defeat the worst reactic^naries in 
one's own camp and bring the common people together to fight for common 
democratic advance, this is, into the real battle".'^° It also advocated for the 
safeguard of minorities, and their democratic rights.'^' The CC described Pakistan 
as the outcome of "the Muslim bourgeois feudal vested interests, who an seeking 
for compromise with imperialism for a share of administration in t divided 
India."'^^ 
Thus on the question of Pakistan, the CPl's attitude was not blurrtd by any 
concession to any political group on the basis of aspirations based exclusively on 
religions. At the same time it was not averse to the provisions of safeguarding 
their legitimate interests in the general backdrop of their backwardness and under 
representation in power structure. The CPI always tried to bring economic issues 
like poverty to the fore front of its agenda which cut across both the contestmg 
parties. Subsequently, after independence the question of self-detemiination 
continued to be discussed by the party. Even in the election manifesto of 1951 the 
Communists' put forward the demand for the linguistic redistribution of states. 
Finally at the Ninth Party Congress (CPI) held in 1972 in which the self-
determination was dropped.'^^ 
"° 'Onward to Task Ahead', 15 August 1947, in Jyoti Basu (ed). Documents of the i \mrmimst 
Movement in India, Vol. V, pp. 406-407 
'" Ibid, pp. 399-407 
''^ ' Irfan Habib, 'The Left and the National Movement", p. 32 
15^ 
M.R. Masani, Communist Party of India, p. 142 
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Conclusion 
The period between 1920 and 1948 is the most critical phase of both the Indian 
National Movement and the communist movement in India. The Communist Part> 
of India started at Tashkent in 1920 by a group of Indians led by M.N. Roy played a 
significant role. At the same time, the British Government apparently st ared of the 
impact of communist ideas on the members of the Indian National Congress. 
Alarmed by the advocacy of radical ideas from the nationalist fora, the government 
filed a case of treason and conspiracy to overthrow the legally constitute d authority 
against the communists in 1924 which is popularly known as Kanpur Conspiracy 
Case. 
The Kanpur Communist Conference played a very important role in the 
formation of Communist Party of India It strengthened the lef elements 
considerably. It was the first legal communist conference in India. And apart from 
Satyabhakta and his associates, communists like Muzaffar Ahmad, S.V. (jhate, K.N. 
Joglekar, R.S. Nimbkar, Abdul Majid, Ayodhya Prasad, Janki Prasad Bagerhatta etc. 
attended this conference. The emigre Communist Party of India was formed in 
Tashkent under the guidance of the Communist International which led to the 
emergence of several communist groups in different parts of India with their varying 
degree of understanding about the principles of scientific socialism. 
It was under the impact of the Russian Revolution that the revolutionaries of 
India began their search for new paths for struggle for Indian independence. It 
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exercised a very powerful influence on the Indian freedom movement and helped to 
broaden the base of that struggle by drawing into it the industrial workers and 
organised peasants and youths. 
We have seen that despite the foreign origin of the Communist Pa ty within 
India a new awakening was taking place which helped in the formation of a broad 
based left oriented workers' and peasants' party in different parts of ccuntry. The 
attempts to build Communist Party began at four places in India indeptmdently of 
each other. The first four prominent places were Calcutta, Bombay, Lahore and 
Madras. For all of these places, inspiration was the Communist Inremational. 
However, the Communist International established independent connections with 
each of these four places. 
Thus we can safely say that most of the Communist groups in India had 
originated independent of each other. But for long they could not become strong 
enough and existed as illegal bodies. There was no central conmittee or 
organisation of the Communists till December 1925. The Communist International 
played an important role in forging a common relationship among Comnumists and 
goaded continuously the idea of forming a party at all-India level. 
The most important and the crucial question to be investigated in this thesis is 
the communal question and the CPI attitude towards it. During the couise of our 
research we find that ever since the Communist Party of India was fcunded at 
Tashkent M.N. Roy started writing incessantly on the question of communal 
problem. He emphasized that the communal problem of the Hindus and Muslims 
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was based on their economic situations. The upper classes of i)oth the 
communities were fighting for the seats in legislative assemblies, munii ipalities, 
government jobs. The elites of both the communities had been exploitmg the 
masses for their selfish motives. The party also vehemently criticized insistence on 
Bande Mataram and language controversy. 
And a front was created under the aegis of the communists whicl excluded 
persons belonging to communal organisation or had communal ideology We have 
seen that Hasrat Mohani and S.D. Hasan were expelled from the Party because they 
were having their associations with communal organizations as vvell. The 
Communist Party of India was the first ever political organisation during the course 
of India's freedom struggle which noticed the danger of communalism so early. 
The British government got alarmed after the success of the Commuriist groups 
in different industrial cities leading to a large number of hartals and strikes by the 
industrial workers. To counter their increasing influence the British Government 
hatched 'Meerut Conspiracy case (1929-33)' leading to the arrest of almost all the 
prominent communists. The year 1933 opened a new chapter in the histoiy of the 
Communist Movement; as it moved towards reorientation and reorganisation. This 
growing popularity of the Communist Party of India (CPl) alarmed the colonial 
authorities, which took several repressive measures against Indian Communists. 
Despite the CPl and its affiliated organisations being declared unlawfil in 1934. 
the Communist movement did not die down. Neither did it lose its momentum In 
fact, in many ways, it strengthened itself against all odds.' And yet its mode of 
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operation and strategy underwent some transformation, as it allied itself strongly 
with the Congress Socialist Party, the Indian National Congress and other 
mainstream Left parties, in their never ending struggle against imperialism. And the 
communist influence had markedly increased among Bengal revoutionaries. 
workers, peasants, students and youth. 
The British government's efforts to crush them did not dim nish their 
commitment and conviction to socialism, anti-imperialism and communism. In fact, 
the British repression hardened their resolve to oppose imperialism and capitalism, 
and sharpened their commitment to the idea and vision of an indept-ndent and 
socialist India. This reality was not lost out to a colonial official, M.G. Hallet, who 
wrote that "as for M.N. Roy, every little act of a real Communist is a blow to 
Imperialism, so too, I suppose it right be said that every httle act of a real Imperialist 
is a blow at Communism." 
In this chapter, we find that the relations between CPI and British durmg 1939-
1945, were not very amicable. It can be seen clearly into two phases. First phase 
was between 3 September 1939 and 21 June I94I when it was considered as 
imperialist war by the Communist Party of India. In this phase the task before the 
people according to CPI was "Revolutionary utilization of war crisis for the 
achievement of National Freedom and second phase coincided Hitler's attack on the 
Soviet Union (on 22 June 1941) when the CPI adopted the pro-war policy. The 
policy towards CPI was thus a failure at all levels of administration on th<; one hand. 
The Home Department would have believed that communist cooperation could be 
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used to mobilize the war effort in India to destroy the legitimacy of the Congress 
instead they supported and continuously demanded the release of Gandhij \ and other 
political prisoners. It is important to remember that they regularly mobili ?ed people 
by promising a 'final assauk' against the government and its lackeys afier the war 
was over. It is evident that the Kerala Communists never lost any opportunity to 
harness local militancy in Malabar. The Communists did not support the Quit India 
resolution, due to existing international situation when there was a w;ir between 
Fascist on the one side and Soviet Russia and allied powers on the other side. But in 
the course of repression against the Congress member, quite a large nuriber of the 
Communist workers were also arrested by the local authorities, "he Home 
Departments' secret reports also show that the communists were trying to reorganize 
and strengthen their party. Communism fundamentally opposed the theory of 
imperialism, so the whole hearted loyalty from the communists 'vas remote 
possibility'. In U.P. the entry of People's War was banned by the provincial 
government. Finally it may be said that the relations between the two wei e mutually 
hostile to each other. Although there were no political strikes during pt ople's war 
period (as the workers were involved in the production of war material, FJsans were 
busy in no-rent movement at one or another place), during war period CF'I benefited 
in terms of organizational expansion and consoHdation and could lay claim to be 
the third most influential party in post-war Indian politics. 
The Communist Party attitude towards the question of Pakistaii has been 
analysed in the light of available archival and documentary sources. Ihe C Pi's 
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position was originally voiced by Adhikari in 1942 in Pakistan and Indian National 
Unity, which was quite different from Dutt's understanding. The CPl took the 
position that the Muslim League was an organ of self-expression of tlie Muslim 
masses and not necessarily a separatist and communal outfit, as alleged by Dutt. 
Accordingly, the CPI took a positive attitude towards the Muslim Leagut 's demand 
fro self-determination of the Muslims without, however, endorsing the slogan of 
Pakistan. In 1943, there was a marked shift in the position of the CPI, £S Adhikari 
presented a revised thesis in the CC, which came out in 1944 under the title 
Pakistan and National Unity. In this revised understanding, the slogan of Pakistan 
was endorsed, the argument being that as the Muslim League was tlie national 
organisation of Muslims, and its demands for a separate state cf Pakistan 
represented the urge for freedom of the ordinary Muslim masses. Although, R.P. 
Dutt was consistently critical of the Muslim League's demand for the esiablishment 
of Pakistan as a separate state, his understanding resting on two main arguments. 
First, there was the argument of oneness of India, already outlined in bidia Today. 
Second, he considered the Muslim League as a separatist and communal 
organisation and its demand for Pakistan a reactionary slogan. 
The Communist Party recognition of the existence of nationalities and 
acceptance of self-determination for nationalities contributed to understand the 
problem of minorities, the problem of communalism and the problem of partition. 
The communal question was also linked with the problem of nationalities 
244 
Thus on the question of Pakistan, the CPI's attitude was not blurred by any 
concession to any political group on the basis of aspirations based exclusivel> on 
religions. At the same time it was not averse to the provisions of safeguarding then 
legitimate interests in the general backdrop of their backwardness and under 
representation in power structure. The CPI always tried to bring economic issues 
like poverty to the fore front of its agenda which cut across both the contesting 
parties. Subsequently, after independence the question of self-determination 
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Source: [Home (Poll), F. 18/6/1928, National Archives of India, New Delhi] 
APPENDIX-II 
Langford James, the Crown counsel in the Meerut Conspiracy Case had filed a list 
of known organisations and persons outside British India. The list containec the name 
of 12 organisation and 51 persons. 
(1) The Third International or Comintern and affiliated bodies; 
(2) The Krestintem; 
(3) The Red International of Labour Unions; 
(4) The U.S.S.R for Cultural Relations with Foreign countries; 
(5) The CPGB; 
(6) The National Minority Movement; 
(7) The Workers Welfare League of India; 
(8) The Labour Research Department; 
(9) The Young Communist League of Great Britain; 
(10) The Indian Seamen's Union; 
(11) The Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and 
(12) The League Against Imperialism. 
Alleged Persons abroad 
(1) R.P. Arnot, (2) T. Bell, (3) Bahaduri, (4) R. Bishop, (5) L.C. Bradlev, (6) EH 
Brown, (7) H.R. Brown, (8) V. Chattopadhyaya, (9)Dombal, (10) C P Dutt, (1) 
R.P. Dutt, (12) A. Clyn Evans, (13) Fazl lUahi, (14) Arthur Field, 15) Percy 
Glading, (16) J.S. Ganden, (17) E.J. Horsman, (18) Harry Howell, (19) A. Inkpin, 
(20) I. Jusefowhsch, (21) J.W. Johnstone, (22) C.L. Lesse, (23) Bob Lovell, (24) A 
Lozovsky, (25) Luhani, (26) L.C. Mellonie, (27) Willi Munzenberg, (28) AGN 
Nambiar, (29) Orloflf, (30) W. Paul, (31) Graham Pollard, (32) H. Polit , (33) J H 
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Politt, (34) J. Potter, (35) Wilson, (36) H.P. Rathbons, (37) R.W.Robson, 38) M N 
Roy, (39) William Rust, (40) J. Ryan, (41) S. Saklatvala, (42) Khushi Mohamad 
alias Muhammad Ali alias Sepassi, (43) RCL Sharma, (44) Agnes Smedley, (45) 
S.V. Sovani, (46) S.N. Tagore, (47) Julius Thosin, (48) N.J. Upadhxaya, (49) 
Vernoff A. Vozneclensky, (50) Max Ziesse, (51) George Allison alits Donald 
Campbell 
Source: [Home Poll, F. No. 10/20, Pioneer, Meerut, 2 August 1929, National 
Archives of India, New Delhi] 
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APPENDIX-IV 
EXTRACT FROM PARA 18 FROM THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF 
POLICE, NOVEMBER 1934 
18, Action against Communist Activities: - The recent measures directed against the 
CPI and communist activities generally have been only partially effective The 
notification of various bodies under the Criminal Law Amendment Act lad some 
immediate effect in checking the movement, but the bodies concerned have succeeded in 
evading the purpose of the action taken by changing their designations ano by other 
similar stratagems. Prosecutions have been largely precluded by the difficuU of provmg 
membership of a particular organisation against any particular person. These remarks 
have, however, to be qualified by note of the fact that the use of the Crininal Law 
Amendment Act in the Punjab, where the Communist movement is mainly of an agrarian 
character, has resulted, for the first time being at least, in subduing the local communist 
movement. Similar action taken in 1931, in the UP., where also the movement is largely 
agrarian, had an equally good effect. These facts lead us to the conclusion i hat action 
under the Criminal Law Amendment Act may be more likely to succeed in agi arian than 
in industrial areas. Good resuhs have been obtained from the use of the Press Lniergency 
Powers Act; while the prompt internment of prominent organisers in the Punjab has 
contributed greatly to the degree of success attained there and similar action in Madras 
has checked the serious development of the movement in that province. We believe that a 
policy of unhesitating internment of leaders is well calculated and likely to be effective 
and that by no other means under the present laws can a dangerous movemen , which is 
being organised behind the scenes, be controlled. The various local Act:> enabling 
Communists to be interned are unfortunately, temporary Acts The Criminal Law 
Amendment Act is largely, and the Press Emergency Powers Act entirely a temporary 
Act. We consider that permanent weapons are necessary which will enable effective 
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action to be taken. It has proved possible to take action against Communists under the 
ordinary criminal law only to a very limited extent. 
19. Future Action against Communism:- We have submitted the draft Revolutionary 
Movement Bill which was circulated to Local Governments and consider that tl e passage 
of this Bill into law is essential if communism is to be checked. Its application combined 
with the use of the Press Emergency Powers Act and accompanied by a general policy of 
unhesitating use of Regulation III of 1818, Bombay Regulation XXV of 827, and 
Madras Regulation 11 of 1819, is likely to be effective. Provisions for the exten.sion of the 
Press Emergency Powers Act when its present term expires will also be necessar> 
We fully realise the desirability of the development of India of a healthy trade's union 
movement, but we see no hope of its attainment unless the present unions are effectively 
prevented fi"om coming under Communist influence. We feel that, as in the case of 
terrorism in Bengal, Communism is not purely a police problem but is one that concerns 
many other branches of the administration, and we think that there is essenti il work in 
this direction which should be under expert co-coordinated guidance. 
ANALYSIS OF ACTION TAKEN AGAINST COMMUNIST LEADERS OF ALL 
INDU NOTORIETY WHO ARE AT PRESENT IN JAIL EITHER AS 
CONVICTS OR AS UNDER TRLVLS 
Seditions 
Sedition-124A,I.P.C. 
Rioting, 147, IPC . 
Conspiracy to commit offences 
punishable by Sec. 121 A, I P C . 
Member of an unlawfial Assembly-
143,I.P.C. 
Party to a Criminal Conspiracy, 120 (20) 
(B)(i)I.P.C. 
Promotion of Class Hatred, 153 A, IPC . 
Abetment to Conspiracy, 109, IPC . 
Incitement to Rioting, 117, I P C . 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 
Disobedience of orders passed v/s 144 
Criminal P.C.C. (188 IRC.) 
Security Proceedings 107 I.P.C. 
Regulation II of 1819 
Temporary Legislation. Distribution or 
















































Total 27 16 11 ^ 
Source: [Home (Poll), F.N. 7/25/34-Poll, National Archives of India, New Delhi] 
APPENDIX: V 
BAN ON THE COMMUNIST ORGANISATIONS IN BOMBAY 
Letter from Secretary to the Government of Bombay, 24 September, 1934 
I am directed to refer to the telegram no. 1764, dated the 14* July 1934 from the 
Secretary of State for India to the Government of India in the Home E'epartment 
regarding the proposed use of the Criminal Law Amendment Act against Communist 
organisation. The Government of Bombay have decided to declare the following 
organisation whose headquarters are in Bombay city and Ahmedabad to be unlawfijl 
association throughout the Presidency of Bombay under Section 16(1) of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act, 1908 (XIV of 1908):-
1. The Young Workers' League, Bombay; 
2. The "Lai Bavta" Gimi Kamgar Union, Bombay; 
3. The Kamgar Vangmaya Prasarak Mandal, Bombay; 
4. The Marxist League, Bombay; 
5. The Bombay Provincial Working Class Party, Bombay; 
6. The 'Red' B.B. & C.I. Railway Union, Bombay; 
7. The G.I.P. Railway Labour Union, Bombay; 
8. The AITUC, Bombay; 
9. The Mill Mazdoor Union, Ahmedabad; 
10. The Bombay Girni Kamgar Union (Red Flag). 




GOVERNMENT OF GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 
NOTIFICATION No. 594-P.S. dated M"'February 1935 
Where as the Governor in Council is of the opinion that the association^ specified 
in the Schedule hereto appended have for their object interferences with the 
administration of the law and with the maintenance of law and order and constitute a 
danger to the public peace. 
Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (1) of tl e Section 
16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 9XIV of 1908) the Governor in 
Council is pleased to declare the said associations to be unlawful associations \/ithin the 
meaning of Para II of the said Act. 
1. The WPP 
2. KirtiDal 
3. The Indian Proletarian Revolutionary Party 
4. The Bengal Jute Workers Union 
5. The City Motor and Transport Workers Union 
6. The Match Factory Workers Union 
NOTIFICATION BY GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, No 1110, P S datec 1 ' March 
1935, Calcutta 
Under Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act 1908 (XIV) of 1908) Governor declared 
many association to be unlawful. 
1. The Calcutta Communist Party 
2. The Calcutta Port and Dock Workers' Union 
3. WPP, Bengal 
4. The Calcutta Committee of the CPI 
5. Kirti Dal, Bengal 
6. The Workers' Party of India 
7. The Indian Proletarian Revolutionary Party 
8. The Bengal Jute Workers Union 
9. The Bengal Match Factory Workers Union 
10. The City Motor and Transport Workers Union 
11. The River Steam Navigation and Indian General Navigation and Railway 
Company Workers Union 
12. The Youth League 
13. The Chhatra Juba Samsad 




NOTIFICATION BY THE GOVT. OF BENGAL, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, 
NO 1110-P.S. DATED CALCUTTA, 1^ ^ MARCH 1935 
Where as the Governor-General in Council is of opinion that the associations sDecified in 
the schedule hereto appended have for their object interference with the administration of 
the law and with the maintenance of law and order and constitute a danger to tlie public 
peace. 
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Section 
16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (XIV of 1908), the Governor in 
Council is pleased to declare the said associations to be unlawful associations within the 
meaning of Part II of the said Act. 
Schedule 
1) The Calcutta Communist Party 
2) The Calcutta Port and Dock Workers' Union 
3) The Workers' and Peasants' Party (Bengal Branch) 
4) The Calcutta Committee of the CPI 
5) Kirti Dal, Bengal 
6) The Workers' Party of India 
7) The Indian Proletarian Revolutionary Party 
8) The Bengal Jute Workers Union 
9) The Bengal Match Factory Workers' Union 
10) The City Motor and Transport Workers' Union. 
1 l)The River Steam Navigation and India General Navigation and Railway 
Companies Workers Union. 
12) The Youth League, Bengal 
13) The Chhatra Juba Samsad. 
Source: [Home Poll, F.N. 7/20/1937, National Archives of India, New Delhi] 
APPENDIX-VIII 
REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SITUATION IN INDIA DURING THE YEAR 
1936 
General: - The terrorist situation in India is definitely satisfactory. 
This improvement in the situation which began some years ago mainly as the result of 
successful police activity has more recently been helped by the tendency of terrorist 
leaders to veer towards Communism. This apparent affection for Communism has been 
noticeable for some time past. And is due partly to a realization of the fact that sporadic 
terrorist outrages do not pay and partly to the acceptance by the terrorists of soine form of 
the communist creed. Doubtless, also since the communist programmes includes violent 
mass revolution, it satisfies not only terrorist inclinations but also the desire tc obtain the 
assistance of peasants and workers whom all revolutionaries want as their allies it is 
difficuh to sort out the terrorist from the communist, particularly as the literat are of both 
is full of hackneyed communist phrases. For example, the Ghadr Party, inspired as it is 
from Moscow and working as it does for 'mutiny' is normally classified as a :ommunist 
255 
organisation yet it was almost certainly responsible for one of the most serious of the few 
terrorist crimes of 1936. Since communism recognizes the need for the occasional violent 
'liquidation' of approvers and spies at least it does so in Malaya- it is obvious that the 
line between terrorists and communists is difficult to draw. It must also be remembered 
that terrorists, like the subscribers to other subversive creeds, are waiting for the 
opportunity which they hope that a European war will provide. 
In Bengal the year 1936 has again clearly shown that the spread of ( ommunist 
ideas is an important factor in the future policy of the terrorists. Most of the cetenues in 
detention camps have been studying communism and socialism and are impressed by the 
value of an armed mass revolution as a means of obtaining independence. Most of them 
would [on release] work for this objective without pausing to consider what would 
happen after independence had been gained by such means. It also appears thai there will 
be no dearth of recruits to such a programme as there is much evidence to show that 
communist ideas are spreading both among terrorists in Bengal and among the Hindu 
student community, from which terrorist are generally recruited. 
United Provinces:- The main characteristics of terrorism in the U.P diring 1936 
have been a continued swing of terrorists towards Communism, and lack ot" effective 
leadership. Here, as elsewhere, it will become increasingly difficult to separate terrorism 
from Communism in future. One time terrorists have formed Communist organisations in 
Cawnpore [Kanpur], Lucknow, Allahabad, Banaras, Meerut and Jhansi. 
Delhi- Seditious and revolutionary posters continued to make their appearance in 
Delhi like "Lai Dhandora" (Red Proclamation), "Kranti ki Gunj" (Echo of Revolution), 
and "Philosophy of Dynamite". They were a mixture of a communism and terrorism and 
indicate the presence in Delhi of persons who must be regarded as terrorist suspects 
Source: [Home Poll, F.N. 43/37/36, National Archives of India, New Delhi 
APPENDIX IX 
EXTRACT FROM REPORT ON POLICE ADMINISTRATION IN THE PUNJAB 
FOR THE YEAR 1936 
Part VI-CID 
The ban on the main communist organisations failed to check the development 
and spread of communist doctrines. It had the effect of driving communist agitators into 
other organisations, some of which carried on their open activities in a more or less 
lawflil manner. The underground activities of the communist agents, however, (ontinued 
unabated. More trained workers arrived from abroad, some openly, some seeretly In 
dealing with these the Punjab Criminal Law Amendment Act proved of the greatest 
value. The greatest success of the year was the capture of Gurumukh Singh, a convict in 
the 1914-15 conspiracy cases, who escaped in 1923. a good deal of sympathy and 
sentiment has been wasted over this convict, chiefly by extremist Sikhs. They overlook 
the fact that he was an ordinary convict, who had since his escape been engaged in 
activities prejudicial to the peace and good order of the country. 
The alleged offenders are now standing their trial. The subversive activities of potential 
terrorists and active communists require the constant vigilance of the police. R(;laxation 
of this vigilance would undoubtedly lead to a revival of violent terrorist crime. 
Source: [Home Poll, F.N. 113/1937-Poll, National Archives of India, New Delhi] 
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APPENDIX: XII 
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BAN ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
INDIA 
The Notification:-
1. In 1934 the CPI, it's Committee, Sub-Committee, and branches were declared 
unlawful associations under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, on the ground 
that they constituted a danger to the public peace. 
Reasons: 
2. The reasons for this action were briefly that the Meerut Conspiracy Case haci proved 
that the Communist Party in India was a revolutionary party with the avowed object of 
overthrowing the existing order of society and bringing about India's independence by 
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means of a violent revolution, seeking to secure this object by mass revolutionai y action, 
strikes, demonstrations, etc. culminating in general strikes and armed insurrection 
Evidence had been accumulated to show that the Communist Party was re-forming on a 
new and more ambitious scale, and that attempts were again being made by communists 
in various parts of India to secure control over workers' organisations and to organise a 
combined workers' and peasants' revolutionary movement under communist leadership 
In view of these facts, the Central Government recognised the necessity of taking action 
not only against the Communist Party, but also against its subsidiary organisations 
Government Intention: 
3. The Central Government intention was to give a law in declaring war on Communism 
in India's root and branches to show to the country at large that there was no intention of 
temporizing with the forces of communism in India. 
Government's Policy; 
4. The Central Government recognised at the time that, apart from the psychological 
effect, the ban would act as a deterrent by obstructing and impeding communist activity 
in India in forcing the movement underground, and thereby preventing it from developing 
it into the open mass revolutionary movement which communism in its later stages aims 
to become in order to succeed. It was in fact not so much the immediate activities of the 
communists as the ultimate object which led to the Communist Party in India being 
declared unlawful. 
In brief, the ban was imposed because experiences had conclusively shown that the 
ordinary law was inadequate to control communist activity and because proscription was 
considered more warranted by circumstances than special legislation and calculated to 
succeed without resort to frequent or protracted legal proceedings. 
The effect of the ban: 
5. The ban has achieved its purpose of preventing communism in India from spreading 
into an organised mass movement...the Communist Party has largely as a result of the 
ban been disorganized and its policies discredited. 
Present Position: 
6. It is necessary to quote from secret information to show that despite the Communist 
leaders' attempt to create an atmosphere in which the Communist Party may be regarded 
as a legal organisation, no longer consisting of international revolutionaries but patriotic 
nationalists, communistic designs remain unahered and are to quote the recent words of 
one Hon'ble Minister: "to use the Congress for their own ends which was nothing short 
of the complete destruction of the existing social and economic system in the interests of 
what they are pleased to call Communism". The issue could not be better stated than it 
was by the Hon'ble Minister in a leading Congress province earlier this year when 
replying to debate. 
Conclusion: 
7. The withdrawal of the ban at the present, or any fijture stage, would be tantan^iount to a 
truce with the forces of Communism in India against which the Central Gov^ernment 
declared war in unequivocal terms in the notification of 1934. the ban on the Communist 
Party equally with the Sea Custom Act notification prohibiting the importation of 
Communist propaganda into India is designed to protect the ignorant masses in India 
from being misled by the evil influence of the communism. Communism is not only a 
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creed: It is a plan of campaign. The method of enforcement is as much a part of the 
Communist faith as the doctrine itself 
Source: [Home Poll, F.N. 7/5/39, National Archives of India, New Delhi] 
APPENDIX: XUI 
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